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SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

WESTERN MEDIA: LOCAL INTERESTS AND BEYOND

Richard Mayne
Norman Podhoretz
Jorgen Schleimann
Jean-François Revel
Jean-Claude Casanova
Paul Lendvai
Melvin J. Lasky
Antxon Sarasqueta
P. & Z. Drakopoulos
Cornelia Gerstenmaier

SOVIET ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Burnett Bolloten
Marian Leighton
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On the Role of Clichés and "Chain-Thinking"*

Melvin J. Lasky

*"**Ketten-Denker**:– Einem, der viel gedacht hat, erscheint jede neue Gedanke, den er hört oder liest, sofort in Gestalt einer Kette."*

Friedrich Nietzsche

*"**The Chain-Thinker** . . . is the man who thinks a lot and therefore thinks every new notion which he hears about, or reads about, is yet another link in the same chain."*

MY general subject is the power of the cliché, and I want to consider it in the double sense of its meaning. On the one hand, the influence in international affairs and world politics—for good or bad—of certain individual prejudices, attitudes, and misperceptions. On the other hand, the influence of the particular cliché itself—such clichés have power to shape or to determine diplomatic relations between states and may even be occasions for important turning-points in world affairs. For we are all, each of us, infinitely endowed with a capacity to be nasty about our neighbours—the British are supercilious and the French are arrogant; the Italians are clowns and the Germans rude and crude; the Swiss are boring, the Hungarians sly, the Poles at once courageous and chaotic, and the Russians are cruel, if soulful (and even mystical) primitives—and, to go a little further afield, the Chinese are cunning; the Japanese automatons; and the Indians untrustworthy—not to mention that the Americans are naive, simple-minded, inexperienced, good-natured but badly-behaved, rich but profligately wasteful, strong in muscle and energy but weak in subtlety and wisdom. . . . No, these are not sticks and stones to break our bones.

None of these platitudes is true—or completely true—but my general thesis is not that when these commonplaces or prejudices or resentments are widely held then there is immediate cause for general despair and hopelessness; that peace is endangered, international commerce threatened, culture overshadowed by all manner of disturbances ranging from mean misunderstandings to organized boycott. My main argument will be on behalf of the absolute intellectual necessity to make distinctions—to distinguish between the disagreeable cliché which is casual, passing, and (for all its falseness) basically harmless—and the

* In November 1985 the European Association for Cultural Affairs (London), the Institute for Contemporary Studies (San Francisco) and *Encounter* magazine sponsored a special meeting in London of European and American editors. We publish below some of the papers presented at this conference on "Disrupted Dialogue."

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cliché which has deep roots in the soil of vicious and aggressive character, which is systematically cultivated, which is part and parcel not of vague envy and humdrum resentments but of an ideology, a movement, a political programme or an official foreign policy. Once my first argument is accepted, then the second argument follows, namely, that world politics—with its cold wars and hot wars, its crisis-ridden diplomatic confrontations, and its impassioned conflicts of flags, languages, ethnicity, and life-styles—is not a simple and direct reflection of such subjective forces. We may repine as *bien-pensants*, as tender-minded children of the Enlightenment, that not all of the rest of mankind rises to combine accurate perception with generosity of spirit. But we must not be misled by the sentimentalism of the well-meaning poet who went so far as to write, in a famous line, "We must love one another, or die . . ." (W. H. Auden). Lovelessness—among peoples, classes, races, religions—is a disheartening phenomenon; but it does not lead inevitably to "dying," to the deaths of wars, crusades, revolutions and holocausts. In other words (if I may put it in this way), clichés are not cannonballs.

Let me offer an example or two, which might bring us closer to more topical aspects.

EARLIER this month a young thug named Kevin Whitton was jailed for life by the Central Criminal Court of London. The crime in question occurred in a pub in Chelsea, where I sometimes go for a drink, on the Kings Road, a short walk from my house. Whitton and his cohorts went on a rampage after a lost Saturday afternoon football match; they marched in, shouting "War, war, war!" They sported a uniform of leather jackets, jeans, and heavy boots. When they stormed out minutes later, the American manager of the bar was close to death. One thug shouted: "You bloody Americans—coming here taking English jobs! . . ." (*Daily Telegraph*, 9 Nov. 1985).

Should this incident be cause for serious alarm on the part of students of transatlantic relations? Or was there some comfort to be taken from the fact that the entire weight of the British law courts was thrown in to redress the balance? After all, the life-sentence was the most severe judgment we have yet had in a case of football hooliganism.

Perhaps such local misdemeanours have little to do with international altercations. Let me cite an incident of a few years back, involving the *New York Times*, West-German foreign policy, and European–American relations; nothing less. It involved the most important American newspaper, and the most important article on Germany by its chief foreign correspondent, summing up his experiences after some five years in the *Bundesrepublik*. I won't go into his peculiar impressions that no German newspaper ever quotes anybody exactly, or that German nationalism is on the march again, or that Germans regrettably do not take the cinema to be part of culture, or that the German-language sentence structure is still ridiculous in putting its verbs at the end. No

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foreign correspondent ever finds himself "at home" in foreign parts. But he recorded one grave and important moment, when accompanying the then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. As John Vinocour writes (*New York Times Magazine*, 8 Aug. 1982, p. 25):

> . . . and I heard him say something I thought honorable and fine. The Germans had to do something about integrating their 4.65 million foreign workers, especially the Turks, he said. Their welfare in a country that had a history of intolerance was a moral priority, a question of national pride.
>
> Dead air in the audience. Nothing. He looked around. 'On the other hand,' Schmidt said, 'four million is enough.' Cheers. 'It's not easy for Germans who live in apartment houses and who don't like the smell of garlic to put up with it, and even have lambs slaughtered in the hallway.' Louder cheers, big laughs. And finally: 'We're not a job-placement agency for the entire world!' An ovation. . . .

In the balance of American–German relations (not to mention the scales weighing the German–*Gastarbeiter* relations), I would make the following reading of this.

I can understand the indignant reactions of many in Bonn. This is held to constitute dangerous "anti-Germanism" in the American press. If it continues, it could possibly imperil sound and sober American–German relations; for if the Americans are persuaded that race prejudice is on the march again in the new German *Reich*—when they, the Americans, are putting up, with so much generous tolerance, the millions of Spanish-speaking garlic-cooking Mexican *Gastarbeiter*—then would there not be a serious crack in the sense of spiritual and emotional solidarity between transatlantic allies?

Nor is this all. This unfortunate moral break-up would be based on an untruth—namely, the implication drawn by many, if not most, *New York Times* readers that the Germans are "once again" exhibiting their hatred for foreigners and that they are on the verge of a vicious, illiberal *Austreibung* of helpless and homeless millions.

But didn't the audience applaud? It did. Isn't there widespread dislike for strangers who have odd customs and irritating habits? There is. Still, it remains wrong to deduce from this—a very unsurprising form of "ethnic prejudice" which, in one form or another, you find in every Western (or Eastern) community—that an ugly racist catastrophe is about to happen. Such "ethnic prejudices" are never to be condoned. But their existence doesn't immediately and directly lead to virulence or violence.

The very reverse misperception and misunderstanding, fed perhaps by even more ideological eagerness to convert the regrettable into the horrible, was evident in the remarks made by Günter Grass in New York when he announced his horror at the "incipient fascism" in the evidence of American racism. No doubt about it, whites and blacks have their tension; US Protestants, Catholics and Jews don't co-exist, not everywhere and at all times, easily or happily; new immigrants from South-East Asia and Latin America have their humiliations. These are

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sad and dispiriting phenomena by themselves. They become inflammatory factors in international relations when they are sloganized, when they become part of an ideology which says America is "racist," is becoming "neo-fascist," and is therefore to be treated like a pariah in the Western community of friendly and allied nations.

Grass and Vinocour meet here—unwittingly—on a common ground of dangerous cliché. A speech at a literary conference in Manhattan, a newspaper dispatch from Western Europe to the *New York Times*—these passing phenomena incorporate the "power of the cliché" in its serious and most troublesome aspect. It represents not just another press interview, or another newspaper article. It fits ideologically into a disastrous context of disintegrating relations in a grand alliance which has maintained the peace in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Distrust is the first step on the road to disaster.

DOES Europe need America? Does America need Europe? Never in the last 40 years has the discussion of this central problem of foreign policy, involving the two transatlantic elements in the Western Alliance and the non-communist community, been so distorted and disoriented by mistrust, sloganized argumentation, ideological over-simplification, and general impatience and short-temper.

Why do the differences and divisions seem to be mounting? Why does a mood of mutual hostility appear to be on the rise? As I see it, *relatively small deviations* of attitude and policy have been twisted into major altercations over both military defence strategy and East–West trade. Whole areas of *common ground* (alarm over Afghanistan and Poland, recognition of the Soviet military build-up, etc.) fail to appear important enough to maintain unity. The leaders in the Kremlin, new and old, have publicly indicated how pleased they are. The friends of the United States in the UK (and throughout Europe) have never been so disorientated and dispirited.

Can one say the *media* in both America and Europe are basically responsible for this transatlantic crisis? Only to a certain extent. The major part of the responsibility, in my view, lies with the short-sighted official leadership of the last 10 to 15 years, both here and in Washington.

American foreign policy on occasion tends to be obsessive, concerned only with West Berlin, or with Cuba, or with Vietnam and Cambodia, with El Salvador, Nicaragua, or the hostages held in Iran; not since the sovereign days of Dean Acheson has it had a calm, well-balanced approach to world politics, rarely neglecting one issue and area while paying urgent attention to another. Western Europe, secure under NATO protection, was over long years taken for granted. The public opinion polls throughout Western Europe, with minor fluctuations, continually showed that the substantial majority still felt America to be the necessary indispensable partner in Western security, and saw in the Soviet Union the main threat to its present peace and freedom. This remains so.

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But what reaches Americans through the media is the news, highly exaggerated and badly analyzed, of the possible defection of their British, French and German allies—who now appear to be eager to do more and more prosperous business with Moscow, and show themselves to be more afraid of the Pershing and Cruise missiles (which the then German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt asked the Americans to supply to rectify the dangerous imbalance of forces), than they are of the Soviet SS-20s, *already* in place and pointed directly at *them*. The quick-tempered reaction thus becomes: if the Europeans do not need us, we do not need them! If they think they can maintain their way of life, with the liberties to think and travel and trade, and work as they please, under the shadow of such an intimidating Soviet superiority a hundred miles or so to the East, then let them stumble and fall over these illusions. American public opinion is as yet rather far from this drastic conclusion, but the media has put it luridly into the foreground of the picture. It cultivates additional distrust, and brings disaster nearer.

Finally, the ethics of the neo-isolationist position are troublesome. On the one hand, its anti-communist impulse leads to eloquent and quite sincere warnings of the dire threat to precious civilized values from a Sovietized (or, if you will, even a "Finlandized") Western heartland; on the other, it petulantly and impatiently gives signals that it soon intends to withdraw, indeed to abandon and altogether wash its hands of an alliance that fails to measure up to the high and grave moral challenge.

European public opinion has been assaulted by the mirror images of this divisiveness. On the one hand, the Americans become—not "anti-German" or "anti-European"—but, rather, world-weary of their responsibilities and commitments. On the other hand, the West-Europeans—at least in opinion-making ideological, intellectual, editorial and other *avant-garde* circles—seem to be searching for a new and different road to protect what they suddenly see as their special "national interests." The chatter grows about nationalism, even neutralism, or new military and security arrangements. America comes to be viewed as untrustworthy, and irresponsible foolish writers and orators prate on endlessly about a "Hollywood President." Militant elite-minority movements, without a mass base in the population or even in any of the major political parties, appear to be arrogating to themselves a veto power over the continuation of traditional European–American cooperation.

The media, as I say, did not create this divisiveness, even if it is in print and on the TV screen daily, deepening it in tendentious ways which I find professionally as well as intellectually indefensible. The first fault lies in policy and politics. President Carter, following the lead of the Nixon–Kissinger regime, exaggerated the possibilities of a genuine *détente*, and he did not wake up until 1979 to the fact that Soviet armament was busily exploiting the lull to fearful advantage. Chancellor Schmidt became suddenly aware of the imbalance which would force the *Bundesrepublik* into a position where political blackmail would be difficult to resist, a

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totalitarian pressure from the East which in the 1980s and '90s might throw a shadow of creeping "Finlandization" over *Mittel-Europa*; and he pleaded urgently for a *Nachrüstung* (a useful German word, alas not available in English, denoting the belated catching-up quality of the military effort). But he was unable to maintain himself in power, and was clearly unable to carry his own party with him to accept and defend the traditional post-war defence posture in Western Europe vis-à-vis Soviet imperialism: namely, the *collective security* of all in the West, Germans and Americans alike. This, and nothing else, is the essential "national interest," in this case the "German interest"; and it was these German interests that were defended by the West German Chancellors from Adenauer to Erhard, Brandt and Schmidt. Whether the new Chancellor and the whole European *Zeitgeist* can recover the position remains to be seen.

There can be no peace in Europe (or, I am afraid, anywhere else) without a clear-eyed and unflagging policy of *deterrence* to discourage ambitious and adventurous forces from attempts to seize and extend power. There can be no peace without an obvious and convincing balance of military forces. Armies and weapons are expensive things; they are also ugly and dangerous. But more ugly and dangerous is the possible collapse of the post-war system of peace in Europe. It will also prove to be more expensive.

This is, alas, something of a minority view in the enlightened circles of Western journalism. When I watch current affairs programmes on European TV, or read some of our best and famous weekly news- and picture-magazines, from *Der Spiegel* to *The Observer*, from *Le Monde* to *Stern* and the *International Herald Tribune*, I almost feel I have become (present company excepted) a minority of one. I confess I am no less lonely when I read the editorials in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. As I have said, the "anti-Americanism" of one matches the "anti-Europeanism" of the other. The policies of peace-through-unilateral disarmament—of not tempting or provoking the strong by showing yourself to be weak—are delusory; and the media presentation of this cause is politically one-sided, intellectually untenable, and morally ambiguous. The West had already had the experience of blind, if well-meaning, pacifist movements who talked only of peace and helped to prepare the way to war. They were wrong in the England and America of the 1930s, and they are wrong today. They were too mentally short-sighted to grasp the long view of how wars actually happen, of how and when the war-makers are encouraged to set their military machines into motion. They were too politically naive to understand the imperialist nature of an aggressive totalitarian system: the Nazi system then, the Soviet system today. Such voices obfuscate, not clarify—and make urgent the need for debate, discussion and controversy as part of a larger struggle of ideas. At the moment, if I am touched by that very fashionable emotion of *Angst*, it is the anxiety that peace-mongering might prove to be the greatest danger to peace in Europe today. In any

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case, by its one-sided agitation against Western weapons and Western defence efforts it is dividing the Europeans and Americans from each other; and it is imperilling an alliance which has, in point of fact, proved that it can *deter*, and by *deterrence* succeed in preserving a peace in Europe which has reigned for longer than we have ever known in our war-torn history.

I do not mean to give the impression that I have come to "cry havoc." As I say, most clichés are harmless platitudes. For 30 years now I have, in my sleepless late-night hours watched the late (and the late-late) shows on Anglo-American television, showing with monotonous regularity old films about the Second World War, where the Germans all march around in *SS*-uniforms, and gallant *maquis* in the resistance save the cause of freedom in the last reel. The Second World War is fought over and over again, every night on the television screen; and each time, unfailingly, unsurprisingly, the evil Germans lose and the gallant Allies (together with the heroic Russians[1]) win the famous victory. Is this worth getting excited about? I doubt it, and indeed deny it.

Some Germans do get excited about the matter. The other day a newspaper reported from Strasbourg that one German parliamentarian wanted to put through a resolution which would somehow ban such "provocative" propaganda, and thus help "understanding" between the post-war Germans, who don't after all go strutting around in Hitler's tunics these days, and the rest of the world. He is welcome to his campaign.

For my own part I reckon these images of the past to attest to the powerlessness of clichés. Consider this. They have been exhibited on the screens before millions for almost four post-war decades; and they have influenced by not one whit any decisive moment of post-war history: not the decision to help ruined Germany with the Marshall Plan; nor to allow it sovereignty with a new *Republik*; nor to risk war with the Russians by feeding a blockaded West Berlin via an air-lift over the Soviet zone of East Germany; nor to welcome its national military forces as equal partners in a grand Atlantic alliance; nor any of a dozen decisive economic, cultural, and diplomatic initiatives which were translated into reality—without at any point being put at risk by the lingering images of the wartime propaganda and horrors of the night before. Harmless clichés all . . . and no ground for excitement!

In the course of a short talk it would take us too far afield to consider in detail why this should be so. Part of the explanation lies in the paradoxical element in the social and emotional life of national political communities. This will always upset and confound the simple-minded

[1] This was underlined in a recent repeat showing on British TV of the Hollywood film version of Ambassador Joseph E. Davies' notorious *Mission to Moscow* (sardonically called at the time "Submission to Moscow") in which a genial "Uncle Joe" Stalin explains how brave the new post-war world is to be.

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who, in their ideological inexperience, jump quickly and happily to the worst conclusions. They are always "crying wolf." They also see the huckstering worst in modern advertising campaigns, and are convinced that the consumer is the helpless victim of every new image of the advertising manipulator. Images, slogans, and even the most eloquent salesmanship, can fail, do go awry, often turn people *off* rather than *on*. Another part of the explanation is that in certain areas of Western civilization—would that it were universal!—*there has been a taming of certain historic emotions*. Capitalism no longer allows primitive industrial exploitation; nationalism no longer features manic chauvinism; international banking, trade, and investment are no longer accompanied by colonialism and imperialism. Similarly, the natural insistence of communities and nations on certain features of their historic identity does not necessarily lead to racism and repression. It may induce a vague feeling of confident well-being; and it makes, more often than not, only for more or less harmless clichés.

Of course, old peoples and cultures do not forget their most essential historic experiences. For some Israelis two thousand years are but yesterday, when they think of Zion, of Judea and Samaria. But in our transatlantic civilization many of the most tragic yesterdays have become dim, and are almost forgotten. Who remembers in the England of today, in the recent year of the Luther anniversary, the historic blasts against "Teutonic criminality" in the polemics of both King Henry VIII and Sir Thomas More? Or the French conviction in 1914 that Catholic France had to overcome a Protestant Germany's Hunnish heartland? There is, I know, danger here of "history-lessness," of a mindless amnesia taking grip of new generations who are led to believe that nothing of importance ever happened long ago, that history began this morning. Still, on the plane of the peaceful and more understanding national attitudes—as they have characterized a dozen national states who regularly, in the past, used to devastate each other—in the phenomenon of forgiving if-not-forgetting is something which I have found in the last three decades to be surprising, gratifying, and altogether positive.

A final example, before we lose our specific theme in historical generalities. Even the mass media, for all their opportunism, superficiality, and salaciousness, respond in their way to the peculiar and progressive pattern of cliché-mongering which I have been describing. A few years back a German film had its American première—Bucheim's story of *The Boat*. This is what one New York correspondent wrote about the Anglo-American reaction (*Daily Mail*, 20 Feb. 1982, p. 6):

> . . . These are Germans that we have never seen before. Not the skulking, treacherous, cold-eyed, Master-race, U-boat predators the cinema has accustomed us to. They have fear and compassion and they weep, and they not only sing British songs, they are contemptuous of their leaders and admire ours.

Art does not always imitate reality; but, if we wait long enough, it may well catch up with it.

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In spite of a slight note of moral optimism and political encouragement which has crept into my remarks, I am not offering any simple analysis or confident generalizations. The media sometimes leads; but the media also follows. Sometimes it can contribute to the poisoning of relations between peoples, races, religions and nations; but not infrequently by its very trivialization it can also help to render harmless the exacerbations which will always characterize differences in the way different communities speak, work, eat, marry, pray, and dress. Strangers may be disliked, and this may constitute an insult to their dignity. But for all the hard and alien feelings abroad in the land—in *this* one, not unlike in *all* the others in *our* corner of the world (and I am not speaking of Assam, or Cambodia, or South Africa or the blood-soaked frontiers of Iran and Iraq)—there have developed sufficient reserves of Western or Euro-American political culture, mixing various elements of enlightenment, shame and guilt feelings, indifference, prudence, and sheer self-interest in communal peace, to obviate an estrangement that would lead to the parting of the ways.

THE practice of Media Critique calls for the art of Cliché Critique. No understanding of past history or present politics is possible without the most rigorous application of not only an intellectual technique of subjecting every platitude and commonplace which passes for "well-known truths" about post-war Europe and America, and about the so-called "national character" of peoples generally, to sceptical challenge, but is also impossible without a wry and rueful sense of paradox, of what Karl Kraus was referring to when he cynically remarked that "*Alles ist wahr, und auch das Gegenteil.* (Everything is true, and also its opposite, also the contrary.) . . ."

Is it, then, true, as I read in last week's *Spiegel* (or was it this week's *Stern*, or perhaps even *The Guardian* or *Le Monde*) that America is "young," "naive," "inexperienced . . ."? Actually in many respects the situation is the reverse; and it surprises many a visitor from the Old World who considers the New World only to be a superficial transatlantic extension of their own old civilization. Yet the Bonn Republic or the Italian or the truncated Austrian Republic, as one doesn't need reminding), are all *new* constitutional constructions, quite inexperienced by comparison in the ways of law and civic practice. The record of the US Supreme Court would appear to be as time-worn in its traditions and wisdom as Plato and Aristotle; certainly the two hundred years since the *Federalist Papers* were written record an unbroken era of a *Rechtstaat*, occasionally reformed by amendments, which still functions admirably.

Out of the Anglo-Saxon tradition which gave to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America a grounding in Magna Carta, in the ideas of John Locke and James Harrington, came a "special relationship" which linked the USA and the UK in a shared community of interest. Soon the special relationships multiplied. For all the occasional contretemps, America and France more often than not entertained republican feelings

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of kinship which always betrayed signs of that old Jeffersonian sentimentalism to the effect that every American had two countries: his own and France. And now in our own day, some 40 post-war years have evidently seen the emergence of yet another "special relationship": with the Bonn Federal Republic. Is it then true that the Americans and the Germans represent a special solidarity of (as I read in one journal) "a White and Christian capitalism," deriving strength even from their common ethnic origins? I doubt this, and would ask you to share my distaste for this kind of pseudo-thesis. It is, of course, true—and no seductively false argument is without its fragile basis in real fact—that America in some ways can be taken to be "very German." That is to say, in the statistical sense that more Americans can trace their ancestry to Germany than to any other country.[2]

Statistics do not lie, but one may well ask how much light they shed. Here, to borrow the remark of a famous wit, "one is using statistics as a drunkard uses lamp-posts—for support rather than illumination. . . ."

I refrain from further polemic against such foolhardy quantifications. Americans and Europeans are neither good nor bad, but for thinking, which makes them so. American and European history and politics exhibit no single isolated strand of hope or despair, except for the stigmatism which perceives it all in a blur. The mass media constitute the natural and unnatural breeding-ground for almost all current attitudes, biases, sentiments, illusions, delusions, and other chimaerae. Each of these has to be clinically examined for its portion of ascertainable truth and hoary mythology, for its slight or serious elements of malignancy. Throughout one must never lose sight of the fact that all of our generalizations are false . . . including, possibly, this one.

MY final remark is a more personal one. I have lived half of my life in America and half in Europe, and almost all of it involved in one way or another in so-called "transatlantic relations." I am not alarmed at the persistent ignorance which still prevails. It is difficult enough to understand one's own people and one's own history without demanding comprehension of foreigners, their ideas and true identities. I remain unmoved and unexcited by the impervious mass of clichés circulating about "*Yankees*" and "*Limies*," "*Krauts*," "*Frogs*," and "*Wops*." I have been encouraged in the 40 post-war years that out of the murderous bitterness of World Wars that decimated tens of millions, has emerged (at least in the West) among a dozen democratic nations a civil sense of general sympathy and solidarity.

But what I find depressing and dispiriting and dangerous is the re-emergence of certain not-so harmless clichés in the form of ideological passion. This is where the platitude crosses the Rubicon to propaganda.

[2] The last US census reported that nearly 29 per cent of the American population were of at least part German ancestry. (The Irish formed 24·4 per cent, followed by the English with 22·3 per cent.) Reported in *The Times*, London, 12 May 1982.

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Here is the point when the prejudice becomes vicious, the commonplace becomes a weapon, and mindless phrases begin to draw blood. I can only ask the cliché-mongers in our media to condescend to a little self-criticism. I can only plead with those who think that America does not need Europe, or that Europe does not need America—that even a strong power could not afford to cut itself loose from friendly allies into a "splendid isolation," or that a small Western or Mediterranean or Central European community could survive in prosperity and freedom without the friendship and protection of a democratic superpower—I can only plead with those people, in my country and yours, to think again.

We may well be on a slippery slope. Superficial sentiments slide into dangerous slogans; passing intellectual foolishness turns into political folly. As Nietzsche once reminded us, we live in the age of the *Ketten-Denker*,[3] the "chain-thinkers" . . . people who think a lot and therefore think every new notion which they hear about, or read about, to be yet another link in the same chain . . . Let us put *chain-thinking*, and its linked clichés, slogans and platitudes, behind us.

[3] The original German text (as quoted in my motto) is to be found in Nietzsche, *Werke*, (ed.), Karl Schlechta, Vol. I, p. 864.

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The Electric Parish Pump: Reflections on "Our Growing Provincialization?"

Richard Mayne

ONE of the problems of new technology is that it changes our expectations. In 1985, the two questions that go-ahead friends most frequently asked me were "How do you manage without a micro-wave?" and "Why don't you get a word-processor?" The answers, respectively, were "The way I did before they came on the market" and "I've got one—between my ears." But the smug retorts left me, at least, uneasy. I remembered similar rejoinders, years ago, to those who asked why I didn't have a pocket calculator. And now? I *think* I'd be lost without one, because I've become accustomed to checking bank statements, working out true interest rates, and turning absolute figures into percentages, with my fingertips instead of my brain.

Some day, therefore, I may rely on cooking meals in minutes and transposing whole paragraphs of impeccably typed prose. Whether the meals or the prose will suffer is irrelevant: what interests me now is the way in which gadgets can create what we perceive as needs. "Is your journey really necessary?" asked a Second World War slogan in Britain. "Is it possible?" is the current counterpart, with a "fixed link" across the Channel promising to halve London–Paris travel times. Once it is, we shall begin to regard it as essential. In the same way, foreign holidays and all manner of consumer durables have become "necessities" for millions of Europeans, making those without them feel resentful and deprived.

To point this out is not to decry erstwhile "luxuries" or to yearn for a worthier past without television, video-cassette recorders, micro-computers, central heating, or inside lavatories. "The simple life" was always complex, uncomfortable, and labour-intensive. No sensible person nowadays would want to live like a mediaeval king. But there is a case for being selective about the amenities now on offer—and for distrusting the future-snobbery implicit in some attitudes to technological progress.

We may imagine that we've shed the naivety of a century ago, when dazzling new inventions caused widespread blindness to man's limitations, and *hubris* obscured the lessons of *Candide*. We smile at the bombast of Edwardian plumbing, boasting its achievements with shining external pipework and euphuistic name-plates; we mildly deprecate the scientific optimism of H. G. Wells. Yet some salute the vastly greater conceit of the Beaubourg building, and many still cherish implicitly Wellsian illusions. "If we can put a man on the moon, why can't we find a cure for cancer or the common cold?" Fairground logic of this quality is common form among lobbyists seeking "resources" for research.

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Equally, although it's a commonplace that man's political and social development usually lags well behind his technical achievements, we nevertheless tend to expect advances in gadgetry to improve human behaviour. Better communications, we assume, will mean better communication. This, to my mind, is as fallacious as the old saw that "Travel broadens the mind."

IN the West, and in Western Europe in particular, communications have been revolutionized since the Second World War. The obvious instance is telecommunications; but transport and tourism have also been transformed. No one who saw the physical state of Europe's roads, railways, and waterways in 1945 will need reminding how urgent and overwhelming was the task of sheer reconstruction. By the mid-1950s, it had been completed: but by then, too, user expectations had changed. One in 25 of all West Europeans owned a car, and the number on the roads was increasing by two million a year. One response was the building of motorways. By 1983, Germany had nearly 8,000 kilometres of motorway in service, France nearly 6,000—just ahead of Italy, Britain nearly half that amount. Even tiny Luxemburg had 58 kilometres. Europe was enmeshed in a network rivalling the railways. But was it more united? Most of the networks were as national as the railways themselves had been.

These too had been physically rebuilt in the 10 years after the war. In the mid-1950s, rail traffic was still growing, but the growth was slowing down. By 1957, only the Dutch and the Swiss railways were able to break even without subsidies. To compete, the railways built the Trans-Europe-Express and, later, high-speed trains. From most points of view—energy, economy, ecology—they were preferable to "artisan" transport by road. But the bad years had eaten away at the railways' infrastructure, curbing or even closing local services now eclipsed by the roads.

The biggest transport revolution was in Europe's airways, which by 1984 accounted for 170 billion passenger-kilometres. Here, too, the effects of new technology were ambivalent and paradoxical. Air transport hugely facilitated cross-frontier contacts—between governments, officials, businessmen, and trade unionists, as well as private citizens. But national airline monopolies and cartel arrangements kept schedules rigid and prices artificially high: 38.38 pence per mile on a one-way trip from London to Brussels, compared with 5.6 pence per mile on a one-way flight from London to Los Angeles. Crossing Europe was expensive: crossing the Atlantic and the United States was cheap.

Undeterred, however, tourists travelled. By 1983, European tourists alone were supporting an industry whose annual turnover was more than $51 billion—nearly two per cent of Western Europe's Gross Domestic Product. In any one year, nearly 150 million West Europeans now travel abroad—almost as many as the combined populations of Britain, Germany, and France. One result has been increased domestic demand for food and drink from other European countries. Superficially, national

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differences of "life-style" seem to have been eroded. But how many prejudices and stereotypes have been eroded with them? As Charles Darwin recorded of himself, the human brain is adept at noting facts which confirm existing hypotheses, and ignoring those which refute them.

Most recently, telecommunications have become dramatically capable of forging links between countries. Direct telephone dialling within and across frontiers, "teleconference" facilities, facsimile transmission, and the "video-phone" have made possible far more rapid and intimate contact than was practicable even 20 years ago. As transport costs have risen, those of telecommunications have fallen. In France in 1970, for example, 40 litres of petrol cost the same as 140 basic telephone charging units: by 1980, they cost 260 units—approaching twice as much. Today, the information and communications industries provide more than one-third of the jobs within the European Community: but, despite the efforts of the European Commission, the new markets are still dominated by the United States and Japan, while in some sectors such as cellular radio systems the national governments have tended to compete with incompatible technology rather than combining to pool their resources.

This, of course, is what they notoriously did when establishing colour television, France adopting SECAM and Germany PAL. Today, with cable and satellite transmission making it possible to counteract the curvature of the earth's surface, "television without frontiers" in Europe is a technical possibility. However, copyright laws, advertising restrictions, censorship, libel, and national monopolies seem likely to delay such a development, and perhaps to prevent it altogether. Meanwhile, if the United States and other countries were to beam programmes by satellite to Europe, for political or commercial motives, many Europeans would be tempted to buy or build "dishes" to receive them, irrespective of national laws. "Wall-to-wall *Dallas*," the nightmare of at least one commentator, would then become even more of a reality than it is at present.

ENHANCED communications, then, have raised a number of hopes. Europe's motorway networks could provide the arteries of a truly common market. Her railways could minimize pollution, accidents, waste of energy, and further destruction of the countryside. Her airways could be freed. Tourism could promote international understanding. Telecommunications could be truly European. So could television. Without modern technology, who would have entertained such aspirations? With it, why do we fail to grasp what is within our reach?

Most of the answers can be summarized in the bromide already quoted: that politicians lag behind scientists and engineers. In 1985, the British House of Commons gave a laboratory demonstration of the cliché, by voting once again not to allow television in the House. But the specific reasons for our failure to profit from our own inventions are more than just an atavistic reluctance to see our habits disturbed.

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1. There is a general failure to look at problems in their entirety. Each national government sees its own segment. Each, for example, builds its own motorway network, creates its own railway system, owns or controls a national airline, organizes its own telecommunications, lays down at least the framework for its own radio and TV. Necessarily, and increasingly, there are contacts between the systems—the Paris–Brussels motorway, the Mont Blanc tunnel, the proposed cross-Channel "fixed link." There are "EUROP" wagon agreements on the railways, joint arrangements between airlines, telecommunications links, television co-productions, and exchanges of recordings. But only very seldom is there a conspectus and a common overall plan.

2. Governments and interest groups are not always in favour of open frontiers: hence their failure, by 1986, to have established the common market they undertook to open in 12 years from 1958. The new deadline for removing non-tariff barriers to trade is 1992. Veterans will mark their calendars, but in pencil, not ink.

3. Decisions which looked sensible at one time often turn out to have been wrong in the longer term, but too late to reverse them. One such is the running down of branch-line railways, most notably by Dr Beeching in Britain. In retrospect, this looks like well-meant vandalism. It has recently been suggested that one of the options for the cross-Channel "fixed link," if adopted now, would look irrevocably foolish in the future, when hovertrains may travel at 250 m.p.h.

4. Vested interests will always postpone the application of new technology which threatens them. The *locus classicus* is Fleet Street, where printers have long been largely superfluous, although not yet "redundant." The Channel ferries may—or may not—be another example. Car factories surely are, as they currently operate—churning out cheap but high-priced vehicles which kill, maim, pollute, and guzzle finite resources.

5. Monopolies—like power—tend to corrupt; and national monopolies more than others. In the days when air travel was still a comparative novelty, passengers were uncritical. Sucking their boiled sweets in imperfectly pressurized cabins, listening to piped music and the pilot's reassuring baritone, they were happy to fly with their national airline, at whatever price. Now, more blasé and facing post-oil-crisis costs, they are more eager to shop around. Where they shop is in bucket-shops—connived at by the airlines themselves. Monopolies indeed tend to corrupt.

6. National pride is self-defeating. By failing to concert their efforts in key aspects of technology, European governments have too often lost ground to the United States and Japan. The classic instance, two decades ago, was the French *Machines Bull*; but many others have followed. Television broadcasting by satellite threatens to be next. As with the air travel bucket-shops, as with CB radio, market forces will prevail: your or my refusal to let our elected servants tell us what we can and cannot watch will make nonsense of whatever laws may forbid private "dishes." When

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DBS starts in earnest, "dishes" will sprout like mushrooms, in every conceivable disguise. Good luck to them. But bad luck, in fact, for Europe—unless it gets there first.

FINALLY, however, if Europeans were to take the political and administrative steps that technology both makes possible and calls for—would the result be more than an electric parish pump? Would all this glittering hardware overcome our "growing provincialism," in Jean-Claude Casanova's phrase?

In two respects, I believe it could help to do so. The first is the slow, overall effect of better communications—and the expectations they arouse. "If we can dial each other direct and meet at an hour's notice, why can't we make common cause?" This too may be fairground logic; but if people believe it, they may gradually alter the way they behave. Even the Geneva summit, for all the question-marks hanging over it, suggested that personal contact had value.

Secondly, if Europe were able to establish its own "television without frontiers"—and if the product were both compelling and responsible—then it could begin to make us all less provincial. Not merely by opening our minds to each other, but by raising our eyes to the wider world. But I stress the word "could." Short of firm and brilliant control, Euro-television could all too easily become either didactic roughage or trivial *schlock*.

In the end, that is, hardware will never be enough. We may whisk our citizens around like marionettes; we may chatter to each other; we may watch the same games, plays, and contests on ever-more-compatible TV: but without understanding it can all be a tinkling symbol of futility. And by "understanding" I mean two things.

One is purely linguistic. Tourism, and television too without expensive adjuncts, can reinforce parochialism if everyone is resolutely monoglot. In countries whose languages are widely spoken (e.g. Britain and France) language teaching tends to be poor. It may even be an early victim of any economy "cuts." If we want our children to be less parochial than their parents, we should insist that they learn languages, and at an early age. They learn their own tongues brilliantly by the Berlitz method: why not at least one other at the same time?

But, secondly, linguistic understanding requires semantic back-up. "False friends" are not the only pitfalls in international understanding: ignorance of others' assumptions, deafness to nuance and connotation, lack of grasp of geography or history from another's point of view—any of these can lead to mutual incomprehension. We need to read each other's newspapers, schoolbooks, novels, comic books, science fiction, before we can see the world through each other's eyes. Even intellectuals, save at such conferences as this, have scandalously little dialogue with each other at the levels on which it is needed. How many regularly read other countries' intellectual magazines? How many British students of the European Community feel the full force of French indignation at

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attempts to "betray" the Common Agricultural Policy or rewrite the Rome Treaty's budgetary rules? How many Frenchmen understand in their bones, as Anthony Eden once put it, British indignation at selling cheap butter to the Russians or imposing financial arrangements that are "unfair"? How many Italians know what it is like to be a *Berliner*? How many Germans know what it is like to be Portuguese?

These are realms where politics and economics can hardly help us. Quite seriously, the true remedies for "our growing parochialism" are imagination, literature, and art.

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A Dodecalogue

Jean-François Revel

THIS session bears the title "Challenge and Response." I think that, on this last afternoon of our conference, we are beginning to understand something of the challenge. I shall now therefore make a few suggestions as to our possible response. I have been given 12 minutes. I shall make 12 suggestions, one per minute; a kind of tentative dodecalogue of how to face the totalitarian challenge.

1. *We must make better use of the knowledge we have acquired of the communist system.* No system has been as thoroughly analyzed as the communist system, but still democracies continue to deal with it as if we knew next to nothing about the way it works. The knowledge is there, but in most cases we do not use it.

2. This is a utopian proposal: *we should make an elementary course on "how a communist power works" compulsory* for Western and Third World leaders and journalists. Thus we could avoid certain misinterpretations, such as, for instance, the mistaking of a succession in the Kremlin (which is a purely biological phenomenon) for a political phenomenon.

3. *In East-West negotiations we should never make preliminary concessions*—this has been the usual method of negotiation during the so-called *détente* period. The art of negotiating has always been, after all, to obtain at least as much as you give away, possibly even a little more. This has been the diplomat's basic principle of conduct from the neolithic age until the beginning of the *détente* era.

4. After negotiations, democracies should be *adamant over compliance and verification.* One of the American negotiators of the 1972 ABM treaty once told me: "When we signed the treaty, we thought: 'If the Soviets violate the treaty, they know we shall cancel it.' But what the Soviets knew even better was that they would violate the treaty and that we would not cancel it." The same thing applies to the Helsinki agreements.

5. *We must never allow the very normal differences of opinion amongst allies to be exploited by a totalitarian power* in order to create deep divisions between democracies, as happened, for example, over the neutron bomb, Euromissiles, SDI, and the Siberian gas pipeline. The latest crisis, in Poland, originally a crisis in the East, thus became a crisis also in the West!

6. *We must make the fight against Soviet ideological warfare and disinformation considerably more efficient.* A democracy is committed to freedom of speech only for its own citizens. We have no obligation whatsoever to give Messrs Zagladin, Arbatov or Ortega access to our

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press and media, unless our spokesmen can have equivalent access to the Soviet TV and the front page of *Pravda*. We are under no obligation to perpetuate the imbalance which allows the Soviets to penetrate the democratic system, to influence our public opinion and to explain nicely to us, directly or through surrogates, that we should commit suicide.

7. Along the same lines, we should *never allow Soviet leaders to interfere with our electoral campaigns*. Much less should our candidates rush to the Kremlin to ask for the blessing of the Politburo. I must say that we have seen some rather shameful initiatives in that context.

8. We should practise a *total implementation of linkage* and we should deal directly with Moscow, not with its surrogates—or at least deal with both at the same time. We did not do this, for instance, in Lebanon or Chad.

9. We must remember that there is no specific *North-South relationship* or dialogue or economic order that is not also involved in the East-West confrontation—at least, the USSR understands it that way. The concept of specific North-South relations has been coined for the exclusive use of the East. The so-called "new formation order," one of UNESCO's masterpieces, was conceived with the sole purpose of expelling the Western press from the Third World. Thus, the division of labour between East and West would have meant economic responsibilities to the West, political power to the East.

10. *We must have a more assertive economic and political approach towards the Third World,* knowing, of course, that there is no Third World as such, except when it is seen in the context of democratic capitalism as opposed to totalitarian collectivism.

11. *We should use the crises and problems of the communist system,* just as they exploit and try to aggravate ours, in order to weaken their system, instead of helping them to solve their problems.

12. *We should not rely upon the spontaneous collapse of the Soviet system.* We must, of course, study, follow and take into consideration the internal difficulties of the communist system. But the future hypothetical collapse of the totalitarian system is *no substitute for foreign policy and defence.* History does not make our decisions: our decisions make history.

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Ideas, Influence, and American Politics: The Case of *Commentary*

Norman Podhoretz

BY chance, this conference exactly coincides with the 40th anniversary of *Commentary*, whose very first issue appeared in November 1945, and it closely follows my own 25th anniversary as editor, which was celebrated in January 1985. Under my predecessor, the late Elliot E. Cohen, the magazine went through a number of interesting changes, but none so drastic as the one it underwent after I became its editor in 1960; and that change in turn paled in comparison with the dramatic shift that began taking place in 1967 and became fully explicit in 1970. The *Commentary* of today is for all intents and purposes the magazine that was born in 1970.

Or perhaps, borrowing a term from evangelical Christianity, I should say "born again." For from a political or ideological point of view, the post-1970 *Commentary* in many respects represents a return to the pre-1960 *Commentary* that was created and edited for the most part by Elliot Cohen. Under Cohen, *Commentary*, sponsored by the American Jewish Committee but enjoying complete editorial independence, developed into one of the main centres in the American intellectual community of what came to be called "revisionist liberalism" by some and "cold-war liberalism" by others.

"Revisionist" or "cold-war" liberalism comprised many things, but its most important distinguishing characteristic was its positive attitude towards America. In the past, so far as the intellectuals were concerned, there was nothing good to be said about America, except perhaps that it had a certain raw energy and vitality. For the rest, it was a bourgeois, narrow-minded, puritanical, philistine country, dominated by businessmen and run entirely for their benefit. In such a country it was a badge of honour to be alienated or estranged.

Yet thanks mainly to Hitler and Stalin, a new appreciation of America as the main alternative to and the great bulwark against totalitarianism began to spread among the intellectuals—even the ones associated with *Partisan Review* who had once been unreservedly committed to the idea of alienation and the tradition of "critical non-conformism." One of the editors of *Partisan Review*, the poet and critic Delmore Schwartz, put the case for abandoning critical non-conformism as follows:

> Clearly when the future of civilization is no longer assured, a criticism of American life in terms of a contrast between avowed ideals and present actuality cannot be a primary preoccupation . . .; civilization's very existence depends upon America, upon the actuality of American life, and not the ideals of the American Dream. To criticize the actuality upon which all hope depends thus becomes a criticism of hope itself.

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It was not, however, *Partisan Review* but *Commentary* that became the main centre of this new point of view (even while devoting much more of its space every month to issues of special concern to the Jewish community than it was later to do under my editorship). But it was also *Commentary* that eventually became a leading force in the radical rebellion against the same point of view. Thus for better (as I thought then) or for worse (as I think now), when I succeeded in 1960 to the editorship, I immediately pressed the "new *Commentary*" into articulating and developing the ideas that simultaneously encouraged the emergence of a new radicalism and gave it legitimacy and intellectual respectability.

Yet as those ideas spread—to an extent and at a rate that amazed me then and amazes me even now in retrospect—some of us found ourselves growing more and more uneasy with the way they were being interpreted and the kind of political activism they were inspiring on the New Left and within the counterculture (collectively known as the Movement). We were put off by the Movement's assault on the universities with its surprisingly anti-intellectual overtones; we were appalled by its celebration of violence in the black ghettoes; we were disturbed by its self-righteousness, its dogmatism, and its intolerance. Most of all, however, and most generally, we were unable to stomach its ferocious hatred of "Amerika" and the coarse and vulgar caricature it was making of the serious radical critique we had been trying to develop of American society and American foreign policy.

It was the process of explaining both to ourselves and to others why we felt this way that forced us into taking another close look at our own ideas; and it was out of that re-examination that we gradually moved towards a rediscovery of the virtues and values of American civilization. In other words, we went through much the same political or ideological transformation that our predecessors had gone through in the first post-war decade. Like the Cold-War liberals before us, we discovered America in the course of becoming disillusioned with the radical Left—in their case the Communist Party; in ours the Movement of the 1960s. It is in that sense that the post-'60s *Commentary* is a born-again incarnation of the pre-'60s *Commentary*. Or, to put this point in more familiar terms, what is called "neo-conservatism" today represents in many essential respects a return to the revisionist or cold-war liberalism of the first post-war decade.

TO the neo-conservatives of today, America is, if anything, even more "America the Beautiful," as Mary McCarthy (who has since changed her mind) called it in the early 1950s, than it was for the cold-war liberals of those days. Like them, we neo-conservatives have come to believe that the American political system is one of the glories of human history and that whatever may be wrong with it can be reformed from within. Radical changes are thus unnecessary and in any case undesirable. Like the cold-war liberals too, we believe that in international affairs American

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power is the only force capable of preventing Soviet totalitarianism from sweeping the globe; and just as they did, we support the use of that power—political, economic, and, where necessary, military as well—to resist the spread of Soviet power and influence.

There are, however, two important differences between cold-war liberalism and neo-conservatism. First, most of the cold-war liberals were either socialists ("liberals" is what socialists usually call themselves in America) or great believers in government management of the economy. Their rediscovery of America, one might say, did not extend to the economic institutions on which America was built; nor did their recoil from Marxism push them into a new appreciation of capitalism. Indeed, capitalism remained for them so dirty a word that they referred to it only in euphemisms like "the free market" or "free enterprise." Moreover, whereas in the political and cultural realms, the word "free" meant good, in the economic realm it meant bad.

The neo-conservatives, by contrast, are not socialists, disguised or otherwise. We believe in capitalism, and we are so liberated from our radical past that we are even willing to use that dreaded term. We have come to recognize that economic freedom is not only good in itself (being in itself a form of freedom) but is also an indispensable protection against totalitarianism. We have also come to recognize that only through economic freedom can wealth be created and that it is only the creation of great abundance that makes widespread prosperity possible. Under socialism, even democratic socialism, equality comes to mean sharing the poverty; under capitalism, even non-democratic capitalism (for example, in Korea and Taiwan), the rich get richer, while some of the poor also get rich and even those who remain or become poor live in a style that in many socialist countries only the rich can afford.

The other main difference between the cold-war liberals and the neo-conservatives concerns American foreign policy. The cold-war liberals certainly believed in the use of American power, including military power, to resist the spread of communism; to a man they supported the intervention in Korea. But to a man they also supported our refusal to intervene in Hungary in 1956. For they never went beyond the idea of containment as the correct strategic objective, hoping that if the Soviets were held behind the lines of their post-war imperial boundaries, they would either eventually liberalize or collapse, or both.

The neo-conservatives do not for the most part share this faith in containment. Most of us want to see the United States adopt a strategy aimed at encouraging the forces of disintegration already independently at work within the Soviet empire—by, for example, sending more aid to the Afghan resistance, to Savimbi in Angola, and to the "Contras" in Nicaragua, while at the same time following a policy of denial in our economic relations with the Soviet bloc. The hope is that this will exacerbate the internal contradictions that are so much more salient a feature of Marxist regimes than Marx himself thought they were of the capitalist world.

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We neo-conservatives have our own disagreements, of course. There are those among us who think that such a strategy could only be implemented if the United States were to go it alone. Opposing these "global unilateralists," others believe that an American withdrawal from NATO would lead to the Finlandization of Europe ("red Vichyism," as I prefer to call it) and ultimately to the collapse of free institutions in the United States as well. We disagree too on the nature of the enemy: is it the Soviet Union alone (in which case the alliance with China makes sense)? Or is it communist totalitarianism (in which case the alliance with China costs us more in the currency of clarity and political will than we gain from it in geopolitical terms)? It is possible that some day these disagreements may lead to further splits and realignments, but for the moment they are disagreements among political friends and allies.

TO return to *Commentary*: just as the magazine was a centre of revisionist liberalism in the '50s, and just as it then became a centre of the new radicalism in the '60s, so since 1970 it has been a centre of neo-conservatism, especially with regard to international affairs.

I am often asked by foreign journalists and scholars how influential *Commentary* is—or, more generally, how much influence the "intellectuals" have in America. Usually the influence in question is narrowly defined: what these journalists and scholars really want to know is how much attention the politicians, especially the ones in power, pay to the intellectuals and whether and to what extent their policies are shaped by the things we write. They have heard that Jeane Kirkpatrick, like Daniel Patrick Moynihan before her, was appointed Ambassador to the UN on the basis of an article in *Commentary*, which is true; they have heard that many members of the Reagan administration are former contributors to *Commentary* and that others, including the President, speak highly of it, which is also true; they have heard that the President himself telephoned me to take issue with a critical article I had written, and that too is true. Surely, then, *Commentary* must be very influential.

The problem is, however, that this kind of thing does not in my opinion provide a good measure of the influence of ideas on the life of a country in general or even on its political life. Public officials, whether elected or appointed, are so busy that they rarely have time to read anything except the newspapers; and many of them, I have discovered, hardly even do that. For this reason, the ideas that guide them once they get into public office are those they have already absorbed in the past. Of course, pressures of every kind push them and pull them, and some of them imagine that they are "pragmatists" who approach each issue as it comes without preconceptions or fixed ideas. But of these "pragmatists," I would say roughly what John Maynard Keynes said of businessmen who operate on the same assumption: that they are the blind slaves of some defunct intellectual. Yet even public officials who recognize that they are moved by ideas are usually moved by what they have read or heard in the past. In short, the debates among intellectuals today influence what

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happens tomorrow, not what happens today. The war is a war for the future, not for the present.

For example, when *Commentary* began moving towards a radical position in 1960, the prevailing climate of opinion both in the country at large and in the intellectual community in particular was anything but radical. As a measure of how unreceptive the climate was, Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd*, a book attacking American society from an eclectic radical position and from which we drew three major pieces for the first three issues of the "new *Commentary*," had already been rejected by 19 publishers. Yet as a direct result of the appearance of those articles in *Commentary, Growing Up Absurd* was finally published. Within five years it had become what has rightly been described as the "bible" of the youth culture of the 1960s and by the end of the decade its disciples had transformed the Democratic Party beyond all recognition.

Something similar happened in the area of foreign affairs. In the early '60s we published a series of articles that were widely regarded as outrageous and even heretical at the time for insisting that the United States bore the major share of responsibility for the Cold War and the arms race, and for arguing in favour of conciliatory American policies towards the Soviet Union. Yet such arguments were destined not only to become the conventional wisdom of the various neutralist and pacifist movements of the post-Vietnam era both in the United States and Europe, but also to influence the policies of successive American administrations. Shortly thereafter, we began running a series of pieces attacking the growing American involvement in Vietnam, and within a short time the highly unfashionable arguments made in these pieces had become common currency and even a new orthodoxy, with the most serious consequences for the future American role in the world.

I TAKE no pleasure, to put it mildly, in having contributed to the spread of ideas and attitudes which have, as I see it now, done a great deal of damage. But I take a certain consolation from the fact that *Commentary* played a perhaps even greater role in countering the influence of those ideas than it had in spreading them. Be that as it may, the point I want to stress is that the war against the virtually monopolistic influence of the Left in the world of ideas—a war that looked so unpromising in the late '60s—made even more amazingly rapid progress than the struggle to establish that influence had made a decade earlier. At first, we were angrily or contemptuously dismissed within the intellectual community as apostates and lunatics; we could scarcely get a hearing. What we did get, however, was attention in the media, partly because of the novelty of the phenomenon we represented—for intellectuals defending and even celebrating America, instead of taking the traditional adversary or hostile position, was from the short-term perspective of the media (so short-term that it could not even extend back to the 1950s) surprising and unexpected and interesting: it was *news*. And even though

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this attention was itself strongly tinged with hostility, it helped us in establishing ourselves as a force to be reckoned with.

But ultimately it was the power and cogency of our arguments that conferred an irresistible intellectual authority on ideas that had previously been dismissed out of hand. We went after the high ground, moral as well as intellectual, and we seized it from the Left and then defended it against repeated counter-attacks. If we had not been successful in this ideological campaign, I believe, the change in the political climate that began manifesting itself a few years later in a new surge of patriotic feeling might have been aborted for lack of a sense of its own moral and intellectual legitimacy. As it was, that new determination to reverse the post-Vietnam decline of American power—American military power in relation to the Soviet Union; American political power in relation to Europe; American economic power in relation to Japan—grew in strength and self-assurance. And as it did, it affected first the policies, and especially the foreign policies, of the Carter administration, which turned 180 degrees in its last year; and then, in 1980, it elected Ronald Reagan.

Let me make it clear that I am not claiming a direct influence on the actions of Jimmy Carter, and still less upon the millions of people who voted for Ronald Reagan. Hardly any of these people had ever heard of *Commentary*, much less read it (our circulation has hovered in recent years between 40,000 and 50,000). It was history, in the concrete form of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that showed a majority of Americans, Jimmy Carter among them, how misguided was the prevalent view of the Soviet Union as a status quo power, no longer interested (if it ever had been) in expansion and eager for an accommodation with the United States. Conversely, the humiliation to which the United States was subjected by the year-long hostage crisis in Iran persuaded most Americans that there were unacceptable prices to be paid for the decline of American power—a decline that liberal opinion had declared to be both inevitable and desirable.

Yet raw events like these only make for major changes in the climate of opinion when there is ready to hand a coherent and plausible explanation to which people can turn for illumination. And it is here that the influence of an intellectual magazine like *Commentary* comes into play. Because we had built a solid case over the years—and it takes years of patient reflection, argument, and debate to build such a case—we could now account for Iran and Afghanistan in an infinitely more convincing way than our opponents were able to do. Forced in effect by their own view of the world to justify the invasion of Afghanistan as a defensive move, and to blame the United States for the Iranian aggression against it, the Left and the liberal community as a whole were discredited in the court of public opinion, while our view was confirmed and vindicated.

I WISH I could end the story on this happy note. Alas, I cannot. For after a period of demoralization, the Left began to pull itself together

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and was able to launch a surprisingly effective counter-attack. By playing on the fear of nuclear weapons, it was able to revive a willingness to accept the notion that the Soviet Union is defensive and bent on accommodation; and by demagogically exploiting the anti-Soviet rhetoric used by Ronald Reagan in his first two years as President, it managed to make the old habit of "blaming America first" relatively respectable again.

Given the extent to which the Reagan administration has backed down in the face of this counter-attack, one might conclude that our influence was very weak and short-lived indeed. But this conclusion would be wrong. What Henry Kissinger says of Japanese prime ministers—that they are the custodians rather than the creators of the national consensus—is to a large extent also true of American presidents. With rare and extraordinary exceptions, they do what the consensus permits, and not much more. Therefore the blame for Reagan's failure as President to act fully on his private convictions could be said to rest, at least in part, with those of us who labour in the world of ideas and whose job it is to shape the climate of opinion by which in turn our governors are governed. We have done well enough to help make possible the election of someone like Ronald Reagan; but we have not yet done well enough in helping to establish the conditions under which such a President can govern in accordance with our lights (and his own).

What this means is that we still have a lot of work cut out for us. But it also means that we can approach this work with hope and good cheer, knowing from our past successes that, if we are not exactly Shelley's "unacknowledged legislators," we are nevertheless a proven force in the shaping of the national consensus.

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Our Growing Provincialization? Some Answers to the Problem

Jean-Claude Casanova

IT is in some respects strange to be speaking of "provincialism" in our day and age. After all, whether in trade, tourism, finance, life-style, music or fashion, there has never been so much interchange between nations as there is today. Our societies resemble one another—or are on the way to doing so—and they buy from and sell to one another. To the eyes of an Asian or an African, only barely noticeable details distinguish one Western society from another. In the sphere of culture, a kind of uniformity is becoming evident. Two major dailies, the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Herald Tribune*, are transatlantic. Other papers like the *Financial Times*, the *Economist*, the *Neue Züricher Zeitung* and *Le Monde* have a wide readership outside their country of publication. English is now practically a *lingua franca*. All kinds of books are quickly translated into other languages. Films and television programmes are exchanged, and American TV series are viewed almost worldwide. In other words, a Western culture could properly be said to exist. What is debatable is the *critique* of this culture, of its commercial potential, of America's undue preponderance (by European standards), and of the monopoly of the English language (as viewed by a Frenchman).

In spite of all this, there are signs of what may be termed provincialism, that is to say, of *a tendency to stop seeing issues in universal terms, in terms that are common to the various areas of our civilization.* This provincialism manifests itself in the following ways:

1. In contrast to the "transnational" type of society and economy that is emerging, political discourse has remained more national and, thus, more provincial. The more aristocratic an elite, the more cosmopolitan it is likely to be; the more democratic it is, the more provincial. Provincialism in political affairs leads to a sort of shortsightedness—there is no clear view of common issues (everyone thinks his own problems, and their solutions, are unique). Our national policy would surely be more effective if our political figures could see more clearly just how interconnected our societies and economies really are. What goes for politicians applies even more to bureaucrats, civil servants and journalists. In a country like France, when it comes to education, health, administration or security, our civil servants and journalists are deeply indifferent to foreign realities, much more so than at the end of the nineteenth century. It is as though the sense of history and the spirit of comparison, so necessary to political thought and action, had been occluded by short-term, nationalistic attitudes.
2. Strangely, the universities have not followed the economy down the path to internationalization. The number of French

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students who study abroad has not stopped growing, but it is increasing at a slower rate than the total number of students. Today's universities are less cosmopolitan than the elitist universities of the beginning of the century.

3. The dominance of scientific and technical progress, which is genuinely universal, has the counterbalancing effect of leaving philosophical and literary culture to focus on national values. The defence of literary, philosophical or linguistic particularities has come to be seen as a legitimate reaction to the technical homogenization that menaces our societies.

Where is the equivalent today of the great intellectual figures of the past who could speak to the whole Western world and wield influence over it—Croce, Thomas Mann, Gide, Russell, Ortega y Gasset? Those who occupy this position now are people who have been torn away from their native culture (for example, Milosz, Solzhenitsyn, Kolakowski). I would be hard put, however, to quote the name of a single great French, English, Italian or German intellectual of whom it could be said that he thinks for Europe or that he conducts a debate with his peers in Europe or the United States concerning the problems and dangers facing our various countries.

I shall not go into the reasons for this state of affairs. For the sake of discussion, I think it is enough to give an outline without going into too much detail. Let me sum up by saying that our societies are simultaneously more cosmopolitan than at any time in history, but that where certain aspects of their political, cultural and intellectual activity are concerned, they have never been more provincial-minded.

THE situation I have described seems to be more prevalent among European nations than between Europe and the United States. First of all, there are differences between the Anglo-Saxon position and that of, say, France or Italy. The common language shared by Great Britain and the United States gives greater potential for communication and a wider market for newspapers, periodicals and books. No doubt, under the double influence of tradition and the special, comfortable relationship it enjoys with the United States, Great Britain manages to avoid some of the more extreme symptoms of provincialism in its political and intellectual life. My impression is, however, that the once close communion that existed between British and continental European culture—think, for example, of such men as John Stuart Mill or George Orwell—has weakened as a result both of the provincialism that is rife all over Europe and of these special relations with the United States.

The situation in Germany, Spain, Italy and France is worse. In these countries, cosmopolitanism or universalism boils down to strengthening, or at least preserving, links with the United States at the expense of other European cultures. I cannot think of a first-rate French historian of England (whereas we once had Halévy), of Russia (we once had Leroy-Beaulieu), of Spain (we once had Bataillon), or of mediaeval Italy

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(we once had Luchaire). France is surely not alone in this, And yet the American universities turn out many European scholars. Perhaps a trifle too narrowly specialized in one particular topic, they are, however, less deeply penetrating than they used to be at one time, as for example in the case of Brogan.

Language, of course, is partly responsible for this trend. The fact that French, German or Italian are less widely spoken than English and that Frenchmen, Germans and Italians have to learn English, while they can forget about the other European languages, means that the intellectual exchange of ideas and mutual interests that ought to exist among the European countries are probably undernourished.

I do not think, however, that this is the main factor involved. It may contribute to the immuring of culture but it is not the cause of it. The same is true of the market. The fact that the French market is smaller than the American one does not explain the provincialism of our literature and our intellectual concerns. My own theory is that our cultures have become more narrowly national and less cosmopolitan because our societies have become more democratic at the same time as our economies have become increasingly transnational. For a culture such as the French, this phenomenon is particularly marked. Once universal, it has reacted to its loss of influence by retreating into a defiant, thin-skinned provincialism.

We have no reason to be proud of what has happened. If we are to be of help to the Eastern bloc countries, if we are to strengthen our own democratic institutions, if we are to raise the level of our intellectual discourse, we have a legitimate case for combating provincialism. This is all the more true in that the best way to defend national cultures is to let them intercommunicate freely.

The distinctive feature of European and North American culture is that it is universal. If it forgets this, it renounces its identity. There are grounds for hoping that what has been weakened by the movement towards democratization and by economic internationalism will, at a later stage, be strengthened by these very same forces. Greater democracy should produce a greater wealth of talent, and a wider market should result in increased interest, critical discernment and exchange of ideas.

THE problem is no longer how to understand the state of the world, but how to change it. What should we be doing to catalyze the development of cultural exchange? As this is a meeting of review editors and other press representatives, I have some modest suggestions to make.

I feel that our publications should do their best to achieve the following:

1. To internationalize political commentary, particularly on:
   — trends in our societies (by way of reciprocal criticism and comparison);
   — trends in the Soviet Union, China and the Eastern bloc countries (by pooling of analysis);

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— the West's foreign and strategic policies and the unification of Europe.

2. To internationalize intellectual criticism, especially the criticism of ideas and literature. Whenever an important book in English, French or German is published, it should immediately be discussed by authors from the other countries.

3. To promote intellectual and political debates on national controversies of common interest (drug abuse, crime, divorce, education, contemporary music, etc.).

4. To give a more cosmopolitan dimension to arts criticism. There is great potential here for cultural exchange, but so far criticism has remained too insular.

5. Finally, although it is outside the scope of editors and publishers, to give thought to instituting a prize system along the lines of the Nobel prizes, but with more internationally representative juries and, if I may say so, a greater sensitivity to the threats posed to our democracies.

In order to facilitate work on the first four points, I propose that we set up a publications federation. This would not mean placing a central body above our various publications. Rather, editors and publishers would meet once or twice a year, with each publication taking it in turn to organize these meetings.

In the course of these meetings, we would decide on the topics to be treated—confidentially, obviously, as we are private businesses operating in competition with others. Once the topics had been chosen, we would commission writers from various countries. The articles received by each publication would be sent in typescript to the others, who would be free to translate and print the texts, on an exclusive basis.

Each publication would retain the right to deal with international topics in its own way or in line with the others. The amount of pooled material would vary according to the nature of the topics concerned and the prevalent domestic or international state of current affairs.

As for book reviews, some sort of rapid communications system should be devised. Each publication could immediately print the critical articles which appear in the others, and could make an arrangement whereby, for example, French books would be reviewed by Anglo-Saxon critics, and vice versa. Any such organization would have to be extremely flexible. It should make ordered choice possible and bring down costs.

Translation is another knotty problem. For us at *Commentaire*, it is the single most expensive item in our budget. If the proposed publications federation were able to obtain subsidies for translation from foundations, or other bodies interested in promoting intellectual interchange, we could increase the volume of translation, improve its quality and guarantee translators a more regular income.

This, then, is what we could set out to do. It is not a spectacular idea, but it might perhaps be useful.

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The Influence of Soviet Propaganda on the Western Media

Cornelia Gerstenmaier

THE existence of unscrupulous Soviet propaganda is not in itself astonishing; much more astonishing is the ease with which large sections of the Western public—usually influenced by the media—accept such propaganda at face value. They do not see (or do not want to see) the discrepancy between Soviet words and Soviet deeds. Take, for example, the Soviet attitude towards pacifist or peace groups. The Soviet Union actively supports such groups in the West, while on its own territory it persecutes them, using imprisonment, forced psychiatric treatment, and other coercive measures.

The Western media, and with them the broad public, have never come to terms with the Soviets' ambiguous interpretation of the UN Human Rights Declaration, UN Agreements, or the CSCE Final Act. They seem in all seriousness to start from the assumption that these agreements have the same meaning for the East as for the West. Worse still, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the West is even ready to adopt the Soviet interpretation of human rights, as for example in the case of the priority of so-called social rights such as the "right to work." That there is in practice no "right to work" in the Soviet Union is somehow overlooked in the West, thanks to Soviet propaganda. Hardly anyone in the West knows, for example, about the enormous unemployment among teachers currently prevailing in the USSR. At present, primary and secondary school teachers receive only five-year contracts. These contracts cannot be renewed before the applicant has undergone intensive tests of ideological loyalty.

There is a quotation, the authenticity of which is not in question, from a Soviet camp commandant who replied to political prisoners invoking the UN declaration: "You haven't understood correctly. That does not apply to you; that is for the blacks." There are any number of quotations to match this one.

THE Federal Republic of Germany today holds two dubious distinctions. It is the object of special attention from Soviet propaganda; and it is particularly receptive to it. It is not necessary to go into the details of the political background or the specific interests of the Soviet Union in this respect. The fact of the matter is that against the background of increasing anti-Americanism there are people, not even attached to the "Left," ready to accept the assertion that Sakharov could never emigrate to the West "because the Americans are against it."

For a year and a half almost all the information and, especially, disinformation concerning Sakharov and his wife has reached us via the

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German Federal Republic. In almost every case it has come from *Bild Zeitung*, the financially "healthy" tabloid published by the Springer concern. One can only speculate as to why the KGB selected precisely this paper, for which Victor Louis, a journalist with "special connections," has been a kind of permanent collaborator ever since. This type of continuing disinformation—wrapped up in "sensational" Orwellian films and photos of Sakharov—ends by causing boredom and apathy in most people, and may even completely appease a large number of the uneducated.

Ten years ago, even in the midst of *détente*, the members of the Norwegian Nobel Prize panel had enough courage to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Andrei Sakharov. In 1985 an international campaign failed to award the prize to the persecuted Helsinki monitoring groups in the person of their founder Yurii Orlov, the physicist, after seven years of camp imprisonment forcibly exiled to Siberia (and now exchanged with the US reporter Daniloff for the Soviet spy, Zaharoff). Since 1984 six members of the Helsinki groups have paid in prison with their lives for their belief in the Helsinki Final Act. The 1985 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded instead to the "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War" (IPPNW). As a result, in the person of Dr Yevgenii Chazov, a member of the Soviet Central Committee has been honoured. It is more than just sad irony that only a decade after Sakharov, a man who previously took part in the public campaign against Sakharov was a recipient of the Nobel Prize in Oslo. A letter signed during this campaign by Dr Chazov reads:

> We Soviet medical scientists are embarrassed by the behaviour of academician Sakharov, who has brought shame on the honour and dignity of Soviet scholars. We condemn his activities directed against the peace policy of the Soviet Union . . . Crudely distorting the reality of our life, A. D. Sakharov is under the thumb of the most aggressive imperialist forces that are attempting to fan the flames of world war and create new sufferings for mankind.

The Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee has come a long way since 1972. But never before has the Soviet Union won such a clear victory over this body as it did in 1985. The awarding of this prize provided a striking example of the extent to which the USSR has been successful in influencing the decisions of formerly neutral bodies.

Dr Chazov has received the highest decorations of the Soviet state—yet clearly not for his medical, scholarly merits, but rather for his political activities. That he gives Party interests absolute priority over human considerations is further illustrated by the fact that when after the Chernobyl catastrophe Chazov was offered medical aid for the victims by his IPPNW co-president Bernard Lown, he turned it down. He refused Dr Lown's proposal to send doctors—members of the IPPNW (and thus politically "cleared")—to the Soviet Union, claiming that everything was "under control." He obviously not only did not care about the victims,

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but also deprived his own organization, the IPPNW, of a propaganda victory: the three doctors (including an Israeli specialist) who were later sent to the USSR to assist the Chernobyl victims were not members of Chazov's organization.

When—in May 1986—the IPPNW held its sixth congress in Cologne it was confronted with the issue of human rights. The participants were asked to speak up for the (also medically) maltreated prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, for the victims of the politically inspired abuse of psychiatry, for their colleagues, like Dr Koryagin or Dr Brodsky, incarcerated in prison-camps. However, all attempts to initiate a debate during the public meetings were suppressed.

THOSE congresses, seminars, and other such events held in the West to which guests from the communist countries are invited form another dismal chapter. Despite opposition from the Western hosts (which tends to be at best limited, at worst, non-existent), the "ideological leathernecks" frequently show up. This means that the flow and outcome of any discussion are strongly influenced by Soviet propaganda. The enlightened and critical experts do not receive travel permits, and representatives of any sort of oppositional tendency are unlikely to be granted permission to attend.

The guest list of Polish participants in the numerous German–Polish encounters arranged by German political institutes or by scientific or cultural organizations are strictly dictated by Warsaw through the Polish embassy. Under the current rules of the game, representatives of Solidarity or even of legally published newspapers such as *Tygodnik Powszechny* have hardly any chance of taking part in such meetings. Instead, journalists and other representatives of the "intelligentsia" who have unsavoury reputations in Poland show up in large numbers. As a result, propaganda clichés about the "lazy Polacks," and "work-shy Solidarity," which "is ruining the Polish economy," "is demanding too much," and "is threatening peace," are reinforced for the German public (and to be sure, this is not limited to Germany). When queried about the one-sidedness of the Polish representation at these get-togethers, German hosts frequently reply: "We Germans should not interfere in Polish internal affairs precisely because of the tragic history of Polish–German relations." For years we have been hearing the same answer from German physicians when the abuse of psychiatry in the USSR is mentioned or from German physicists when Sakharov is spoken of. Consequently, these Germans are often conferring with the most dubious of Soviet and East European officials, and step-by-step assuming some of the latters' viewpoints. The so-called "cooperation" between Western firms and their Eastern trading partners has "progressed" into moral bankruptcy. One can hardly distinguish here between stupidity and cynicism. Human rights organizations active on behalf of East Europeans, for example, receive hysterical phone calls from well-known Western firms which, in refusing requests for donations, are even afraid

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to write their refusal, dreading that any letter may "endanger our Eastern trade."

IT is a distressing fact that people do not want to hear about tragic and terrible things, especially over a long period of time. It is remarkable that they are even less keen to listen if these tragedies concern the USSR and the "socialist" countries—countries that for the most part lie in Europe, at our own back door.

In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, in addition to the factors sketched above (such as the notorious lack of resistance to ideological propaganda), it is, in my opinion, above all fear of Moscow which plays a decisive role in creating a climate which makes the publication of a periodical like *Kontinent* difficult. The periodical has been appearing for 12 years now, and its course has been—and still is—arduous. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the labour, if soberly assessed, is now more rewarding than ever. First, because the political challenge is increasing, and second, because we are attracting more and more young people. Amongst our regular and enthusiastic readers we have a few members of the "Greens," some pacifists, and even a number of former members of the DKP, the pro-Soviet communist party. They have now broken their ties with this party, not least as a result of the impression made by the contents of *Kontinent*. These are only small groups, but they do exist.

However, after this optimistic note, I can only conclude with a pessimistic reflection on the ignorance of Western intellectuals, and particularly journalists; of the so-called "scientific," or "value-free" approach of Western Sovietologists; of the pervasive psychological unpreparedness in the West to deal with not-so-cleverly conceived Soviet propaganda. The view is increasingly accepted not only that both systems, the democratic and the Soviet, can coexist, but that both—perhaps equally—have their pros and cons. Meanwhile, Soviet rulers continue to demonstrate the arbitrariness and the power of their system, its Stalinist essence.

It is a melancholy reflection that the full extent of the horrors of expansionist, totalitarian regimes are only recognized in retrospect. Reporting about the past is easy; reporting about the present is difficult, dangerous and unrewarding, which is one more reason why we must continue it.

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Tendencies and Question Marks in Austria: 12 Years of *Europäische Rundschau*

Paul Lendvai

ABSTRACTIONS and second-hand impressions about a small, deceptively simple central European country, perched on the edge of the free world and forced through geography and history to deal with three neighbouring communist states, two of which are members of the Warsaw Pact, often colour perceptions and even assessments in papers or periodicals which are usually well-balanced. Some of the prejudices or bias or simply hasty generalizations go back to the time of the *Anschluss*, the "easy rape of Austria." An unfortunate and indeed unpardonable handshake extended by a young Minister of Defence to an old war criminal on the return of the latter after decades in prison in a foreign country sufficed to resurrect the ghosts of the past, and to erase all that has happened to change the political fabric of the country and to forge a newly found national identity. Paradoxically, and a fact hardly known abroad, this young "friend" of the "old Nazis" has all along been regarded, and not without reason, as the symbol of upcoming "young liberalism" in this same country. Of the Emperor, one could ask today, "is he what I mean by a liberal?" and the answer, in the case of an English liberal or an American neo-conservative, would be a firm and unequivocal "No." Yet the same man is, by Austrian standards, a relatively positive force in domestic politics. "Progressive" compared to what, that is the question which at one single stroke is apt to destroy illusions in and about Austria. The Kreisky era of 1970–1983 with its unprecedented series of electoral victories served to confuse the picture further.

On the one hand, his reign served as a belated, but useful *Persilschein*, a kind of posthumous rehabilitation of Austria, since where else in Europe or in the world has there ruled at such length and with such a degree of popular acceptance, a Jewish, socialist intellectual who had in addition spent 12 of the worst years of recent Austrian history in exile? That the same man has been attacked hotly by Israel and by spokesmen of the world Jewish community as a classic case of an "anti-Semitic Jew," and of "falling over himself" to curry favour with the most extreme Arab groups, the PLO, etc., served as a convenient smokescreen for a classic case of *Realpolitik*.

Yet it would be completely wrong to regard the Kreisky era as one of deception, hypocrisy and phony grandeur. It injected a spirit of forward-looking dynamism, even optimism into the general atmosphere. Nothing could be more misleading than the assumption, spread today by

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the opposition and the media, that everything which is rotten—morally, politically, and economically in the country is in one way or another an inheritance from Kreisky and his government. The deep-seated mentality and practice of active and passive bribery, of *Kuhhandel*, or *quid pro quo*, in a country which for 10 years was under four-power occupation and for 20 years was ruled by a "black-red" coalition, has both preceded and followed Kreisky's chancellorship. Look at the record and the behaviour of some of the regional bigwigs; the *Landesfürsten* provides a host of instructive examples of short-sighted egoism, megalomaniac planning, and of ruthless control of the local media.

IT was only natural, after the long rule of a great politician, arguably the most successful political operator since Roosevelt, that there should occur a very real backlash both in the political atmosphere and in the choice of priorities. There is no point in going into the specifics of Austrian domestic politics and the motives behind the actions of the politicians. What matters is that the gloss has gone, that even the pretence of Austrian foreign policy being relevant to the great issues of the day can no longer be upheld. It was after all the personalization of politics which led to the identification of Austria with Kreisky. In a sense it is the same yawning gap as that felt after Adenauer, de Gaulle, Churchill and, in some ways, Tito.

Yet is it not a blessing in disguise that the geopolitical and economic realities reassert themselves, that the illusion of grandeur disappears once and for all? Was it so bad that a small country from 1983–86 had a Chancellor in the person of Dr Fred Sinowatz who, like all his predecessors except for Kreisky, did not speak any foreign languages, yet was rooted in central Europe, and driven every day from his home in a small town in Burgenland, Austria's easternmost and smallest province, to the capital? Sinowatz resigned after the triumph of Dr Kurt Waldheim at the presidential elections. It is still too early to say whether his successor, Dr Franz Vranitzky, an urbane banker with a good command of English, will mean not only a change in style, but also in substance. For the time being, Dr Sinowatz remains head of the Socialist Party. Economic and financial force is being shifted to the West, yet political power remains for the time being in the East; that is, Austria's political establishment looks to central and east-central Europe rather than to Munich for a sense of political mission. (Since the delivery of this paper, the controversies concerning the past of the newly elected Federal President have dealt a severe blow to Austria's international image; just how severe, time will show.)

It is in this sense that one can speak of an Austrian success story both in terms of politics and economics. Figures show that Austria has caught up with Germany and Switzerland to a high degree, while at the same time the gap between Austria and its Eastern neighbours has widened tremendously. During the last 15–20 years per capita incomes in terms of purchasing parities have deteriorated from the point of view of the East

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by 40–50 per cent, as shown by a recent in-depth investigation by the respected Vienna Institute of Comparative Economics. Yet at the same time Austria has no unemployment worth speaking of, its record in strikes and labour peace has remained one of the best in the world, and its rate of inflation one of the lowest.

The fact that Austrian radio is not jammed and that Austrian television can be seen by over 40 per cent of the Hungarians, some 3–4 million Czechs and Slovaks, as well as by millions of Slovenes and Croats in Yugoslavia provides one of the keys to Austrian influence in this area. The balance sheet of the Second Republic, whether under "black-red," red, or as now, "red-blue," i.e. Socialist–Freedomite, administration is an extremely dangerous challenge to ideologically structured regimes lacking legitimacy and popular acceptance over 40 years after the Second World War.

It is against this background that the perennial debate as well as some misconceptions about neutrality and neutralism must be seen. As the erstwhile Chancellor Raab, who signed the State Treaty of 1955 with the Soviets said, neutrality puts the state under an obligation, but not the citizen. As a result Austria not only welcomed almost 200,000 Hungarian refugees in 1956 and tens of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks 12 years later, not only temporarily harboured and provided safe passage for almost 260,000 Soviet Jews, but also all along has placed no restrictions whatsoever on critical reporting by the media about the Soviet bloc or for that matter about Yugoslavia. As someone who in recent years has been attacked in long editorials by *Izvestiya* in Moscow, by *Pravda* in Bratislawa and by a host of Croatian and Serbian newspapers on account of allegedly "malign," "slanderous" or at the very least "not objective" TV and radio programmes, including those produced by my associates, I can attest to the fact that Austrian chancellors as well as foreign ministers and also the opposition leaders have firmly resisted all attempts to muzzle us or to blackmail the media, in accordance with the well-known rule that "good behaviour" and "objective reporting" are the precondition for visas and work permits.

THE results of the general elections since 1959 convincingly show that there are no illusions here, not even lingering ones, about Marxism or communism. The Communist Party is merely a biological problem, inasmuch as its voting strength is less than one per cent and its membership has declined in direct proportion to the mortality rate of its (officially) 16,000 members!

It can be said today that the greatest danger to the Austrian future is provincialism, the feeling that a glorious past is a safe conduct for the future without an agonizing reappraisal of national priorities and a speedy adjustment to changed conditions at home and abroad. This is the reason why the fate of such ventures as that of *Europäische Rundschau* goes beyond that of a single periodical. So let me write a few words about the balance sheet of our experiment with this quarterly journal.

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Founded in the summer of 1973, *Europäische Rundschau* has managed to appear four times a year without missing a single issue. Funding is provided by the leading banks and institutions in the form of advertising. Furthermore, we receive subsidies from a fund of the Federal Chancery controlled by all parties and given by law to every periodical with a claim to quality and regular publication. For special projects, such as a comparative study of economic reform experiments in the East European countries, we are entitled to special funds from the National Bank. Circulation is between 2,500–2,800 copies, based on a solid block of individual and institutional subscribers.

From the very beginning our aim has been to provide a platform for dialogue and debate between East and West. This of course has been possible only within certain confines, and at the price of printing pieces from Soviet spokesmen as a "shield" for real voices from the East, who, through references to such Soviet contributions, could operate more easily vis-à-vis their own censorship. Thus for instance when Professor Mihajlo Markovic, the Yugoslav philosopher and founder of *Praxis*, or later Professor Svetozar Stojanovic, were attacked for writing in such a "right-wing Social-Democratic or worse publication," they could point out that along with Hugh Seton-Watson, Norbert Leser, Max Beloff and Walter Laqueur, such figures from the communist establishment as Peter Renyi from Budapest, M. Rakowski from Poland, D. M. Gvishiani, and O. Bogomolov have also contributed to *Europäische Rundschau*.

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Epopteia: 1976–1985

Panayiotis and Zenobia Drakopoulos

WITH the fall of the Colonels' regime in July 1974, Marxist ideology began to penetrate all levels of Greek society for the first time. In an atmosphere where this ideology prevailed, the democratic conservatives felt isolated and were even ashamed to express their views in public. The liberals, traditionally numerous in Greece, accepted the view that communism was a progressive theory and somehow felt free to cooperate with the Left. Thus, with few exceptions, our intelligentsia yielded to Marxism. The only problem was to decide which wing of Marxism—several had appeared by then—an intellectual should follow.

Illustrative of the prevailing current is the case of the universities. A law enacted in late 1974 introduced "courts of justice" in the universities where certain professors and lecturers were tried for allegedly cooperating with the junta. Not infrequently, the proceedings devolved into "witch hunts" where personal vendettas played a decisive role. The student committees often imposed their will on the court. Since the "professor-judges" did not vote by secret ballot, failure to support these committees' propositions might make these same professors victims of the next trial.

The publication of *Epopteia* in April 1976 was a response to a series of calamities over the last 40 years: a dictatorship, a world war, an axis occupation, a civil war, an interlude of parliamentary democracy and another dictatorship. During that time Greek institutional and intellectual life suffered exceptional harm.

In the editorial of its first issue *Epopteia* posited its aims. First, to present modern philosophical thought and scientific trends which were unknown in whole or in part to our students, and to contribute to the development of a fresh intellectual climate in the humanities. Second, to replace propaganda with critical thought and to bolster an anti-totalitarian spirit.

Epopteia has endeavoured to follow the above guidelines consistently. Each issue comes out on the first of every month—save August—and is divided into two parts. In the first part there are usually essays on a particular subject, philosophical or scientific. Amongst those which have already appeared are:

— The Genesis of the Individual
— Utopia and Revolution
— The Future of the Past (on Tradition)
— The Fear of Being Free
— The Philosophy of Technology
— The Notion of the Social System
— On Secularization
— Terrorism

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— The Language of Totalitarianism

Also in the first part special issues have been devoted to particular scientists or philosophers, such as Karl Popper, Max Weber, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Friedrich Hegel, Imre Lakatos, Jacques Lacan, Alexander Koyré, Soren Kierkegaard, Arthur Koestler, Martin Heidegger, Willard Quine, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and others.

The second part, under the title "*Agora*," consists of articles on current affairs. These often include subjects such as: Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Amnesty International, the Middle East, perspectives of an anti-totalitarian Left, the struggle between social democracy, communism, etc.

EPOPTEIA met with opposition from the very first issue. First, because it strongly rebuked the established intelligentsia for giving in to communism and for its acceptance of Soviet totalitarianism as an "historical necessity"; second, because it was obvious that *Epopteia* intended to launch a new intelligentsia which would not simply be a successor to the compromised establishment. Its strongest enemies, however, were the communist intellectuals, whose reactions against *Epopteia* were without precedent in a Western country, and at least unusual in the history of Greek intellectual circles. The communists attacked *Epopteia* by characterizing it either as an "instrument of the CIA" or of the "Greek security police." At the same time, the left-wing journalists working for liberal newspapers were party to a campaign of silence, altogether ignoring the publication of *Epopteia.*

This double attack was possible because the leftist journalists had managed to find employment on conservative and liberal newspapers, being mainly responsible for their "cultural pages"—that is, the pages which are considered of no importance by our bourgeois publishers, because they are of no political interest.

The universities also opposed *Epopteia* for its criticism of academic inadequacy in certain works, and also of the disinformation and distortion of reality prevalent in books by certain Marxist scholars. The communist committees of lecturers denounced *Epopteia* repeatedly as a journal whose reviews prevented their advancement by damaging their reputation.

In December 1976, *Epopteia* reached its nadir. Kiosks and bookshops sold only 50 issues; besides these, 70 issues were sent to its subscribers. Coincidentally, in the December 1976 issue, Karl Popper appeared in Greek translation for the first time. Next month *Epopteia* counter-attacked. In "an open letter to our readers" its editor described the dirty war that *Epopteia* had been facing during the preceding months. He named some of those who, either for the sake of a questionable career or because they supported a totalitarian ideology, had allied with communists in the universities, and also those among the press who disseminated disinformation in their cultural columns. The editor concluded his open letter with the announcement that *Epopteia* was even

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prepared to become a *samizdat* publication rather than give up. In the same issue were the "Documents of Prague" (an anthology of official texts from the "Prague Spring" preceding the Soviet invasion), and also translated texts by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Melvin J. Lasky.

The result of that counter-attack was remarkable. The circulation of *Epopteia* began to increase and continued to do so. Today it sells more than 2,000 copies and some issues have reached 3,000. Back copies are still in demand, while many issues are out of print. It has 600 subscribers, which is unusual for a Greek magazine.

The university people have stopped their old activities against *Epopteia*. The communists have been forced to change their tactics: they seem now to be more on the defensive.

SINCE January 1977, *Epopteia* has systematically published articles by eminent thinkers who represent anti-totalitarian philosophies. Among those presented (mostly for the first time in Greek) were Hannah Arendt, Milovan Djilas, Georges Gurvitch, Alvin Toffler, Leszek Kolakowski, Jean Marie Domenach, Sidney Hook and others. It also published a series of interviews with dissenters—ex-communists—such as Boris Souvarine, Alexander Zinoviev, Mikhail Voslensky, Jean Ellenstein, Michel Heller and others.

The deterioration, however, of the conservatives continued on a disconcerting scale. In their endeavour to save themselves "conservative people" increased their concessions to the Left.

In 1980 *Epopteia* wrote:

> [. . .] we have reached the point where if someone or something wants to be accepted either as "progressive" or as "democratic" he or it must have the approval of the Greek Communist Party (GCP). The right-wing government has surrendered to the communists the seal of approval to legalize our political status and our political thought and action.

Before the elections of 1981 (when the vague socialism of Mr Papandreou came to power) the editor of *Epopteia* decided to establish a typesetting and publishing unit. This was necessary for the survival of *Epopteia* because he had been warned that in the case of a victory for PASOK, *Epopteia* would be obliged to "shut up, because it is a magazine that does not represent the ideology of the people"!

In fact, immediately after the 1981 elections PASOK tried its best to drive *Epopteia* to bankruptcy. All subscriptions from libraries, universities, banks and ministries were cut off. All advertisements of banks and other financial organizations were cut off as well. But these measures did not prove fatal to *Epopteia*. *Imago*, the publishing unit, partly compensates for the loss of advertising income and governmental subscriptions. Besides, the *Imago* publications are parallel to those of *Epopteia* and have been well received. So far, over 40 titles have appeared—philosophy, religion, literature, essays, and political books, always liberal and anti-totalitarian in tone.

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However, in its 10-year career *Epopteia* has never actually articulated a definite proposition for Greek social, political and economic life. Indeed, *Epopteia* is known as a dynamic journal with an uncompromising anti-totalitarian spirit and not as one that suggests specific attributes to current affairs. Therefore, after a long period during which the thematic focus was primarily on philosophical and scientific issues, recently it has turned to current affairs issues. In September 1985 *Epopteia* published a special issue on Afghanistan, and two months later one on South Africa and on feminism. Similar issues are currently being planned on selected international and domestic problems.

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Spanish Opinion and the West

Antxon Sarasqueta

ANTI-WESTERN feelings in Spain today are expressed through a high degree of anti-Americanism in the Spanish media, and in a varied array of social manifestations; through an ignorance of the principles of freedom which gave birth to the liberal democracies; and through a clear-cut "Africanist" tendency which has long predominated among government leaders and large sections of Spanish society. For a number of reasons, the idea that Spaniards are descended from "Moors" (Arabs) has long been favoured. Julián Marías, the philosopher and essayist, writes in his latest book, *España Inteligible* (Intelligible Spain): "This obsessive presence of the Moors has been sufficient to alienate Spain from Europe and for this country to be considered as something different and apart." And yet, Marías notes, there has been "a strong factor of occidentalism" throughout Spanish history, dating back to the Roman Empire.

Present-day generations, not only abroad but also within Spain itself, are ill-informed about Spanish history. One reason for this ignorance is the lingering weight upon everyone, inside and outside Spain, of the recent civil war. The twentieth century for Spain has meant a long period of violent internal struggles. Spanish politics were utterly dominated by the military until the death of dictator Francisco Franco on 20 November 1975. Spain did not openly participate in the two world wars, but it suffered their consequences. After Hitler's defeat and the Yalta agreements, Franco's regime was treated as a pestilential outcast. It was excluded, to the point of being denied membership of the United Nations after the San Francisco Conference. Franco's regime clung to power for four decades—and modern Spanish society is, like any other, the product of its own history.

The United States contributed decisively to freeing Europe of fascism and, later, to containing Soviet expansionism. (Though, it should be noted, the Number Two man in Spain's ruling Socialist Party, Deputy Premier Alfonso Guerra, went to a Brussels meeting during the past electoral campaign for the European Parliament to exhort his European socialist colleagues to do away with American "vassalage.") The Marshall Plan made the reconstruction of Europe possible. However, at the same time the United States bolstered Franco's regime, no doubt for the very reasons why it now backs Spain's parliamentary democracy—strategic reasons, directly related to Western security. Indeed, it is true that the twin images of Eisenhower embracing Franco in 1959 in Madrid, and Felipe González embracing Ronald Reagan at the White House in June 1983 convey the impression of a Spanish foreign policy constantly influenced by the Washington connection. (In addition to its being dominated by the Vatican connection.) The major change is that during

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Franco's regime the United States made use of Spanish territory under conditions that were vexing to Spain, whereas now the relationship is becoming more balanced, as befits two allies.

However, even today a certain amount of mutual distrust remains. On the one hand, Western nations (which need a stable Iberian peninsula to avoid tensions that would only benefit Soviet interests) have not yet come round to trusting Spain fully as an equal ally, sharing the same interests and the same purpose. Even Spain's NATO membership has not dissolved the misgivings—a strong proof of that is Britain's refusal to give in to Spanish sovereignty claims over Gibraltar, and the allies have tacitly backed the British position. Within Spain the situation is more complex, but the results are much the same. Washington's support of Franco enables adherents of the Left, formerly in exile or in hiding, to hoist the flag of anti-Americanism as a dialectic weapon against the Right, which has inherited its power from the dictator and in some cases once shared power with him.

Immediately after Franco's death the left wing surfaced in Spain with a number of radical Marxist programmes, and a manifest hostility towards "Yankee imperialism." This was in 1976. The new leader of Spanish socialism—today the nation's Prime Minister, Felipe González—said then that "NATO is only a military superstructure implanted by the Americans to assure the survival of capitalism," and that the organization "is not only directed towards eventual aggression by communist countries, as the official word goes, but also against eventual revolutionary transformations within capitalist nations." Later, on the subject of American bases in Spain, González was to say, "The signing of the cooperation treaty with the United States is just another sale of sovereignty to a foreign power."

As the democratic restoration promoted by King Juan Carlos became a stronger reality, the socialists and communists unequivocally backed the idea that American bases should be respected, but they remained opposed to NATO. In 1977, an analysis made by Spain's diplomatic service with the help of Moscow sources reached the conclusion that if the Left were successful in avoiding Spanish membership of NATO, the next step could be the non-renewal of the base agreements with the US and thus the dismantling of the bases and the installation of a neutral area in southern Europe, which would favour Soviet interests.

ONE of the factors which contributed to the relatively calm transition from dictatorship to democracy was the consensus developed by the then Premier, Adolfo Suárez, with left-wing groups. But this consensus tied him down with regard to NATO membership. Certainly, Suárez himself (a populist leader with his roots in the "social" branch of Francoism) did not favour Spain's entry into the organization. He later willingly confessed as much.

After Suárez's resignation and the failed *coup d'état* of February 1981 (the first *putsch* ever to be televised live), another centrist Premier,

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Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, was elected by Parliament. With Foreign Minister José Pedro Pérez Llorca, he decisively set out to attain membership of NATO. The Left, communists and socialists alike, launched a national campaign against such a notion, with a barrage of publicity, public meetings and parliamentary activities by its leaders and followers—for months on end. With an absolute majority in the chamber, the proposal to bring Spain into the Atlantic alliance was in due time approved. This caused González to exclaim: "The decision which this chamber has reached with a majority vote can only be attributed to the groups backing this decision. The Socialist Party does not hold itself, now or in regard to the future consequences for Spain, responsible for this decision."[1]

Now, four years later, González and most Socialist Party leaders insist that they would never have brought Spain into NATO. They accept that Spain should remain in the alliance, but they reject full military integration. They have been promising to hold a referendum since 1981. The original aim of the referendum was to bring Spain out of the alliance; now, paradoxically, it is to keep it in, albeit with the stated limitations. The change from "No to NATO" to "NATO—yes, but . . ." has been accepted thanks to two considerations: a growing identification with Europe, including EEC membership, and the prospect of a reduction in the size of American contingents on Spanish soil. This is proof that an attempt is being made to "sell" the change of position to a clientèle inclined to the Left, with as little electoral erosion as possible.

Indeed, the fact remains that despite changes in González's and the cabinet's position on NATO, anti-Atlanticist ideas are still prevalent among the socialist rank-and-file. The socialist campaign against membership of NATO was based on such slogans as "NATO does not help Spain's international position," "NATO does not make Spain's democracy stronger," "NATO brings nothing to our well-being," and "NATO increases Spanish citizens' insecurity." What happened to persuade the same voices to say the opposite overnight? Has a magical maturity process taken place in the minds of the socialist leaders? Or is it simply that up until 28 October 1982, the date of the first socialist victory, positions of power had to be vacated, whereas after that date, they were there to be shared and retained? The change in attitudes is due to tactical, temporary reasons and not to a process of doctrinary evolution vis-à-vis Western values. As a consequence, this change is not being made with conviction, but with resignation—by people who are ready to change their minds again in the opposite direction, were socialist interests to demand it.

Nicolás Redondo, the veteran leader of both the Party and the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), the socialist trade union, has made this point perfectly clear. He said that the NATO issue will not end with the referendum, and not even with the coming general elections, but will last

[1] Official Parliamentary Minutes, 29 Oct. 1981.

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"as long as the people here feel the need to fight against the two blocs." The socialist leadership is strategically interested in keeping both images alive—that of moderation, which appeals to the centre, embodied in such leaders as González or Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez (who was a member of the centrist cabinet which approved Spain's entry into NATO on 20 August 1981), as well as that of the burning radical flame, in such figures as Redondo, to please the Left.

IN 1975, 57 per cent of all Spaniards were in favour of Spain's membership of NATO and 24 per cent were against it, according to polls taken by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). 10 years later, those figures have been reversed. In March 1985, 53 per cent of persons polled were against NATO and only 19 per cent in favour, with 29 per cent expressing no opinion. This poll was taken by the sociological services of the OTR press agency in association with the Emopublica Institute, under the direction of Professor Juan Díez Nicolás. In a recently published study which Professor Díez Nicolás has produced on the basis of systematic poll-taking between September 1984 and April 1985,[2] the author mentions that "although it is true that opposition to NATO decreased slightly between March and June 1985, favourable opinions increased less or not at all, and in any case the ratio is still two to one against NATO."

The NATO membership referendum of 12 March 1986 showed that only three to 10 Spaniards with the right to vote gave their approval to the government (31 per cent were in favour, 23 per cent against, and 45 per cent were undecided).

The question asked by the same group for the March 1985 poll was: "As a consequence of the agreements between Spain and the United States, some military bases for joint use were set up on Spanish territory. But, as Spain is a member of NATO, there are some quite different options regarding the future of the bases. Among the following alternatives, which do you think Spain should choose?" The answer was that 46 per cent elected "to leave NATO and get rid of the bases," 9 per cent preferred "to stay in NATO and keep the bases," while 2 per cent opted "to leave NATO and maintain the bases." 33 per cent of those polled did not give any answer. Rejection of the bases (56 per cent) was even higher than rejection of NATO (48 per cent). "In relation to defence," Professor Díez Nicolás comments, "it should not be forgotten [in analyzing current pacifist ideas in Spain] that Spain remained neutral during the two world wars, so that its last two experiences with foreign war, [thus the 1936 Civil War is excluded], were, outside the Iberian peninsula, the conflicts in Cuba, the Philippines and North Africa and, within the peninsula, the War of Independence against Napoleon."

Professor Díez Nicolás concludes: "Neutralism and pacifism, which were promoted during the previous regime (remember Franco's

[2] Polls comprising 1,200 interviews each, in homes picked at random involving Spaniards aged 18 years and over.

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propaganda campaign about his '25 years of peace'), must necessarily have had an influence on current attitudes shown by many Spaniards." The result is that 70 per cent of Spaniards over 18 years old consider that there is "no value or ideal which can justify a war," according to a poll taken by the same group in October 1984, which also showed that 10 per cent were indifferent or did not want to answer the question.

Within such a context, socialists and conservatives—the two major forces in Spain today—express their support for NATO, when and if they do so, for reasons of security only. They very seldom say that freedom is the main value guaranteed by the alliance.

WHAT is the attitude of Spain's Right towards Western values and liberal democracies? Spain's traditional Right has integrationist and ultra-nationalist connotations which reach much further back than Franco's regime. It was the backbone of the dictatorship, which declared itself to be the defender and guardian of the West, but detested the system of freedom upon which Western democracy is based.

Salvador de Madariaga wrote that, from an ideological point of view, Moscow and Franco, "although they were antagonists, functioned as if they weren't, since their collaboration was precisely founded on their antagonism." He added:

> Their common work was none other than that of cutting into shreds or breaking into tiny pieces everything that was liberal, socialist or Christian-democrat. Franco found in the existence of the Soviet system an excellent pretext to justify his own existence [even though the idea that the 1936 uprising was due to the need to save Spain from communism is without foundation], and the Soviet Union found in Franco a valuable argument to prove the 'fascist' nature of the West.

On the other hand, for the liberal Right descended from opposition to Francoism or from the structures of Franco's Spain, Western values are synonymous with parliamentary democracy, the defence of Western Europe, and pro-Atlanticism. This political sector defends the cultural values that oppose government interventionism in society. Under the centrist banner, with the participation of reformist sectors from the old regime, this section of the Right has been globally responsible, from the positions in power which it captured in the 1977 and 1979 elections, for carrying out the transition to democracy.

In foreign affairs, the moderate Right brought Spain into the Council of Europe (1977) and NATO (1982), and left at an advanced stage the negotiations which started eight years ago to bring Spain into the EEC. However, the liberal Right, also known in Spain as "the civilized Right," has paid dearly for its reforms. It gave way after a spectacular joint campaign by the socialists and the conservatives, who carried out a pincer operation until they had installed a socialist-conservative bipartisan domination after the 1982 elections, with an overwhelming socialist majority (202 parliamentary seats to 106). The results of the 22 June election were much the same (184 seats for the Socialist Party to 105 for

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the centre-right Popular Coalition). The splitting up of the opposition alliance means that Felipe Gonzalez still has a free hand to govern, with no serious opposition.

Before the 22 June elections, the conservative Popular Coalition opposition was comprised of three parties (the majority Popular Alliance led by Manuel Fraga, the Christian-democratic Democratic Popular Party which is centrist-oriented, and the small Liberal Party, which is only one of Spain's liberal groupings). After the elections the Democratic Popular Party broke away, whilst the Popular Alliance suffered an internal crisis. The Coalition officially defended Western values, but had little credibility. This was not only due to the origins of some of the Alliance's leaders, including Fraga, who held high positions in Franco's dictatorial regime—facts which provided an easy and welcome weapon for the socialists with which to disqualify their opponents. The lack of credibility was also due to the fact that the coalition largely represented a rightist sector of society which yearns for the past and wants nothing to do with democratic liberties in their widest and deepest meaning. Alongside these dominant rightist groups in the coalition there are other groups and persons who opposed Francoism, and who have impeccable credentials as defenders of freedom and democracy. But, for the time being, they are submerged by the dominating ultra-conservative majority. Fraga presents a paradox: his main asset in today's Spain is that he has brought the extreme rightists, who most actively threatened the survival of democracy during the transition years, into a legitimate party, thus neutralizing their influence—but this achievement is also his party's worst disadvantage when it comes to attracting voters to the polls.

To complete the picture on the Right, one should add that moderate nationalists, who are staunch defenders of Western values, are in power in the self-ruling "autonomous communities" of Catalonia and the Basque Country. The nationalists (Convergence and Union in Catalonia, and the Basque Nationalist Party) refuse to enter into an alliance with the conservative Right because of its Francoist connotations. Franco ruthlessly suppressed Basque and Catalan nationalist movements.

TO sum up: the cultural, political, defensive and economic values of the West are not deeply entrenched in Spanish society nor among Spain's leaders, but there is a tendency towards a slow, progressive strengthening of those values. A sound example of the distance still to be travelled was the refusal by successive democratic governments in Spain to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, due to fears of reprisal by the Arabs, their "traditional friends." After the socialist government established diplomatic relations with Israel on 17 January 1986, it published a communiqué which proves that Spain has not moved from its "traditional" support of the Palestinian cause. In August 1986 it gave official diplomatic status to the PLO office in Madrid. This is no doubt due to weakness and lack of definition, but also to the actual

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psychological weight of the Moorish character which still permeates certain areas of Spain's society and politics.

The Francoist legacy is not that of a developed capitalist system, but that of a society accustomed to an all-pervading government and to a state-oriented ideology. Both are of particular concern to the writers of socialist manuals and to Spain's conservative right-wingers. To simplify greatly, no doubt at the risk of grievous misrepresentation, it could be said that half of Spain, the southern half, is still looking towards Africa, while the northern and eastern parts look to Europe and the Mediterranean, and in the central area, including Madrid, all of those influences coexist but, fittingly, a quixotic vision of life is the dominant factor.

Let us add the attitude of the news media to this general picture. The government is the largest news agency, with a monopoly over nationwide television channels. The government media reflects, to a greater or lesser extent, an anti-American and anti-Atlanticist bias, while giving prominent place to the positions of Castro, Arafat, and the Sandinistas. An example is provided by a television newscast in which the story of the capture of the Achille Lauro terrorists was illustrated with the picture of an American military plane with a pirate's black flag, complete with the skull and cross bones of the Jolly Roger, painted on its tail. In another programme, a Spanish television interviewer ended her conversation with Arafat with her "personal congratulations" and an expression of "our backing" for his cause.

A study by Inocencio Arias (currently the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), carried out two years ago, concluded that overall the Spanish press was clearly anti-American. A prominent role is played by the most influential newspaper, *El País*, which has a radical left-wing line, justified by its editor, Juan Luis Cebrián, in a recently published book, *Crónicas de mi país*. One of this newspaper's most recent campaigns was against the building in Spain of the proposed Euro-Disneyland park. This is what *The Economist* had to say about it on 19 October 1985:

> During the past two weeks, Donald [Duck] has been a favourite target of contributors to the leading Madrid daily, who present him as public enemy Number One of all those attached to 'a Christian and European culture.' Most of the attacks could have been written by the late General Franco's propagandists, who enjoyed denouncing sinister American inventions such as Coca-Cola, jazz, and bikinis. But this time the thunder is on the Left. Donald [Duck] is not the only target. The government's television service even boycotts *Dallas*. This cultural xenophobia is linked with the argument over Spanish membership of NATO. One Madrid columnist went so far as to assert that "Donald, Mickey and Daisy are the visible heads of America's nuclear missiles in Europe."

There is certainly a contrast between what has been called a "progressive elite," which now dominates Spain's establishment, and Spanish society as a whole, which consumes American-style products and services. Spanish-

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made cigarettes are advertised as having an "American taste." TV commercials most often carry the image of New York City and of American life-styles to sell colognes or fashions. In this, there is little difference between Spain and the rest of Europe. Also, business leaders expressed almost unanimous backing for "Reagonomics" after it was defended by Ronald Reagan himself in a Madrid lecture last May.

SO what is going on? Spanish society is ill-informed (80 newspapers sold for every 1,000 people), and disinformation and demagoguery prevail. Current trends, publicized by the government but well received by the conservative opposition, reveal that Spain is devoted to a purported "pragmatism"—whereas this is really a misleading name for a process aimed at neutralizing a critical and independent society, one that would be drawn by the motor of thought and creative ideas.

Where can one find hope for a change in the trend towards more truly Western currents of thought? No doubt, in Spain's membership of the European Economic Community; in this country's opening up to the world; in the unavoidable definition of its role in allied politics; and in the emergence of new, less traumatized, less complex-ridden generations. These generations are now being born into an era of technological revolution, into an information-based society where supranational considerations are a day-to-day reality. They were not witness to the Civil War, nor to Franco's regime. Of course, they are coming of age in very uncertain times. But, despite the added pressure of an immediate nuclear threat which makes this age different from all others, uncertainty is not a new experience.

It is now 10 years since Spain started the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Formal and institutional aspects of democracy are now solidly installed. The current struggle lies, instead, in creating a real, working, Western democracy within society, to "put democracy to work." This is the challenge underlying Spain's decision to participate with other free societies by membership of NATO and the EEC. It won't be easy, to judge by the facts given in this brief analysis. However, a lucid look at Spain's possibilities as a contributor of stability and creativeness within Western Europe makes it possible to envision a national improvement and the shedding of the disdainful tag of "*España es diferente*" which was curiously made into a touristic slogan.

After all, in historical terms 10 years is a very short time, even in the era of the laser, and in such a short span the main structures of a free society, well-identified with its European context, have been erected. This progress has spared Western Europe a focal point of tensions which might have had dire consequences if after Franco's death extremists had taken control, turning Europe's south-western flank into a permanent trouble spot. In this sense, the real factors of moderation have been the King, and society itself, which was reasonably mature, developed, and frightened too, and thus able to resist terrorist and revolutionist enticements.

Neither the United States nor the European allies should have a

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narrow or stereotyped view of Spain. Rather, it should be seen as a society where, beyond the problems and day-to-day developments, there are groups perfectly able to participate on an equal basis with advanced Western societies. Such currents exist, they have already proven their capacities, and the future is full of opportunity. I say this sincerely. It is only a matter of re-focusing Spain's real interests.

The archives of Victor Zorza, the former Soviet and East European analyst and columnist for the *Guardian* and the *Washington Post*, are available for sale. Institutions or individuals interested please contact *Survey*.

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Provincialization Provoked by Mutual Ignorance in the Political Field: A Nordic Experience

Jorgen Schleimann

WE THINK we know each other. We don't. We got to know Hitler and Stalin, wartime Churchill and Roosevelt, post-war Kennedy and Willy Brandt pretty well. But we never quite got to know Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer, Khrushchev and Richard Nixon. We are beginning to know Ronald Reagan, and we may one day know Mikhail Gorbachov. Too often we do not know each other.

And yet we belong to the same European and Atlantic political families. We share a cultural heritage, subscribe largely to the same ideas, believe in the same values and cooperate within the same frameworks. Still our knowledge of each other is so limited that misunderstandings continuously arise and misconceptions linger on to the detriment of our working together.

We are not supposed to see things in the same way all the time, of course not, but when we don't, we should not only recognize and admit it, we should also try to understand why it happens. I say this from my position in the small group of nations which form part of the still relatively limited number of free and open societies that exist in the world today. We are known to you as the Scandinavian countries. We often use that term ourselves, but we prefer to be known as the Nordic countries, to make sure that you not only register, but fully appreciate that there are five of us in our North European community of nations and not just three or four.

Iceland is certainly there, positioned in the North Atlantic closer to the coast of Greenland than to the shores of Western Europe, a pioneering state in the approach to North America, a people speaking the ancient Nordic language of a thousand years ago, but now increasingly drawn by the shift of generations into the area of English-speaking peoples and Anglo-Saxon mass media civilization. A people with an acute sense of history, with a taste for literacy as a constituent element of civilization which surpasses that of the French or the Hungarians, and a determined will to remain within our Nordic organizational framework for cultural and political cooperation. As a NATO member-state Iceland commanded international attention on a couple of occasions when it included communist members in its coalition governments. But ever since the crucial battle over the Keflavik base was fought and won by the pro-NATO parties in the general election of June

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1956, the Icelandic nation has had its security policy solidly anchored in the Atlantic alliance. So, indeed, have Norway and Denmark, but on very different premises from those of Iceland, since Iceland occupies a unique position among the world's nations by having inscribed in its fundamental law that this nation—of a quarter of a million people—shall never possess any armed forces of its own. There is a difference also in their wartime experiences. No one would ever compare the Nazi occupation of Denmark and Norway to the British–American occupation of Iceland—but occupation it was, nevertheless, to the Icelanders, a psychological fact which was to influence post-war policies in the—since 1944 by unilateral declaration—fully independent Icelandic nation.

On the surface, three of the five Nordic countries have followed the same path in order to solve their security problems, but even for Norway and Denmark the road to NATO membership was paved in very different ways. The crucial difference again lies in wartime experience. On 9 April 1940, Denmark soon had to surrender to the invading German troops, whereas Norway engaged in a prolonged fight. Denmark was even less prepared than Norway, mentally and in terms of defence measures, to enter the Second World War, having relied almost exclusively on diplomatic efforts culminating in the conclusion of the Danish–German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. Geography too played its role in political decision-making. The extended Norwegian mountains and the deep Norwegian fiords posed greater problems for the invaders than the flat and densely populated Denmark. The Danish king, Christian X, remained in occupied Denmark, sharing the fate of his defeated people. His younger brother, the Norwegian King Haakon, remained with his fighting troops and withdrew with them to exile in Great Britain to continue the fight from there. So Denmark had constitutional governments until 29 August 1943, even a parliamentary election on 23 March 1943, and for the rest of the occupation period, i.e. until the Liberation on 5 May 1945, was ruled by the highest placed Danish civil servants, whereas Norway was immediately placed under Nazi rule, personified by Reichskommissar Joseph Terboven, in an uneasy and unfair relationship with the Norwegian National Socialist leader Vidkun Quisling.

These were very different wartime conditions, and although Field Marshal Montgomery described the Danish resistance movement as "second to none," the Norwegian attitude towards the invaders was unequivocal from the first day, whereas that of Denmark was less than plain. The Norwegian sufferings were far more eloquent. When the wartime cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies broke down, and NATO came into being upon European initiative and request, it was much easier for the Norwegians to make their minds up than it was for the Danes. During the days of exile in London it had become clear to the members of the Norwegian government of national union that after the war Norway would have to secure its independence and national sovereignty within westbound alliances, in cooperation with Great Britain and the United States of America. First,

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along with Sweden and Denmark, Norway had to explore the possibilities of organizing a Nordic Defence Community, but it came as no surprise to the leading Norwegian politicians, Labour or other, when these efforts quickly folded. The regrets expressed were no more than lip-service to traditional Nordic cooperation.

DENMARK and Sweden were not able to go it alone, so Denmark joined NATO, and Sweden was left free of alliances. A single voice was heard in Denmark, that of writer and politician Arne Sorensen, who maintained that our joining NATO might be an expression of even greater defeatism than the pacifist trends of the 1930s, since nobody dared to oppose the slogan of the resistance, belatedly endorsed by the entire population: "9 April—Never again!" As far as Sweden was concerned, there was never any possibility of going any further than to consider entering a Nordic Defence Alliance. Sweden at no point came nearer involvement in the Second World War than by permitting German soldiers on leave from northern Norway to transit through Swedish territory, or by helping and supporting members of the Norwegian and Danish resistance movements which, indeed, official Sweden as well as Swedish individuals actively did. So the overriding feeling in post-war Sweden was, and still is, that Swedish neutrality did the trick. Sweden managed to stay out of the First World War and the Second World War by means of the politics of armed neutrality. The lessons of geography, learned the hard way by Finland first of all, and then by Denmark and Norway, never quite entered the Swedish mind.

Consideration for the plight of Finland, though, played a part in the Swedish decision not to seek security arrangements beyond the limits of an eventual Nordic Defence Community. Here again, we encounter fundamental differences in option and attitudes among those Nordic countries which apparently look so much alike to the outside world. Swedish neutrality is a matter of principle, the result of a determined policy to remain alliance-free, and the Swedes have been willing to pay a far higher price for this in terms of defence costs than the one paid by the tax payers of neighbouring NATO country Denmark. Swedish neutrality is, indeed, an armed neutrality which has no roots in pacifist or defeatist trends such as those traditional in Denmark. Finnish neutrality is quite a different matter. It relies on geography and is motivated by the lessons of history. Finnish national independence came late, after centuries of Swedish and Russian domination, and by way of a civil war so cruel that it was several decades before Finnish writers came to deal with its psychological aftermath of collective guilt and suffering. Concentration camps were not a Finnish invention. They came into use during the Boer War. But they were reintroduced during the Finnish Civil War. It was with the help of German troops that Marshal Mannerheim's White forces finally crushed the Bolshevik-supported Finnish Reds in 1918, and these alliances had lasting effects on the climate of Finnish politics. Social unrest and continuous ideological hatred also account for the fact that

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Finland became the only Nordic country to foster a home-grown brand of fascistic anti-parliamentarism of any noticeable popular support in the Lappo Movement of the 1930s.

The Hitler–Stalin Pact of August 1939 with its secret protocol placing Finland in the same category of nations as Latvia and Estonia, on which the Soviet Union had strategic designs, paved the way for the Soviet attack on Finland on 30 November 1939. The Winter War compares in Scandinavian minds to the Spanish Civil War. Thousands of Scandinavians joined the Finnish armed forces. Teams of medical volunteers lined up with the Finnish Red Cross. Foodstuffs and clothes were collected and dispatched to fighting Finland, and Finnish orphans found homes in other Nordic countries. The medal of Finnish heroism, however, had its reverse side. Finland received no military assistance from the West, and consequently had to sign a harsh peace treaty with the Soviets in March 1940. Later, Finnish politicians succumbed to the temptation to join in the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. Although the Finns did not see themselves as an ideological ally of Nazi Germany—they talked significantly of the "Continuation War" and they stopped short of participating in the German siege of Leningrad—the decision was a disastrous one. Once the Finns with their own forces had expelled the remaining German troops from Finland and had reached an armistice with the Soviets in September 1944, the country was materially in ruins, but somehow politically intact. As distinct from other nations defeated in the war against the Soviet Union, Finland managed to maintain its political institutions. In fact Finland, along with the Soviet Union and Great Britain, was one of the only three European countries participating in the Second World War to avoid occupation.

The price for taking part in two wars was a heavy one. A substantial part of the national territory had to be abandoned. An equally substantial part of the Finnish population had to be resettled. War reparations amounting to $300,000,000 had to be paid in commodities over a period of eight years. A Soviet naval base in the area of Porkkala had to be accepted on the basis of a 50-year lease, and Finland's armed forces were restricted. The amount of war reparations was, however, reduced in 1948, and in 1952 Finland was the only defeated country to have repaid the imposed reparations. The Soviets gave up the lease on Porkkala in 1955, and the restrictions on Finland's armed forces were modified in 1963. Yet the Finns succeeded in coping with these tremendous difficulties with no less determination and spirit of sacrifice than they had displayed when fighting the wars. The present Finnish welfare state is neither founded on the discovery and exploration of oil deposits, nor based on the income of foreign currency loans, but on hard labour and private as well as public savings. The same posture of self-reliance has characterized Finland's foreign policy in the post-war period. The *conditio sine qua non* of Finnish external relations has been the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed in Moscow on 6 April 1948. The

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architect of post-war Finnish neutrality, President J. K. Paasikivi, and his successor, Urho Kekkonen, steered the course of *Realpolitik* so adroitly that the treaty could be prolonged without changes in 1955, in 1970 and again in 1983, when Kekkonen's own successor, the Social Democrat Mauno Koivisto was already in office.

SO why am I recalling all these facts and events, some of which, if not all, are familiar to knowledgeable people outside the Nordic countries? Because they may well be known, but they do not always seem to be present in the minds of other people, when Nordic affairs are topics of public debate or political decision-making.

Take the example of Finnish foreign policy, for instance. Ever since the beginning of the 1970s the expression "Finlandization" has popped up now and then in the debate, characterizing the Finnish nation as one which has an unacceptably low degree of independence in its relations with its powerful neighbour to the east, or still worse as an example of political intimidation which may one day become the model for the whole of Western Europe. The term "Finlandization" as a negative interpretation of Finnish *Realpolitik* is, however, as much of a journalistic and political misnomer as the term "Star Wars" used to describe the Strategic Defence Initiative. But the effect remains, in both cases a negative one. In actual fact Finland has managed to remain a Western-style parliamentary democracy with a market economy, an open society and a defence force of its own strong enough to form a relevant part of the pattern of different security policy solutions which has served to maintain peace and stability in the Nordic region, and which is often described as "The Nordic Balance." This Nordic Balance in all its different components has proved effective in keeping big power involvement in the region at a low level, thus contributing to diminished tension in times of crisis in Europe.

It is true to say that Finland has had to accommodate the Soviet Union politically more than once, most frequently in foreign policy matters, but Finland is not the only Nordic country to put restraints on its policies. Both Denmark and Norway conduct an alliance policy based on the principles that no foreign troops may be permanently stationed on Danish and Norwegian soil, no nuclear weapons may be admitted to their territories in peacetime, and that no military exercises may be conducted involving Allied troops in the Finnmark or on the island of Bornholm. Allied aircraft and ships do not operate on Norwegian territory east of the 24th degree of longitude. A case could in fact be established to support the view that in recent years the Nordic Balance has been less harmed by Finnish security arrangements with the Soviets than by certain Swedish peace and disarmament initiatives taken without consultation with the four other Nordic countries and without consideration for the negative effects of such initiatives on the defence alliance, of which Denmark, Iceland and Norway are members.

It is significant that the term "Finlandization," used in a pejorative

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sense, has more often marked the debate outside the region of Nordic countries than within our boundaries. "Finlandization" is not a problem for Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in their relations with Finland. We think we know better than to base our analysis on the malpractice of calling other people political names. Nobody is qualified to teach the Finns any lessons, when it comes to standing one's ground in coexistence with internal communism or external Soviet power politics. The recent publication of Roy Allison's carefully researched *Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union 1944–84* (St Antony's/ Macmillan Series) bears witness once more to the complexity of a Finnish situation more often described with ideological prejudice than with real insight into Finnish affairs. The Finnish example is obviously an important case in point, since it touches so directly upon very sensitive East–West relations.

The significance of closely following and correctly appraising internal developments and political motivation in secure NATO countries like Denmark, Iceland and Norway, or in equally stable neutral Sweden, seems more remote. But no chain is stronger than its weakest link. Danish footnotes to communiqués from NATO ministerial meetings have provoked debate and needed explanation in recent years. They form part of a political and mental development, of which our friends in the Atlantic Alliance had better take notice, since these trends are likely to continue for quite some time to come. One of the most decisive and coherent features of the Danish post-war political scene was for years the unity of views between the country's dominant Social Democratic Party and the other major political parties of Liberals and Conservatives, when it came to security policies and defence matters. That unity is no longer automatic. It has been largely modified since the coming into power of the non-socialist coalition government of Conservatives, Liberals, Centre Democrats and the Christian People's Party in 1982. The Social Democrats, however, are not questioning the fact, nor raising the issue of Denmark's membership of NATO.

It is not the principle of NATO adherence, but operational matters which now separate the NATO-supporting Social Democratic Party from the other NATO-supporting parties in the Danish Folketing. The Social Democrats have increasingly opposed NATO's programmes of modernization and the political implications of such reforms, most explicitly in the case of deployment of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in West European NATO countries—in spite of the fact that it was the Social Democratic government of the present opposition leader Anker Jorgensen which endorsed NATO's double-track decision in 1979. There is undoubtedly an element of traditional opposition politics in the change of attitude. The Social Democrats, finding themselves unable to criticize the economic policies of the Schlüter government in a serious manner, i.e. to the point of bringing it down, tend to concentrate their artillery on the less risky areas of foreign policy, thus making life harder for Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen in matters pertaining to the

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practical application of Denmark's membership of NATO and of the EEC.

Political opportunism is only part of the story, though. It would be more important in the long run to recognize the genuine change in attitudes which has taken place over the last decade or two. There is the shift of generations. Those who were primarily motivated by their wartime experience are dying out, and those who were born and grew up after Hitler and Stalin do not accept the political legacy of their parents at face value. Although there still seems to be a massive majority in Denmark for the alliance membership, it is not nearly as certain that there is a corresponding majority of the Danish people who see the Soviet Union as a primary threat to peace and stability in Europe. It was a sign of changing times and views, when more than six years ago a scenario for the outbreak of the Third World War was published in Denmark's largest circulation newspaper (*Ekstra Bladet*, 28 April 1979), according to which hostilities start by NATO's fire brigade, the Allied Mobile Forces, being deployed against armed workers in Spain, thus crushing the starting revolution in a blood bath. Not a Soviet attack, but NATO acting as a trigger-happy police force in Franco's Spain was seen as a plausible cause for a new war in Europe.

I do not intend to imply that such a view is shared by the majority of Danes. I am merely pointing out that nobody publicly opposed this ludicrous assertion at the time it was made. Its author is today a lecturer at the Danish High School of Journalism. Peace movements and campaigns for establishing nuclear-free zones in the Nordic region or elsewhere in Europe may well be Soviet inspired or Soviet influenced. The relevant point is, however, that such allegations are of no political impact or consequence, as long as such views are shared, propagated and channelled into party politics by a significant majority of known and identifiable non-communists. Those who argue against the peace movements on the basis of alleged communist links, affiliations and dependence only appear to be unmasking themselves as cold warriors or people obsessed by theories of conspiracy.

IT IS in this climate in which *détente* is all too often confused with *entente* that the Social Democrats of Denmark have turned in their political inspiration from Norwegian Social Democratic Atlanticism, or SPD policy in the Helmut Schmidt sense, to Olof Palme anti-nuclearism, and Willy Brandt *Ostpolitik* in its latest versions, as embodied by Egon Bahr. These trends were further enhanced by the outcome of the Danish municipal and regional elections held on 19 November 1985. Although caution is always imperative in interpreting local elections, this election, taking place midway in the life of the government, assumed a national significance by the doubling in size of the left-wing Socialist People's Party in terms of locally elected representatives. Already the Social Democratic Party has revised its former policy of keeping some distance from the People's Socialists (SF), and now invites inter-party

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cooperation wherever a majority can be reached on that basis. The election victory of SF, along with the emergence of a Green Party, is also likely to prompt the Radical (Social Liberal) Party to sharpen its attitudes and positions in areas where such revision is feasible.

The Radicals cannot revise their support for the government's policies of economic recovery without running the risk of bringing down the government, and thus provoking a national election, which might very well prove catastrophic for the party itself. The Radical Party, the only one of the pre-war, cooperating parties—the "old parties" in Danish terminology—never to endorse Denmark's membership of NATO, and very sceptical to say the least of our adherence to the EEC, may therefore feel compelled to compete with the People's Socialists in criticizing the government's defence policies and options with regard to EEC cooperation in the future.

The question arises as to where, in fact, the government of Conservative Prime Minister Poul Schlüter and Liberal Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen will draw the line. It is safe to predict that they will continue to give priority to economic recovery, and thus resign themselves to new anti-government resolutions on foreign and market policies being passed in parliament, which also means resigning themselves to inscribing new footnotes in the future communiqués of NATO. NATO country Denmark voted in 1984 for the Swedish–Mexican sponsored resolution in the UN calling for an immediate freeze on the stocks of nuclear weapons at their present level. Denmark is likely to do so again, but this year we will be followed by the Norwegian coalition government of Conservatives, the Centre Party and the Christian People's Party. Our allies will not like this vote in the UN, but it hurts feelings of solidarity more than it harms any elements of *Realpolitik*. Conservative Prime Minister Kaare Willoch, weakened by the outcome of the recent election to Stortinget, is thus tasting the first bitter fruit of minority government, but by accepting the UN vote he seems to have staved off political concessions on far more important issues. By accepting the vote he may have secured further Norwegian support for the implementation of NATO's double-track decision of 1979, and for continued stationing of atomic missiles in Europe (whereas a resolution passed in the Danish Folketing on 14 November made it mandatory for the Danish government to support all efforts to avoid stationing or deployment of new or modernized atomic weapons in Europe, East or West), Norwegian support for NATO's negotiation strategy towards the Soviet Union, and the participation of Norwegian business firms in the development of the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Where, then, will the line be drawn in Denmark and Norway? I think it is safe to predict that the chips will be down the very moment any parliamentary majority in Copenhagen or Oslo tampers with the agreements which Denmark and Norway have made with their allies concerning troop reinforcements in times of crisis and war. The reinforcement agreements are the cornerstones of Danish and Norwegian defence

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policies. We are still far from jeopardizing our security policy in Denmark. We are not far, however, from calling our European policy into question, and the reasons for this are entirely our own. Our own ignorance in the first place. In terms of geography, history and culture Denmark is a continental country. Asia starts in Malmö, as an old Danish saying has it. It is true in much the same way as it is said that Africa starts in Portugal. Sweden, for instance, is a Baltic country in a way Denmark long ago ceased to be. Sweden remembers the enslaved peoples on the other shore of the Baltic, the Lithuanians, the Latvians and the Estonians. It has a close relationship with Finland, but also an awareness of Poland and East Germany, which you do not find in Denmark. So, in a sense, Asia may well start in Malmö. Europe, however, never stopped there. Only the continent did.

But continental Denmark showed little knowledge of continental West European politics up to the time when we were drawn into European cooperation by economic forces. Germany was always the gateway to Europe for the Danes. Danish writers, like other Nordic writers, were known to the world through translations into German. Danish academics held posts at German universities, and most of the influences which reached us in the course of centuries came from or through Germany. Our latest wars were fought in the last century against Germans. The Nazi period was but a parenthesis in the history of Germany, as we realize. Nevertheless, it left a mental barrier between occupied and liberated peoples and the two Germanies founded on the ruins of Hitler's Third Reich. Few Danes wanted to study German language and literature at Copenhagen University just after the war, and we did not just hint at our attitudes towards those who came to embody West German politics in the period leading up to Germany's integration into West European and Atlantic cooperational frameworks.

Konrad Adenauer, the Catholic Rheinland Secessionist of the years following the First World War, was considered by many Danes to be the very personification of the kind of Germanness which we particularly disliked, the *Preussentum*. Many Danes saw the Bavarian Franz Josef Strauss as a mental and political heir to Hitler, not realizing that the exuberance of the Catholic Strauss had nothing to do with fascist behaviour. In fact, many Danes held the uninformed view that Charles de Gaulle was a kind of French counterpart to Hitler. Both my children appealed to me for correction of such misconceptions common among their teachers at *lycée* level in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Yet public opinion-building and political decision-making are often founded upon such superficial and misleading beliefs. In certain circumstances ignorance may be a greater enemy than the ideological or political foe, and ignorance is reborn—as Manès Sperber once remarked—with every new generation. Given these psychological conditions I think that it is only fair to remark that Denmark might not have joined the EEC on 1 January 1973, had it not been for the fact that Willy Brandt was West German Chancellor at the time of the Danish

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referendum on 2 October 1972. Germany had to be a good Germany, if we were to enter Europe, and Willy Brandt, the Social Democrat, the anti-fascist, the former *émigré* representative of the other Germany, the then Norwegian-married, Norwegian-speaking Willy Brandt seemed to qualify in the role as the personal guarantor of an acceptable Germany. One may speculate as to how much difference it would have made, in fact, in terms of foreign policy, economic policy and attitude to Europe, if the German Chancellor had been Franz Josef Strauss instead of Willy Brandt, but to the Danish voters taking what was their most important decision since the Second World War, it made all the difference.

The advocates of Danish entry into the Common Market got their two-thirds victory at the referendum—just like the Irish pro-marketeers. But Norway remained outside. Full sovereignty was finally acquired from Denmark and Sweden so belatedly, in 1905, that it seemed to many Norwegians too early to give up any part of it. The last-minute decision of the Social-Democratic Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag to postpone his country's referendum till after the Norwegian one was not very helpful either. For almost 13 years now Denmark has been a useful bridge between the EEC and the four other member-states of the Nordic Council. It has applied almost to the letter, i.e. in an exemplary way, whatever decisions were made in the EEC, provided such decisions were in full compliance with the Treaty of Rome. Not all members of the EEC have a similar record of loyalty to common decision-making. In spite of this, Denmark has acquired the bad reputation of being the EEC country to drag its feet the most when it comes to reforming and developing the Community.

This may seem paradoxical, unless you know that the precondition laid down for Danish membership during the referendum campaign of 1972 was that the EEC was and should remain an exclusively economic venture and thus have nothing to do with politics. On that basis Jens Otto Krag won the referendum and secured not only the entry of Denmark into the EEC, but also maintained unity within his own Social Democratic Party. The price to pay for those two gains was one of intellectual and political honesty. The pro-marketeers denied every political aspect of the proposed entry to the extent of appearing either not to see the world as it is, or to be deliberately withholding an important fact of reality from the electorate. In contrast to this the anti-marketeers had an easy case for presenting themselves as more realistic, aware of the evident political motivation for the EEC, and as more honest by consequently talking politics along with economics. It has taken years for the Danish supporters of the EEC to admit, at least partly, that the Community also has something to do with politics. The taboo which they imposed on the Danish market debate in 1972 has still not been fully lifted, and therefore the anti-marketeers are still free to criticize their opponents effectively for a considerable degree of hypocrisy or political naivety. As a consequence a growing part of the Danish electorate seems sceptical or even hostile towards the perspectives of closer European cooperation.

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According to several opinion polls, that part of the electorate may now be a majority.

In any case the majority in parliament favours making it mandatory for the government, through votes in the all-powerful Market Committee of the Folketing, not to agree to anything during the current negotiations following the summit meeting decision in Milan, which goes beyond the existing scope of the Treaty of Rome in defining areas falling under the Treaty and in defining relations between EEC institutions. Also it enjoins the Danish government to try to block all attempts at doing away with or diluting the acquired practice of veto-casting in the EEC. Such restraints on Denmark's European policy may not pose a real threat to our continued membership of the EEC, but they may lead to a growing isolation for Denmark within the community, thus posing a permanent problem for Denmark and its European partners alike. We will know more about how bad these prospects are when next week's summit meeting in Luxemburg is over.

WHY have I detailed the Danish and Nordic problems? Did I do so in order to demonstrate a growing provincialization of political life within our region? A growing tendency to concentrate attention on issues of domestic concern, and to adapt foreign political attitudes to domestic needs, most often of an economic nature? Of course, but growing provincialization is not only a feature of political life for the minor partners in our European and Atlantic cooperation. Rome no longer exists as an ordering social power and a determining spiritual influence. We have all been reduced to provincial status. So I wanted to address the general theme of growing provincialization less as a cultural phenomenon and more as a political one. Undoubtedly cultural factors are important. Language difficulties raise barriers in our daily life of working together. Inherited cultural and social habits obstruct mutual understanding. National egotism is the rule and not the exception in economic cooperation.

But in our West European and North Atlantic areas we share almost all the basic values. First and foremost we have based our civilization on notions of individualism. The single human being in our Jewish and Greek inspired culture is unique, is never a duplicate in society, never someone who can be replaced by somebody else according to social, ideological or political criteria. The notion of freedom on which we have built our political democracies is the notion of the right of the minority to exist as a minority and not as a prey to attempts at conversion to the views of the majority. And the right to minority status is indivisible. It extends to the single person with equal validity. The notion of justice upon which we have built our rules of law is again the notion of the right of the single human being. Society as a whole, the class, the group, the clan have no rights to exercise over the individual purely in their capacity as the majority. The law protects the individual. We share these basic values. They are proper to our civilization, and they differ in a decisive way from

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the cultural and social legacies inherited by other civilizations in the world.

Compared to that unity of fundamental values our differences of views and traditions seem to be of minor importance. Not so, however, if as a consequence of our political ignorance, of our failure to see the forest of the world because of the trees in our private garden, we jeopardize the degrees of freedom and justice obtained in our open societies. My contention is that ignorance of each other, lack of mutual information and a low level of common knowledge are the operative forces behind the growing provincialization of our cooperating nations. In that respect the provincialization of the minor countries may certainly be more evident, while that of the major powers may be more fatal.

Our West European and North Atlantic political decision-making is still primarily based upon a reasonable degree of mutual knowledge and understanding of situations and developments among a few major powers, the United States, France, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, but not on a similar knowledge and understanding of situations and developments in the minor countries within the framework, although such decision-making increasingly involves and implicates these countries as well in the consequences of jointly pursued policies. Inasmuch as growing provincialization, understood as growing ignorance of each other, may lead to growing insecurity, and thence to increasing doubts in the minds of the electorates of the minor alliance countries, it will lead to further withdrawal—albeit within the boundaries of the given framework—and less expression of active solidarity. Dependence is not a sufficient binder among democracies, i.e. among countries where the public is free to form an opinion, indeed, to form any opinion, provincial or other.

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Hegemony and the PCE

Burnett Bolloten

A PHENOMENON of the historiography of the Spanish Civil War and Revolution is that those writers who play down or totally ignore the hegemonic designs of the Communist Party still enjoy credibility, for the monopolistic aims of the Partito Comunista Español (PCE) have now been a matter of historical record for 50 years. It is therefore essential to continue to stress certain fundamental facts lest the falsifiers of history should ultimately prevail.

Between the advent of the Republic in 1931 and the end of the Civil War in March 1939, the PCE pursued two seemingly dissimilar policies. During the first four years of the Republic, it espoused a radical brand of Marxism–Leninism. "Our task," declared La Pasionaria in 1933, "is to win over the majority of the proletariat and to prepare it for the assumption of power. This means that we must bend all our efforts to organize workshop and peasant committees and to create soviets. . . . We are advancing along the road that has been indicated to us by the Communist International and that leads to the establishment of a Soviet government in Spain, a government of workers and peasants."[1]

Then came the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in August 1935, officially inaugurating the moderate policy of the Popular Front, which was designed in part to bring the peasantry and the liberal segment of the urban middle classes into a "wide anti-fascist popular front" and to improve Soviet relations with the Western powers in the hope of countering the German threat to the USSR. Although the congress reaffirmed the aims of the Comintern, namely, the revolutionary overthrow of the rule of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of soviets, the policy of unity with the urban and rural middle classes soon led to an attempt on the part of the Comintern's various sections to de-emphasize their revolutionary goals and to reassure their potential allies.

Arthur Koestler, who in 1935 was working for the propaganda department of the Comintern, has since described the transition from one policy to the other:

> All revolutionary slogans with reference to the class struggle and to the dictatorship of the proletariat were in one sweep relegated to the lumber room. They were replaced by a brand new façade with geranium boxes in the windows, called "Popular Front for Peace and against Fascism." Its doors were wide open to all men of good

[1] Executive Committee of the Communist International. *XIII Plenum IKKI. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Stenographic Report), p. 531.

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> will—socialists, Catholics, conservatives, nationalists. The notion that we had ever advocated revolution and violence was ridiculed as a bogey and refuted as a slander spread by reactionary warmongers. We no longer referred to ourselves as "Bolsheviks." . . . We were just simple, honest, peace-loving anti-Fascists and defenders of democracy.[2]

Did this mean that the Comintern had now abandoned its hegemonic aims? Not at all. The congress made it clear that a popular front government "could become a special transitional form to proletarian rule."[3] "15 years ago," declared Georgi Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Comintern, in his main report to the Congress, "Lenin called upon us to focus all our attention on 'searching out forms of transition or approach to the proletarian revolution.' It may be that in a number of countries the united front government will prove to be one of the most important transitional forms."[4]

During the Civil War, Joseph Stalin, in his now famous letter to Prime Minister Francisco Largo Caballero, written in December 1936, expressed himself in similar terms. It was possible, he said, that "the parliamentary way will prove to be a more effective means of revolutionary development than in Russia."[5] In plain language, this meant that behind the curtain of democratic institutions, Stalin foresaw the possibility that the PCE might be able to appropriate the main elements of political power. The significance of his observation is even more obvious if we bear in mind that one of his principal goals during the Civil War was the fusion of the Socialist and Communist Parties. Who can doubt that the achievement of this goal would have been a giant step towards the political hegemony of the PCE and the establishment of a single party state? Two recent amalgamations of communists and socialists that resulted in the creation in April 1936 of the Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas (JSU), under Santiago Carrillo,[6] and in July 1936 of the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), under Juan Comorera[7]—both of which soon became appendages of the Spanish Politburo—clearly indicate who would have controlled the Partito Socialista Unificado de España.

The importance that Stalin attached to the fusion is evident from the pressure he exerted on two leading socialists: first on Largo Caballero through Vittorio Codovila, the Comintern agent, and through Marcelino

[2] Richard Crossman (ed.), *The God That Failed* (Bantam Books, New York, 1959), pp. 54–5.

[3] *Kommunisticheskii internatsional: Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk* (Politicheskaya Literatura, Moscow, 1969), p. 408.

[4] Dimitrov, *The United Front: The Struggle against Fascism and War* (International Publishers, New York, 1938), p. 75.

[5] The letter is reproduced in Russian, together with a Spanish translation, in the official Spanish Communist History of the Civil War, *Guerra y revolución en España, 1936–1939*, (Editorial Progreso, Moscow, 1977), II, pp. 100–2.

[6] See Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1979), pp. 131–6.

[7] Ibid. pp. 376–9.

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Pascua, the Spanish Ambassador in Moscow (who unexpectedly arrived in Valencia with an urgent request "on behalf of Stalin"),[8] and then on Indalecio Prieto through Leon Gaykis, the Soviet Ambassador in Valencia. Only when it became apparent that neither Largo Caballero nor Indalecio Prieto, nor such loyal supporters of Prieto as Manuel Albar, Jerónimo Bugeda, Manuel Cordero, Francisco Cruz Salido, and Anastasio de Gracia, who comprised the majority of the socialist executive, would lend themselves to the manoeuvre was Stalin forced to relax his pressure. The following communist version of the attempted takeover of the Socialist Party can be found in the official Soviet *Kommunisticheskii internatsional: kratkii istoricheskii ocherk* (Outline History of the Communist International), published in Moscow in 1969: "When it transpired that some of the socialists were not yet ready for such unification, the Communist Party and the Executive Committee of the Communist International came to the conclusion that the communists 'should not force amalgamation of the Communist Party with the Socialist Party.' . . . It was recommended that those socialists who were already prepared to join the Communist Party should be persuaded that *it would be more beneficial to continue to work within the Socialist Party* to strengthen unity of action and prepare the amalgamation of the workers' parties."[9] (My italics). In other words, the communists and their allies would continue their permeation of the socialist movement until the subversive process was sufficiently advanced to allow the PCE to absorb the Socialist Party.

MEANWHILE, the communists had become the vigorous champions of what they described as the "democratic and parliamentary republic of a new type."[10] This was rank deception and dissimulation, for the much-vaunted "democratic and parliamentary republic of a new type" was simply a frontispiece behind which the PCE intended to suppress—thanks to its predominance in the army, in the secret and uniformed police, and in the Servicio de Investigación Militar (SIM)—all vestiges of democracy, all freedom of speech and assembly, all local freedoms and self-government, and all manifestation of the popular revolution, which, in July 1936, had reduced the 1931 Republic to ashes. In sum, the PCE planned to derail that popular revolution into a totalitarian police state.

In my book, *La revolución española*—which was removed from the publisher's catalogue in 1983 even though 2,000 copies were still available—and in my forthcoming three-volume work *La guerra civil española: La revolución y contrarrevolución*, both based on data I began to collect when I arrived in Barcelona at the outbreak of the Civil War, I describe in minute detail the monopolistic designs of the PCE and the

[8] Francisco Largo Caballero, *Mis recuerdos* (Ediciones Alianza, Mexico D.F., 1954), pp. 223–6.
[9] P. 433.
[10] Bolloten, pp. 215–22.

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extraordinary success it achieved. That this success was due in large measure to the failure of other organizations to meet the communist challenge is open to no doubt. Neither the socialists, badly fragmented and entangled in factional strife, nor the Anarchosyndicalists, riven by ideological dissensions, could compete with the implacable determination and monolithic organization of the PCE and its satellite, the PSUC, guided by some of the best brains from the communist cadres of other countries. As for the Republican parties, they were patently out of their depth and, according to Largo Caballero, in his reply to Stalin's letter, "were doing hardly anything to assert their own political personality."[11] As a staunch friend of the Republic put it succinctly, the Republicans "remained in a comatose state throughout the war."[12]

Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the PCE soon became the dominant political force in the left camp. No one has summarized more convincingly the reasons for its success than Jesús Hernández, former Politburo member, Minister of Education, and Chief Political Commissar of all the armies of the central-southern zone. "In our political struggle," he wrote,

> we could rely upon something the other organizations lacked: discipline, the concept of blind obedience, absolute submission to hierarchical control. . . . What did the others have in face of this granite monolith? A broken, divided, fragmented Socialist party, working in three different directions, with three representative figures: Prieto, Caballero, and Besteiro, who fought among themselves and to whom another was added shortly afterward: Negrín. We managed to exploit their suicidal antagonisms for our own ends. One day we supported one side against the other. The next day we reversed our position and supported the other side. . . . Thus, to destroy Francisco Largo Caballero we relied principally on Negrín and, to a certain extent, on Prieto. To get rid of Prieto we utilized Negrín and other prominent Socialists, and had the war lasted we would not have hesitated to ally ourselves with the devil in order to exterminate Negrín if he had obstructed us. . . . Among the Anarchosyndicalists the panorama was no better. . . . Although their ranks were tighter and more compact than those of the Socialists, we managed nevertheless to create a breach. We helped to deepen the schism—a product of evolution—that was developing in the CNT by drawing into government collaboration a large part of the Anarchist movement, which thereafter experienced a process of internal strife. . . . Nor did the Republican parties . . . present a solid and homogeneous front. Cowed by the violent and disorderly character of the popular reaction to the [military] rebellion during the first days of the fighting, they allowed themselves, to a large degree, to be influenced and won over by our policy of order and discipline. Their value to us lay more in their name than in their effectiveness.[13]

[11] For a photostatic copy of the reply (in French), see *Guerra y revolución*, II, pp. 102–3.

[12] Henry Buckley, *Life and Death of the Spanish Republic* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1940), p. 402.

[13] Jesús Hernández, *Yo fui un ministro de Stalin* (Editorial América, Mexico D.F., 1953), pp. 135–6.

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The hegemonic designs of the PCE were particularly in evidence in the security forces and in the army. In July 1936, under the double impact of military rebellion and social revolution, the Civil Guard, Assault Guard, and the secret police disintegrated as a result of wholesale desertions to the rebel cause and the assumption of police functions by vigilance committees and militia units improvised by the left-wing organizations. In the months following the military insurrection, the communists, aided by overt and covert supporters in high places, by the timidity if not the complaisance of leading socialists and republicans, secured for themselves pivotal positions in the reconstructed police apparatus. For instance, in November 1936, Santiago Carrillo, the Councillor of Public Order in the Junta de Defensa de Madrid (which was set up when the Largo Caballero government moved to Valencia), and his successor, José Cazorla, both converts to the PCE, succeeded in taking control of the new security forces in the capital; Luis Omaña Díaz and Loreto Apellániz, also Party members, were appointed by Angel Galarza, the left-socialist Minister of the Interior, to the posts of General Commissar and Police Inspector in Valencia, the new seat of government; the communists Justiniano García and Juan Galán were made chief and subchief of the Servicios Especiales, the intelligence department of the Ministry of the Interior, while two other members of the PCE, Fernando Torrijos and a certain Adám, were appointed to vital posts in the police administration. Torrijos was made Commissar General in the Dirección General de Seguridad, in charge of the appointment, transfer, and discipline of the police, and Adám was appointed head of the training centre of the secret police school, the Escuela de Policía, that formed the cadres of the new secret police corps.[14] From the time of its creation this corps became a mere arm of the Soviet secret police, which, because of the paramount position Spain now occupied in Soviet diplomacy, had established itself in the left camp quite early in the war.

UNDER the first Negrín government (May 1937–April 1938), communist penetration of the security forces made further headway. According to the Interior Minister, the moderate socialist Julián Zugazagoitia, the Dirección General de Seguridad as well as his own ministry became "nests of spies and confidants of the GPU."[15] A year later, under the second Negrín administration (April 1938–March 1939), although Paulino Gómez, also a moderate socialist, headed the Ministry of the Interior, the communists consolidated their hold still further, when Eduardo Cuevas de la Peña, a friend of the Party, became Director General of Security.[16] At the same time, Juan Negrín attempted

[14] Bolloten, pp. 206–7.

[15] Quoted by Juan-Simeón Vidarte, *Todos fuimos culpables* (Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico D.F., 1973), p. 751.

[16] See Palmiro Togliatti, *Escritos sobre la guerra de España* (Grijalbo, Barcelona, 1980), pp. 227–8, and letter from Indalecio Prieto to Juan Negrín, *Epistolario, Prieto y Negrín* (Imprimerie Nouvelle, Paris, 1939), p. 100.

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to bring the corps of carabineers under communist control. As Finance Minister in 1936 and 1937, he had been instrumental in expanding the corps into a powerful force of public order under the political orientation of moderate socialist commissars, or "delegados de hacienda," as they were officially called, but now, in defiance of the Socialist Party, he appointed a prominent member of the PSUC, Marcelino Fernández,[17] to head the corps in place of Víctor Salazar, a close associate of Indalecio Prieto, with whom he had recently severed his umbilical attachment.

In April 1938, Negrín also appointed his adjutant, Santiago Garcés, to head the Servicio de Investigación Militar (SIM), notorious for its secret prisons and torture chambers. A former socialist, Garcés had already been inducted into the service of the NKVD. Although the official duties of this fearsome organization were to "combat espionage, prevent acts of sabotage and to carry out surveillance and investigative functions,"[18] one of its principal activities, according to Jesús Pérez Salas, a loyal republican and Undersecretary of the Army under Prieto, was to silence all criticism of the Negrín government. In his sadly neglected work, *Guerra en España*, Pérez Salas affirms:

> Flagrantly perverting its official trust, the SIM set up a network of secret agents charged with spying on all persons who dared to speak unfavourably about the course of the war or about the Prime Minister. These were arrested for opposing the regime. Serious criticism . . . was prohibited and civil liberties totally abolished.[19]

One must wonder why the communists sought so assiduously to control the security services if they were not seeking the supremacy of their party and its complete ascendancy in the affairs of state. The question must be asked: would the communists have voluntarily relinquished control of their elaborate police system if the war against Franco had been won?

The hegemonic aims of the PCE were equally in evidence in the army. Here its task was simplified by the fact that, in contrast to other organizations, it lost no time in transforming its militia into militarized units and in vesting the commanders with adequate powers to enforce discipline. Its great military achievement was the Fifth Regiment, which enjoyed the help not only of militia leaders like Enrique Líster and Juan Modesto, who had received military training in Moscow before the war, and of foreign communists with military experience, but of career officers who were either members of the Party or were attracted to it because of its superior discipline, efficiency, and organization, and because it alone seemed capable of building an army that could carry the war through to victory.

Out of the Fifth Regiment there flowed a large number of units possessing uniformity of method and organization. "They were parts of a building set," wrote one authority, "which could be rebuilt into an army

[17] *Epistolario, Prieto Negrín*, p. 100.
[18] *Diario Oficial del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional* (Valencia), 9 Aug. 1937.
[19] Jesús Pérez Salas, *Guerra en España, 1936–1939* (Imprenta Grafos, Mexico D.F., 1947), p. 199.

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when the time came."[20] To set an example, the Party broke up the regiment and welded its battalions with other forces into the mixed brigades of the embryonic Popular Army. In this way, it secured for itself the control of five of the first six brigades of the new army.[21]

While the PCE was thus gathering into its hands the control of the first units of the Popular Army, it was not neglecting its commanding summits. It also became deeply embedded in the vital General Commissariat of War, which was set up for the purpose of exercising ideological control over the army through the medium of political commissars. Although the Party encountered stout resistance in its all-out quest for supremacy, first from War Minister Largo Caballero and then from Defence Minister Indalecio Prieto, it nevertheless retained a solid footing in the military apparatus. During the second Negrín government, it reached the peak of its military power, when Negrín, in his capacity as Defence Minister, appointed Colonel Antonio Cordón, a Party member, as Undersecretary of the Army, who became to all intents and purposes master of the Defence Ministry. By the late summer of 1938, not only the four army corps that made up the Army of the Ebro, defending Catalonia, were under the command of communist officers, but according to data in the official communist history of the Civil War, *Guerra y revolución en España*, eight of the 17 army corps in the central-southern zone were led by communist commanders, while five of the remaining units had communist political commissars. In other words, of the 21 army corps that comprised the Popular Army, 12 had communist commanders and five of the others were subject to the ideological influence of the Party.

HOW did the communists achieve this extraordinary preponderance? Was it due entirely to their superior military discipline, efficiency, and organization? By no means. The literature on the Civil War is replete with examples of communist proselytism in the armed forces, of the coercion of men and officers by political commissars to join the Party, of the preferential treatment of communist units in the matter of arms and supplies, of the better care given to Party members in the military hospitals, and of the strenuous efforts by the Party to exclude from the military summits and combat units officers who were an impediment to their plans for hegemony.[22] But, above all, they enjoyed the unstinting collaboration of Prime Minister Juan Negrín after he took over the Defence Ministry from Prieto in April 1938. Particularly valuable to them during his administration was the unhindered control they exercised over the Junta de Mandos, which made recommendations regarding officer promotions and appointments. Of its four seats, two were occupied by

[20] Ralph Bates (Assistant Commissar of the XVth International Brigade) in *New Republic* (New York), 20 Oct. 1937.
[21] Bolloten, p. 260.
[22] Ibid. pp. 335–60.

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Antonio Cordón and Manuel Estrada, both Party members, and a third by the phylo-communist Eleuterio Díaz-Tendero.[23] As head of the Personnel Section of the Department of Information and Control, Díaz-Tendero had at his fingertips information on the political antecedents and present political persuasion of every officer in the army. The fourth seat was held by General Vicente Rojo, the Chief of the Central General Staff, who throughout the war remained on excellent terms with the Party and never criticized it in any of his post-war writings. As a result, the Junta de Mandos, with the blessing of Negrín, made whatever appointments and promotions it deemed necessary to advance the interests of the PCE. Hence, it is more than likely, as an anarchist report claims, that of the 7,000 promotions made between May and September 1938, 5,500 involved members of the Party.[24]

It would be fanciful to state that in seeking dominion over the army the communists' sole concern was military efficiency or to suggest that, if General Franco had been defeated, the Party would have voluntarily relinquished control of the army to a democratically elected government; for as La Pasionaria herself acknowledged after the Civil War, the army was "designed to play a decisive role in determining the future political structure of Spain."[25]

This frank admission gives added credence to the testimony of Enrique Castro, a member of the Central Committee of the PCE, who, after he had left the Party, published the following excerpt from a speech he made to fellow communists in the Fifth Regiment, when he was still its first Commander-in-Chief.

> Only by winning this war shall we achieve the revolution, establish Socialism and become another Soviet Republic in an area of great importance to Communism in the entire world. You all know, comrades, that to wage a war an army is needed. . . . We are going to become the organizers of that army. . . . That army will be our army—listen carefully—our army. But we alone know this. For everyone else that army will be an army of the Popular Front. We shall direct it, but, above all, we must appear to others as combatants of the Popular Front.[26]

There is really nothing strange about the candour of this speech, for it would be hard to imagine that there was a single sophisticated member of the PCE who did not believe that the Popular Front alliance was merely a transitory coalition, whose purpose was to advance the aims of the Comintern and the Party and that "an army of the Popular Front" would be a determining factor in shaping the present and future course of the revolution.

[23] Pérez Salas, p. 147.

[24] This detailed report is in the Rocker Collection, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.

[25] Dolores Ibárruri (La Pasionaria), *El único camino* (Ediciones Sociales, Paris, 1962), p. 389. See also report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 13 Nov. 1937 in Ibárruri, *En la lucha* (Editorial Progreso, Moscow, 1938), p. 197.

[26] Enrique Castro, *Hombres made en Moscú* (Publicaciones Mañana, Mexico D.F., 1960), p. 277.

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It is of course common knowledge that the battlefields of Spain were testing grounds for weapons and techniques used by the German General Staff. The same is true with respect to its Soviet counterpart and this is confirmed in a book by the Soviet High Command published in 1939, which refers to the practical experience gained during the Civil War "in preparing the Red Army for action."[27] But it is also true that the Civil War allowed the USSR to test new weapons and techniques in the field of politics that have since served it well in its quest for world domination. In the official Soviet *Kommunisticheskii internatsional: kratkii istoricheskii ocherk*, previously mentioned, Moscow acknowledged the value of the Spanish experience: "The course of events in Spain revealed a fact of paramount importance, namely, that the Popular Front, the new democracy, was a connecting link between the defensive anti-fascist struggle and the ultimate aim—the struggle for socialism [i.e. communist totalitarianism]. The significance of the Spanish experiment for an understanding of the means of approach to the socialist stage of the revolution was fully grasped and appreciated by the Comintern."[28] As Manuel Azcárate and José Sandoval, two close associates of Santiago Carrillo, stated in 1963 before they left the PCE, "the democratic and parliamentary republic of a new type" was the forerunner of "the modern people's democracies" that emerged in Eastern Europe after the Second World War.[29] The connection is worth pondering, for the techniques used in Spain and later in Eastern Europe to achieve political and military hegemony are the same techniques as those being used in Central America.

Julián Gorkin, an enlightened opponent of Soviet policy, has written the following compelling lines:

> It has been repeatedly said that the Spanish Civil War was a general rehearsal for the Second World War; what is not clearly understood is that it was also the first testing ground for 'popular democracy,' perfected forms of which we have been obliged to witness in a dozen countries during the post-war period. The men and methods used to convert these countries into Kremlin satellites were tested in Spain. For this reason, among many, the Spanish experience had and continues to have historical and universal significance.[30]

An important question must now be asked. Is the universality of the Spanish experience—with its important lessons for the modern world—the reason that some historians prefer to play down or totally ignore the hegemonic aims of the PCE during the Spanish Civil War?

[27] Generalnyi Shtab RKKA, *Upravlenie voiskami i rabota shtabov v ispanskoi respublikanskoi armii.* (Moscow, 1939), p. 125.

[28] P. 444.

[29] *Spain 1936–1939* (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1963), p. 85.

[30] Essay by Julián Gorkin in Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, (ed.), *The Strategy of Deception* (Farrar, Strauss, New York, 1963), p. 196. John Dos Passos, who visited Spain during the Civil War, wrote some years later, "[It] was in the Spanish operation that the pattern [was] laid down for infiltration, subversion and seizure of power . . . used to such victorious effect in Czechoslovakia and in China a few years later." (*The Theme Is Freedom* (Dodd, Mead, New York, 1956), p. 151.)

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A Balance Sheet of Sandinista Rule in Nicaragua

Marian Leighton

THE Sandinista forces that marched into the Nicaraguan capital of Managua in July 1979 represented a coalition of revolutionary nationalists, business and middle class elements, Catholic clergy and laity, Marxist–Leninist ideologues, and ordinary workers and peasants whose sole common objective was the ousting of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Today, the coalition is in disarray and the Marxist–Leninists are predominant. Heroes of the revolution, notably Edén Pastora ("Commandante Zero"), have broken with the regime, charging it with betraying the legacy of Augusto César Sandino. "Bourgeois" men and women, such as Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of the newspaper editor whose murder in January 1978 catalyzed the revolutionary forces, and Alfonso Robelo Callejas, a wealthy industrialist, have withdrawn from Sandinista ranks. Men who fought shoulder to shoulder with the Sandinistas against Somoza's National Guard have created armies of their own to bring down their former comrades. The resistance forces or "Contras" are gathering strength.

How did the Sandinista revolution move from triumph to tragedy in little more than five years? A key factor lies in the divergence between the goals proclaimed for public and international consumption by the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) before it took control of the government of Nicaragua and the policies it pursued after coming to power.

On 17 June 1979, the Sandinistas organized in Costa Rica a five-member junta, or governing council, of the Nicaraguan Provisional Government of National Reconstruction (GRN). The junta was composed of Daniel Ortega Saavedra, a member of the FSLN who was designated as the junta's coordinator; Alfonso Robelo, a prominent figure in the Broad Front of non-Marxist groups that stood alongside the Sandinistas in their struggle to topple Somoza; Sergio Ramirez Mercado, an FSLN member who was a well-known novelist and biographer of Sandino; Violeta Barrios de Chamorro; and Moisés Hassán Morales, a nationalist, an FSLN adherent, and a longstanding opponent of the Somoza dynasty. Convinced that the junta represented a broad-based, democratic alternative to Somoza, the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States (OAS) passed a resolution on 23 June that in effect delegitimized the Somoza regime and gave OAS recognition to the junta. Recognition was predicated upon the junta's previously expressed commitment to democratic pluralism, a mixed economy, respect for human rights, and a foreign policy of non-alignment.

The GRN issued a document entitled "Steps to Restore Peace in

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Nicaragua" through the pursuit of democracy, human rights, and "the first free elections known by our country in this century." On 13 July 1979, as the Sandinista forces were poised to capture Managua, Sergio Ramirez held a press conference in Costa Rica to reaffirm the letter and spirit of the document and to solicit, in return, "active solidarity" on the part of the OAS.[1]

After the Sandinistas took power, however, many of their well-wishers, both domestic and international, began to suspect that they harboured a hidden agenda. For those who read the FSLN's programme and studied the movement's history and the backgrounds of some of its leaders, a perspective emerged that was seriously at odds with the public image that the Sandinistas had foisted on their audience at home and abroad.

Some of the doubters' worst fears have now been realized. Despite generous American and other Western economic aid in the initial stages of their rule, the Sandinistas have steered the economy steadily in a socialist direction and have concluded a wide variety of economic and trade accords with the Soviet bloc. In foreign policy generally, Nicaragua remains non-aligned in name only. Cuba and the Soviet Union have become its foremost allies and military suppliers; such formerly stalwart supporters of the regime as the Socialist International have become disenchanted; and the Sandinistas' invocations of a "revolution without frontiers" threaten to engulf Central America in turmoil.

The Sandinistas waited more than five years to hold elections. Moreover, the throttling of the political opposition during the campaign was symptomatic of the regime's determination to transform Nicaragua into a single-party state. Daniel Ortega has not attempted to conceal the Marxist orientation of the Sandinistas. Asked by an interviewer about the government's commitment to Marxism, he replied, "Our roots are profoundly Nicaraguan, though we do not deny our relationship with the universal ideology."[2] Daniel's brother Humberto, the Nicaraguan defence minister, was even more forthright: "We could say that Marxism–Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our revolution," he declared.[3]

Whatever doubts may have lingered among the Sandinistas' democratic friends about the nature of the regime should have been banished decisively with the publication of a remarkable speech by Commandante Bayardo Arce Castaño. Arce, one of the nine members of the ruling FSLN National Directorate, is an ideological watchdog and served as the coordinator of the FSLN's commission to oversee the 1984 electoral process. His speech was delivered in June 1984 to the policy

[1] The press conference was broadcast by Panama City Televisora Nacional on 13 July 1979. (See FBIS Latin America, 16 July 1979, p. 13.) The FSLN—the real locus of power in Nicaragua—wrote a separate letter that acknowledged OAS recognition of the Sandinista regime, thereby implicitly accepting the *quid pro quo* laid out by the OAS.

[2] *New York Times*, 18 Dec. 1983.

[3] *New York Times Magazine*, 28 Aug. 1983.

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committee of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), the country's pro-Soviet Communist Party, which evidently had ridiculed the need for elections. A cassette recording of the speech was smuggled to the newspaper *La Vanguardia* in Barcelona, Spain, and was published verbatim on 31 July. No Sandinista leader has denied the authenticity of the speech, although Daniel Ortega claimed that Arce's remarks "do not represent the official position of the Sandinista front."[4]

Arce described the elections scheduled for November 1984 as "bourgeois formalities" and a "nuisance" that nonetheless constituted a mechanism for handling US pressure for the establishment of a democratic government in Nicaragua. He added that:

> We see the elections as one more weapon of the revolution to gradually materialize its historical objectives. . . . We intend to reap every advantage we can from them; first, to wage a political–ideological indoctrination campaign among the people [and], second . . . to use the outcome to legitimize the revolution.

Referring his audience back to the period before the triumph of the Sandinistas, Arce recalled various proposals by the OAS and the United States that—in his opinion—could have resulted in power-sharing with Somozist elements. "Against that background," he said, "we spoke of bringing about revolutionary change based on three principles that made us presentable in the international context and which, as far as we were concerned, were manageable from the revolutionary standpoint. Those principles were non-alignment abroad, a mixed economy, and political pluralism." Returning to the situation in 1984, Arce asserted that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" must have the "ability to impose its will by utilizing the means at hand and not go through bourgeois formalities." However, he recognized the need "to call elections and take away from American policy one of its justifications for aggression against Nicaragua, because the other two factors cannot be conceded." Arce elaborated:

> Imperialism asks three things of us: to abandon internationalism, to abandon our strategic ties with the Soviet Union and the socialist community, and to be democratic. We cannot cease being internationalists unless we cease being revolutionaries. We cannot cease strategic relationships unless we cease being revolutionaries. . . . Yet . . . bourgeois democracy has an element we can manage and even derive advantages from for the construction of socialism in Nicaragua. . . . The main thing about the elections . . . is the drafting of the new constitution. That . . . will allow us to mould the juridical and political principles for the construction of socialism. . . . We are using an instrument [elections] claimed by the bourgeoisie which disarms the international bourgeoisie, in order to move ahead in matters that for us are strategic. On the one hand, it allows us to neutralize the aggressiveness of imperialism, while on the other providing us with a means for moving ahead on

[4] *Washington Post*, 12 Aug. 1984.

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> substantive aspects of our revolution. In saying this, we the Sandinista Front are indicating that we cannot go into the elections with a pink flag in order to make a red constitution. . . .

Apparently alluding to the PSN's desire to place candidates on the ballot under that party's own symbol, Arce contended that the Sandinista flag alone would appear on the ballot so that people would "know who they were voting for." According to Arce: "We believe that the elections should be used for a vote for Sandinism, that it is the latter that is being challenged and stigmatized by imperialism. . . ." He added, "What's the difference whether you have separate status or not . . . in the electoral process if it is already perfectly clear what the strategic goal is from the viewpoint of the governing forces of society?" Arce implied that the communist PSN might dissolve itself eventually into the broader Sandinista front—a phenomenon with precedents in Algeria and Egypt.

Evidently aware of the unfavourable international reaction that Fidel Castro elicited upon proclaiming openly his fidelity to Marxism–Leninism, Arce left his audience with an important reminder. "We [Sandinistas] have not declared ourselves Marxist–Leninists publicly and officially," he said; "we manage without definitions."

FORMAL labels aside, the FSLN from the time of its creation in Havana in 1961 has been an ideological bedfellow of the communist bloc. The affinity was somewhat obscured by the presence among the FSLN leaders of genuine non-communist nationalists such as Eden Pastora and by the clever manner in which the FSLN absconded with the nationalist legacy of Sandino, who loathed the "Yankees" more than he loved the communists. During the 1983 conference in East Berlin commemorating the centenary of Marx's death, Sandinist leader Victor Tirado Lopez declared that "We, the founders and organizers of the FSLN, prepared our strategy, our tactics and our programme on the basis of Marx's teachings. . . . We are sure that in following the banners of Marx, Lenin, and Sandino we will overcome all difficulties. . . ."[5]

Carlos Fonseca Amador, the founder of the FSLN, was a radical leftist student leader in the city of Matagalpa in the early 1950s when he was invited to join the National Union for Popular Action (UNAP). This was a movement to promote social change and the rights of labour to organize in Nicaragua. One of its leaders was Pedro Joaquin Chamorro-Cardenal, who later became the editor of the opposition newspaper *La Prensa* and was martyred in 1978. The basic thrust of UNAP's activity was the democratization of political power; it rejected communist totalitarianism. Fonseca declined to join UNAP—probably because of its lack of ideological militancy. In the mid-1950s Fonseca embraced Marxism and joined the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, which had been created in 1944. He travelled in the late 1950s to the Soviet Union, where

[5] Quoted in Timothy Ashby, "Nicaragua: Soviet Satrapy," *Proceedings of the US Naval Academy*, July 1984, p. 55.

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his communist leanings were reinforced.[6] Fonseca reportedly united several small anti-government groups in Nicaragua and suggested that they name their movement after Augusto Cesar Sandino, the peasant-born leader and self-styled general of the forces battling the US Marines in Nicaragua during the 1920s and early '30s.[7] Fonseca's comrades-in-arms, mostly children of the middle classes, included the Ortega brothers, Victor Tirado Lopez (a former member of the Mexican Communist Party), and Enrique Ruiz.[8] As early as 1961, small bands of Sandinistas carried out operations along the Nicaraguan–Honduran border.

Fonseca was a fervent admirer of Fidel Castro. In fact, Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge Martinez, all radical activists, founded the FSLN in Havana in 1961.[9] In 1970 the Cuban journal *Tricontinental* published the programme of the FSLN. The document described the Sandinista movement as "*a vanguard organization* which, through a direct struggle with its enemies, is capable of seizing political power and establishing a revolutionary government based on a worker–peasant alliance and the support of all the anti-imperialist patriotic forces of the country."[10] In 1971, in a message to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Fonseca called the FSLN "the successor to the Bolshevik October Revolution."

The Sandinista movement comprised three major factions which shared a commitment to the establishment of a socialist Nicaragua but differed on the tactics and timing of the revolution and on the pace and scope of change in the post-revolutionary period. Three representatives from each faction now form the FSLN's ruling nine-member Directorate. Whether the competing tendencies have effectively neutralized one another or whether reports of antagonisms among the commandantes portend serious discord is a question that preoccupies "Sandinologists."

Borge became the leader of the so-called Prolonged Popular War faction in the Sandinista movement. This group, organized during the early 1960s among the peasants in northern Nicaragua, was inspired by the Chinese and Cuban revolutions and emphasized guerrilla warfare and proselytizing in the rural areas. Borge himself was trained in Cuba and maintains a close friendship with Fidel Castro. He was released from jail

[6] For further details, see Arturo J. Cruz, "Nicaragua: The Sandinista Regime at a Watershed," *Strategic Review*, Spring 1984, pp. 13–14.

[7] *New York Times*, 10 Nov. 1983.

[8] Daniel, Humberto and Camilo Ortega were sons of a lower-middle class family but reportedly were helped financially by a more affluent relative and managed to obtain good educations. Daniel was among the political prisoners whose freedom Somoza exchanged for the hostages that the Sandinistas seized during a 1974 raid on an official government Christmas party. He was flown to Cuba, where he reportedly underwent military training and subsequently returned secretly to Nicaragua. He and his brothers formed an influential trio within the FSLN. Camilo was later killed in the revolutionary struggle. See *New York Times*, 26 March 1982.

[9] See Michael Kramer, "The Not-Quite War," *New York Magazine*, 12 Sept. 1983, p. 42. Fonseca was killed in battle against Somoza's National Guard in 1977. An eternal flame burns at his tomb on the Plaza of the Revolution in Managua.

[10] Emphasis in original. See Kevin Devlin, "Nicaraguan Lesson," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 20 Aug. 1979, pp. 3ff.

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and flown to Havana in August 1978 as part of an exchange of 59 political prisoners (including Daniel Ortega) for 1,500 hostages seized by Sandinista guerrillas during an attack on the National Palace. As the only Nicaraguan leader to hold top posts in both the military (as army commander) and civilian (party as well as government) hierarchies, Borge emerged as *primus inter pares* among the Sandinistas after the revolution. Borge, Arce, and Ruiz are the representatives of the Prolonged Popular War faction on the National Directorate and are generally regarded as the ruling body's most radical members.

Another faction of the Sandinista movement is the Proletarian Tendency—also committed to Marxism—which broke off from Borge's faction in 1973 to foment revolutionary activity among workers and students in urban areas. Its leaders include Jaime Wheelock Róman, Carlos Nuñez Tellez, and Luis Carrion Cruz, all of whom now sit on the Directorate.

The Terceristas (Third Force) were the largest and reportedly most moderate of the Sandinista factions in the period before the revolution. Edén Pastora was their most prominent figure. Daniel and Humberto Ortega and Victor Tirado Lopez are the Tercerista representatives on the National Directorate. Although the Terceristas initially advocated more gradual tactics, in 1977 they abruptly began to press for an immediate insurrection to overthrow Somoza.

In the face of charges from the other two FSLN groups that they were guilty of "adventurism," The Terceristas boldly attacked a number of National Guard outposts in October 1977. Although the raids were unsuccessful militarily, they provided a political and psychological impetus to the Sandinista movement.

With respect to political strategy, the Terceristas contended that the revolution would succeed more quickly if the Sandinistas created a coalition with non-Marxist business and church groups and other elements of the middle class opposed to Somoza. The Terceristas succeeded in persuading the two other Sandinista factions and were instrumental in organizing what came to be known as the Broad Front of non-Marxist opponents to the Somoza regime.

The American Department of the Cuban Communist Party worked to promote collaboration among the three factions of the FSLN. In July 1978, during an international youth festival in Havana, Castro announced the unification of the factions and urged other Latin American revolutionary groups to demonstrate solidarity with the Sandinistas.[11] Castro reportedly also advised the Sandinistas on that occasion that the revolution could succeed more quickly not only if the factions were united but also if the Terceristas' strategy of alliances with non-Marxist elements were implemented.[12]

[11] *Granma* (Havana), 27 July 1978.
[12] *Washington Post*, 14 June 1983.

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In February 1979 the Cuban leader sponsored a meeting in Costa Rica that was attended by communist parties of Central America (including Panama) and Mexico. All were urged to increase their support (in the form of training, arms shipments, and provision of safe havens) for the Sandinista guerrillas. Cuban help was acknowledged by Angel Barrajon, the FSLN representative in Europe, when he noted that "numerous Nicaraguan combatants" underwent training courses in Cuba "at a very qualified level."[13] In March 1979, as the pace of the Nicaraguan revolution quickened, Castro summoned the leaders of the three Sandinista factions to Havana, where he helped them forge a unified leadership and told them that their unity was his precondition for large-scale Cuban military and financial assistance in the climactic stages of the revolution.

Evidently, the Sandinistas met Castro's stipulation. Cuba provided crucial support in the form of arms, logistics, and military advisors during the final Sandinista offensive. Cubans also participated in an "international brigade" that fought alongside the Nicaraguan guerrillas. According to the columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Sandinista strategy was coordinated by Julian Lopez, the Cuban intelligence agency's chief of covert operations for Costa Rica, who posted himself in the FSLN command bunker in that country.[14] Cuban military advisors from the Department of Special Operations, an elite commando unit that reportedly had assisted in Maurice Bishop's coup in Grenada in March 1979, accompanied the Sandinista forces during their final offensive.[15]

REPORTING from Nicaragua, Tad Szulc interviewed the Sandinista leaders shortly before their victory:

> If they come to power, they said, they would establish a revolutionary state that would expropriate all Somoza property, nationalize natural resources and implant social justice along with the establishment of a "popular and democratic army." The guerrillas left no doubt about their admiration for the Cuban revolution, whose influence is powerful within their movement.[16]

Somoza's property was indeed confiscated; referring to the extent of his landholdings—perhaps a third of the country's cultivable acreage—and business empire, one wag declared that Nicaragua had achieved instant socialism.[17] The new government also nationalized five private Nicaraguan banks, announced that foreign banks would be forbidden to accept deposits from the general public, nationalized insurance companies, took control of foreign trade, and placed the administration

[13] AFP, Paris, 25 July 1979.
[14] *Washington Post*, 1 Aug. 1979.
[15] "Strategic Situation in Central America and the Caribbean," *Current Policy*, No. 352, Department of State, 14 Dec. 1981, p. 6.
[16] Quoted in *Human Events*, 23 June 1979, p. 23.
[17] See James Nelson Goodsell, *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 July 1979.

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of natural resources under central control.[18] Wheelock, the minister of agrarian reform, proposed the creation of cooperative farms of 300 to 400 acres each, since "we are finding that the peasants would prefer a collective arrangement to an individual one."[19]

It quickly became obvious that the Sandinistas would impede private enterprise. In an interview with the *Jornal do Brasil* on 23 July 1979, Borge was asked whether Nicaragua would have a mixed economy. He replied: "Yes, *at first*, with great state participation."[20] Sergio Ramírez noted that "We have to solve the economic crisis but do so in political terms." Daniel Ortega added: "Our process is clearly of a Socialist nature."[21] In the spring of 1980, some workers began to seize land and occupy factories with the apparent consent of the regime.

On the political front, the Sandinistas issued a bill of human rights, but its provisions banned "all propaganda against the peace."[22] Similarly, a law on press freedom was adopted, but a member of the FSLN Directorate warned that "the freedom of the press we support will be freedom of that press which supports the revolution."[23]

Power in Managua rested ostensibly with the five-man junta. The junta's ideological spectrum quickly narrowed as the result of the resignations of its two most moderate members. Before the first year of Sandinista rule had passed, Violeta Chamorro resigned "for health reasons." In reality, she quit out of opposition to the growing leftist trend of the regime, and particularly its censorship policies. Alfonso Robelo resigned from the junta over a backstage Sandinista manoeuvre that altered the composition of the new Council of State—the legislative body—so as to give the FSLN a guaranteed majority.[24]

The real locus of power in Nicaragua from the outset was the nine-man Sandinista National Directorate, all of whose members would qualify as political radicals. Unlike the junta members, some of whom studied in the United States, four to six members of the Directorate received

[18] *New York Times*, 6 Sept. 1979.

[19] Ibid. 5 Aug. 1979.

[20] Emphasis added. In the northern city of Léon, which fell to the Sandinistas before much of the rest of Nicaragua, an economy based on communally shared property was created. According to the *New York Times* (29 July 1979), in Léon, the nation's second largest city, "the people receive essential supplies from the central military command through . . . committees that have the power to expropriate and to requisition without compensation. Money is not officially used, and all labour is organized by the Sandinist forces. The arrangement departs significantly from the 'mixed economy' outlined by theoreticians of the junta in which private enterprise would be encouraged in sectors not run by state-owned institutions. The Léon plan is nominally to remain in effect only through the post-war 'emergency,' a period of about a month, or a year, depending on the source of information. But the leaders here are clearly hoping to make the emergency more permanent."

[21] *New York Times*, 25 Jan. 1980.

[22] *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 Aug. 1979.

[23] *Human Events*, 11 Aug. 1979, p. 6.

[24] In May 1980 Rafael Cordova Rivas took Chamorro's place, and Arturo Cruz replaced Robelo. In March 1981 the size of the junta was officially reduced from five members to three—Ortega, Ramirez, and Cordova Rivas. Cruz became ambassador to Washington—a post he held until January 1982, at which time he resigned and subsequently went into self-imposed exile in Costa Rica. Hassan Morales, the other former junta member, was named Minister of Construction and, in 1983, Vice-Minister of the Interior.

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military training and political indoctrination in Cuba, Borge and Ruiz studied in the USSR, and Wheelock was in exile in Chile during the presidency of Salvador Allende. The Directorate's leading role in policy making was reflected in such instances as its decision to abstain on the UN resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The junta previously had made known its intention to support the resolution.

The Sandinista revolution represented the first triumph for Marxism in the western hemisphere since Salvador Allende won power in Chile in 1970. Both the USSR and Cuba had carefully studied the lessons of Chile (particularly Allende's failure to secure control of the armed forces and the police) and were determined to prevent a similar *débâcle* in Nicaragua.

The Sandinistas moved quickly to secure control of the armed forces and the police. They created a Sandinista Popular Army to assure that the armed forces would be loyal to the new regime. Local militia units and Cuban-style Committees for the Defence of Sandinism were established in workplaces and neighbourhoods. Sandinista-controlled labour and peasant confederations took root, and the government (assisted by hundreds of Cuban teachers) embarked on a vast literacy campaign, which implanted political indoctrination along with the rudiments of education. Commenting upon the contents of the basic teaching manual, "The People's Tomorrow," a British observer noted that "the reader is taken through eulogies to land reform, nationalization and to people's power. At the end of the campaign, many peasants may know no more than how to scribble and shout a handful of political slogans."[25]

Shortly after the first anniversary of the revolution, the Sandinista regime announced that it was postponing elections—even for municipal bodies—for several years in order to "educate" the Nicaraguan people in democracy and to organize a new Sandinista political party. In justifying the postponement, junta member Ramírez claimed that "this is an authentic revolution. There are lots of boys who fought for a real revolution. We can't just hold elections and say 'That's that.'"[26] Another high official asserted that "the people have already had their election. With their blood and with the guns in their hands, the people have cast their votes."[27]

The apparently differing views of Nicaraguan leaders on such basic issues as maintaining political pluralism (or even the façade of such pluralism) points once again to the difficulty of gauging the extent of Sandinista unity. Borge—along with Arce, Humberto Ortega, and Ruiz—is said to press for a system in which power flows from the Party in orthodox, Marxist–Leninist fashion and is not diffused, democratic-style.[28] Other members of the Directorate, including Daniel Ortega,

[25] *The Economist*, 10 May 1980, p. 22.
[26] *New York Times*, 22 July 1979.
[27] *The Economist*, 10 May 1980, p. 22.
[28] Marlise Simons, "Inside and Out, Pressures on Nicaragua Are Rising," *New York Times*, 17 July 1983.

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Wheelock, and Carrion, "are said to favour keeping the system flexible, sharing economic power with the private sector, and risking open elections."[29]

On foreign policy matters, divergences among the Sandinista leadership were said to have been particularly noticeable with regard to Defence Minister Humberto Ortega's comment to a foreign correspondent that Nicaragua would study any Soviet proposal for the deployment of nuclear missiles in Nicaragua. "Humberto provides a lot of journalistic scoops," a senior Nicaraguan official reportedly complained.[30]

The respected Costa Rican newspaper *La Nacion*, citing sources close to the Sandinista regime, claimed that in the wake of Daniel Ortega's election as President, Borge conspired with one of his deputies in the Interior Ministry to topple Ortega from power. Borge reportedly was motivated by opposition to Ortega's relatively conciliatory approach to domestic dissent and to the United States.[31]

The sharply contrasting personalities of Borge and Ortega also may contribute to the friction between them that has been reported from a wide variety of commentators. Borge's charisma stands out vividly against Ortega's monotonous public utterances. In 1983 a *Washington Post* correspondent wrote that ". . . Borge's attraction for personal publicity, which in the early days of the Sandinist government placed him regularly on television screens and in newspapers around the world, reportedly irritated his colleagues. His visibility now appears to have decreased substantially."[32] Other reports of discord among the Sandinist leaders have focused on the extent of Cuban and Soviet influence in the country.

Within weeks after coming to power, the Sandinistas sent a delegation led by Borge to Havana, where accords on educational, medical, and technical assistance were reached. Nicaragua also successfully applied for membership in the Non-Aligned Movement—whose chairman in 1979 was Castro—and sent a delegation to the group's summit meeting in Havana in September. Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto Brockman used the Havana summit as a platform from which to announce that Nicaragua would withdraw from the Central American Defence Council (CONDECA). Meanwhile, the FSLN daily *Barricada* published a four-column photo of an East German aircraft delivering food and medicines to Nicaragua (while studiously ignoring the infinitely greater volume of US humanitarian aid); Nicaragua extended diplomatic recognition to Vietnam, North Korea and the puppet Heng Samrin

[29] Ibid.

[30] *Washington Post*, 14 June 1983. The issue arose in the wake of the US decision to deploy Pershing-2 and Cruise missiles in Europe. Moscow declared that, in response, it would position intermediate-range nuclear weapons closer to the United States.

[31] See Tegucigalpa Cadena Audio Video in Spanish, 23 Jan. 1985; FBIS—Latin America, 23 Jan. 1985.

[32] *Washington Post*, 14 June 1983.

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regime in Cambodia; and the FSLN ordered Washington to channel its aid directly to the Sandinista government instead of through the Red Cross and threatened to turn to the socialist bloc for weapons and military training if these were not forthcoming by the West. Nevertheless, President Jimmy Carter received Daniel Ortega in the White House in the autumn of 1979.[33] This gesture was consonant with US efforts to help the Sandinist regime get on its feet in the early post-Somoza period. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick pointed out that on the basis of the Sandinistas' written commitments to the OAS:

> The United States rushed some $24·6 million in emergency food, medical and reconstruction assistance to the FSLN and provided some $118 million in direct financial assistance in the subsequent 18 months. In addition, the United States firmly backed the application of the new government of Nicaragua in the multilateral lending institutions and assisted it in securing some $262 million in aid from those . . . institutions, an amount double what the Somoza government had received in the preceding 20 years.[34]

In the immediate aftermath of the Nicaraguan revolution, the USSR was cautious about furnishing direct aid to Managua, but a portion of its subsidy to Cuba (about $9 million per day) probably found its way into the Sandinistas' coffers. In November 1979, Ruiz travelled to Moscow for talks with Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the CPSU's Central Committee. In January 1980, a five-member Soviet delegation led by Piotr Koshelev of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations arrived for extended discussions in Managua. Then, in March 1980, a Nicaraguan delegation, headed by junta member Hassán Morales and including Borge, Ruiz and Humberto Ortega, visited Moscow for five days at the invitation of the Soviet government and the CPSU Central Committee. The visit was part of a month-long sojourn in the Soviet bloc countries, with stops in East Germany, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The Soviets and Nicaraguans concluded agreements on trade; economic and technical cooperation in the fields of agriculture, fishing, mineral prospecting, power engineering (a possible reference to nuclear energy), transport and communications; scientific and cultural exchanges; cooperation in the field of economic planning; establishment of consulates; inauguration of direct commercial flights between Moscow and Managua and, perhaps most significantly, formal links between the CPSU and FSLN.[35] The fact that the Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov was present at the signing of the joint communiqué and that the document cited "mutually advantageous links

[33] Ibid. 26 March 1982.

[34] *Washington Times*, 15 July 1983.

[35] As one scholar has aptly noted, "Although the [Sandinistas] Front is not a communist party, the agreement reflected Soviet expectations that it would become one and, under Soviet guidance, take on the characteristics of a Soviet-style organization, much as Castro's organization had evolved in Cuba." See Morris Rothenberg, "Latin America in Soviet Eyes," *Problems of Communism*, Sept.–Oct. 1983, p. 7.

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in trade, economic, cultural and *other* spheres," suggests that an accord on Soviet military aid to Nicaragua may also have been reached.[36]

The communiqué, published in *Pravda* on 23 March, stressed the identity of Soviet–Nicaraguan views on virtually every international issue. During an interview for Soviet television, Defence Minister Ortega emphasized Nicaragua's determination to build its future "with the same ardour that was characteristic of the Bolsheviks, with the same enthusiasm that characterized the heirs of Lenin, and with the same zeal that has been characteristic of the heirs of Sandino's cause." In carrying out their future tasks, said Ortega, the Nicaraguan people are "relying on the moral support, political strength, and fraternal assistance of all progressive and revolutionary peoples of the world and, in the first place, naturally, on the support and fraternal proletarian solidarity of the Soviet Union and its people."[37]

THE initial economic policies of the Sandinistas did not cause alarm in the US. Land reform and nationalization of banks and other "commanding heights" of the economy have taken place in many pro-Western countries throughout the Third World as well as in some developed capitalist states. The nature and timing of subsequent policies in Nicaragua were reported to be a subject of intense debate among those Sandinistas trying to stimulate a productive private sector and those committed to doctrinaire communism. In the spring of 1982 the hardliners, led by Planning Minister Ruiz, evidently emerged victorious, as indicated by

> escalating confiscations of Nicaragua's most productive farmlands and the scrapping through massive taxation of new incentives, however anaemic, for the private sector. Ruiz's principal antagonist—Alfredo Cesar, the young Stanford-educated president of the central bank—signalled surrender by going into exile on his honeymoon trip to Panama. With Cesar's departure, the door opened for unrestrained printing of paper money and strangulation of commerce.[38]

Nevertheless, when the wave of nationalizations and expropriations of private property subsided, about 60 per cent of the economy—including such crucial sectors as petroleum refining and distribution—remained in private hands.[39]

Growing estrangement between Managua and Washington, the outbreak of the insurgency, the increasing reallocation of the country's

[36] Emphasis added.

[37] *Pravda*, 22 March 1980.

[38] Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, "Another War for Nicaragua?" *Washington Post*, 31 May 1982. Ruiz reportedly also has encountered competition from Minister of Agriculture Wheelock. The two men are said to be pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban, respectively, but their reputed differences probably are motivated by personal rivalry for influence in economic policy-making. The abolition in 1984 of the Ministry of Planning, of which Ruiz was the head, could indicate the ascendancy of Wheelock. *Washington Post*, 14 June 1983.

[39] *Wall Street Journal*, 20 June 1983.

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meagre economic resources from productive enterprises into the military, the harassment of the Jews (who have played a prominent role in the commercial and financial establishments), and the corruption and mismanagement on the part of the government bureaucracy all took their toll on the economy. The Sandinistas failed miserably in their efforts to inspire the confidence of Nicaragua's businessmen, whose political support had been instrumental in bringing the regime to power. Such distinguished members of the business community as Alfonso Robelo, who served on the original junta, and Adolfo Calero, manager of the Coca-Cola bottling plant in Managua, publicly expressed their disaffection with the regime and went into exile or joined the resistance forces. Most of those who remained found the regime arbitrary at best and hostile at worst. Moreover, food rationing constitutes an assault on the pride of middle and upper class businessmen and professionals—particularly since the neighbourhood defence committees, which distribute the rationing cards, pry into the private and social affairs of everyone under their jurisdiction.

In the countryside, the regime is promoting agro-industrial development, which Arce referred to as "the heart of the socialist transformation of our society."[40] While much of the coffee-growing land remains in private hands, producers feel the heavy hand of the government. Instead of exporting their coffee directly, the growers must sell to the state, which pays them in Nicaraguan currency, collects dollars for the crops on the world market, and "cheats them on the exchange rate."[41] Moreover, it is virtually impossible for the producers to obtain loans from the state-owned banks unless they join an agricultural cooperative.

Not only the business and professional classes, but also the urban lower classes have failed to benefit economically from Sandinista rule. Inflation, low industrial productivity, and shortages of such staples as cooking oil, rice, flour, and sugar brought about by the insurgency and by economic mismanagement have lowered living standards and have forced the population to spend much of its income on basic necessities. According to a UN-sponsored study, the majority of Managua's residents had to spend 78 per cent of their income in 1982 on food alone—compared with 44·5 per cent in 1973.[42]

Adding to the frustration and discontent among all segments of Nicaraguan society has been the emergence of a "new class"—the Sandinista elite—which has appropriated many of the lavish homes and beach-front properties once inhabited by Somoza and his cronies,[43] acquired Mercedes Benzes and other deluxe cars, and created a network of special shops to cater to its expensive tastes. The new privileged class

[40] *La Vanguardia*, 31 July 1984.
[41] *Wall Street Journal*, 20 June 1984.
[42] *New York Times*, 17 July 1983.
[43] A widely publicized photo that circulated in the early days of the regime showed one of the Sandinista commandantes soaking in Somoza's bathtub.

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also enjoys easier access than do other citizens to such rationed commodities as petrol and foodstuffs—not to mention imported luxury items.[44]

Although Nicaragua's mixed economy still survives, capital investment benefiting the private sector is virtually non-existent. Private enterprises thus are becoming increasingly obsolescent as time passes. The Sandinista policy in this respect was indicated by Arce:

> The important thing is that the entrepreneurial class no longer controls all the means to reproduce itself. It no longer controls the banks, foreign trade, or the source of foreign exchange. Therefore, any investment project in our country belongs to the government. The bourgeoisie no longer invests—it subsists.[45]

The Sandinistas have launched a campaign against "speculators, profiteers and hoarders," who are accused of waging "economic aggression."[46] The main targets of the campaign are the vendors in the sprawling markets of Managua and other cities, who pay higher prices to peasant farmers and small manufacturers for their products than does the government. The state-operated marketing system does not pay producers enough to cover their costs, let alone to make a profit. The private vendors are flourishing because of the severe shortages of basic foods and household items at official prices. The "anti-corruption" offensive seems designed to divert public attention from the regime's economic shortcomings by creating scapegoats for the existing economic difficulties. As a vendor in Managua said: "We are not speculators. If the government were able to supply us with what we need, we would be happy to sell at their price."[47]

The difficulties of the Nicaraguan economy are compounded by Managua's growing economic ties with Moscow. In mid-1981, for example, the Sandinistas announced that 2,000 tons of coffee would be sent to the Soviet Union and four East European bloc countries in return for trade credits.[48] A Soviet–Nicaraguan trade agreement valued at some $2 billion was signed in May 1982. It provided for the exchange of 14,000 tons of coffee, cotton, and sugar for Soviet manufactured goods and development projects.[49] Such barter arrangements—typical of economic relations within the Soviet bloc—hamper Nicaragua's ability to earn hard currency. Nicaragua also came to rely upon the Soviets for its energy needs after Venezuela and Mexico decided to cut back oil shipments

[44] Jack Anderson stated in one of his columns that "the Sandinista leaders and their cronies are so blatant about their pursuit of luxury and wealth that the long-suffering Nicaraguan people . . . cynically refer to the revolution as *el engano*, meaning the trick or hoax." He added that Daniel and Humberto Ortega and Tomas Borge created two companies to divide up Nicaragua's import market. "What the Ortega brothers don't control, Borge does." *Washington Post*, 20 Sept. 1985.

[45] *La Vanguardia*, 31 July 1984. See also "Nicaraguan Businesses Face Competition from Sandinistas." *Washington Post*, 5 Oct. 1985.

[46] *New York Times*, 12 Feb. 1985.

[47] Ibid.

[48] FBIS—Latin America, 30 July 1981.

[49] *National Review*, 29 April 1983, p. 500.

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because of Managua's inability to pay. Nicaragua's ability to earn hard currency was further reduced when the United States moved in mid-1983 to eliminate most of the country's sugar quota. Under the quota system, Washington had paid a preferential price for Nicaraguan sugar. Managua has added to its economic difficulties by allocating about one quarter of its national budget to defence.[50] This allocation presages a continuing shortfall in investment capital and other inputs into the already crippled civilian economy.

In February 1984 Daniel Ortega received a delegation from the Soviet-controlled Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The group visited a number of agricultural and industrial enterprises and put forth recommendations for closer cooperation between CMEA and Nicaragua. The result could be a mortgaging of the Nicaraguan economy to the Soviet bloc for the foreseeable future.

The Reagan Administration imposed a trade embargo against Nicaragua in May 1985.[51] Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne Motley announced that the embargo would remain in effect until the Sandinistas stopped aiding communist insurgencies in Central America, cut their military ties with the USSR and Cuba, curtailed their military build-up, and introduced democratic political reforms. The embargo was imposed at a time when the US Congress was debating the issue of aid to the Nicaraguan resistance. The resulting vote banned even non-lethal assistance. In the immediate aftermath of the Congressional vote, Daniel Ortega took a three-week trip to the USSR and several Soviet bloc countries in search of financial and economic aid for the Sandinista regime. Although Ortega claimed that the trip had been arranged considerably in advance of the Congressional proceedings, its inappropriate timing probably created the climate in which President Reagan later was able to secure legislative approval of a $27-million humanitarian aid package for the Nicaraguan resistance forces. Ortega, for his part, reportedly received promises of financial assistance and credits from his Soviet bloc allies, including a Soviet offer to supply as much as 90 per cent of Nicaragua's oil needs.

THE top leadership of the FSLN has proved remarkably stable over a seven-year period. The original nine members of the FSLN Directorate still retain their posts. According to Daniel Ortega, "the FSLN is present as the guide of the revolution, and the National Directorate as its top leader."[52] Most members of the Directorate simultaneously hold positions in the government, so that the FSLN exerts its presence in all important administrative organs of the state—as well as in the military. The nine members of the Directorate are Daniel Ortega (elected

[50] *Washington Post*, 4 Oct. 1984.

[51] See *Washington Times*, 8 May 1985, for a description of the sanctions. Unlike the sanctions imposed on Iran during the hostage crisis, the measures taken against Nicaragua do not impose curbs on international bank credits, nor do they freeze Managua's assets in the United States.

[52] Managua Domestic Service, 19 July 1983.

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President of Nicaragua in November 1984), his brother Humberto (who also serves as Minister of Defence and commander of the army and the Sandinista People's Militia), Tomás Borge (Minister of the Interior and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the army), Luis Carrion (Vice Minister of the Interior and a Deputy Commander of the army), Enrique Ruiz (who headed the Ministry of Planning until its abolition and now serves as Minister of External Cooperation), Jaime Wheelock (Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform), Carlos Nuñez Tellez (Minister of the Presidency in charge of Press and Information Affairs and President of the National Assembly), Bayardo Arce (Coordinator General for Foreign Affairs), and Victor Tirado Lopez (responsible for labour organizations). Decisions among the nine are apparently reached by consensus, and the members rotate the chairmanship of the Directorate.[53] The FSLN has approximately 200,000 members,[54] but there are estimated to be only about 4,000 activists whose function it is to guide and interpret the FSLN's policies to governmental and other bodies.[55] Several leftist parties have joined with the FSLN to form the Patriotic Revolutionary Front (FPR). They include the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), the Popular Christian Socialist Party (PPSC), the Popular Action Movement, and the Independent Liberal Party (PLI). The PSN is a pro-Soviet communist group, while the Communist Party of Nicaragua (which does not belong to the FPR) is Trotskyite.[56] To all intents and purposes the FSLN performs all the official functions, both at home and abroad, of a communist party. For example, it sends delegations to the congresses of "fraternal" parties and participates in various international and regional communist meetings.

JUST as the Sandinista regime has moved towards strangulation of free enterprise in the economic sector, it has also created a climate of intimidation in the political sphere. The Committees for the Defence of Sandinism (modelled on the Cuban committees for the defence of the revolution) carry out much of the work of enforcing the regime's dictates. Their network of informers in neighbourhoods and places of employment is instrumental in ensuring social control, and their power to curtail or withhold rations of basic necessities constitutes an additional lever against dissidents. In addition to the defence committees, the Sandinistas have created a country-wide web of mass organizations affiliated with the FSLN. These serve as Leninist-style "transmission belts" between the regime and the populace. Citizens who decline "invitations" to join these groups are subjected to a gamut of measures ranging from interrogations to threats or actual use of violence against their persons or property. As the Sandinistas have come to rely increasingly on these obedient

[53] *Washington Post*, 14 June 1983.
[54] *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Hoover Institution, 1984), p. 154.
[55] *Washington Post*, 14 June 1983.
[56] Ibid.

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organizations to promote the policies of the revolution, they have become progressively isolated from the non-Marxist elements of society with whom they had allied in the last stages of the struggle against Somoza.

Opposition to the Sandinista regime has developed within the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), the Catholic church, and among politically active members of the middle and upper-middle classes who became alarmed at the FSLN's denial of democracy and free public expression. Jorge Salazar, head of the Nicaraguan coffee-growers' association (a pillar of COSEP) was one of the first prominent citizens to fall victim to the Sandinistas' police. A leading member of Nicaragua's Jewish community also met a violent death after having endured mob attacks on his business establishment. The church became divided between the conservative hierarchy and the "popular church," as will be described below. The regime has curtailed the broadcasting of Mass, harassed the clergy, and sent its *turbas* (mobs) to disrupt worship services. The newspaper *La Prensa*, which stood in the forefront of opposition to Somoza, has been curbed by the Sandinistas through cutbacks of newsprint, interrogations of editors by the security police, and heavy censorship. In June 1984 some 300 Sandinistas demonstrated outside *La Prensa*'s offices chanting "Paredon!" ("To the firing squad!").[57] In November of that year, the FSLN instituted an expanded set of censorship guidelines that prompted *La Prensa*'s editor, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro (son of the martyred publisher), to go into self-imposed exile in Costa Rica.[58] The Sandinistas closed down *La Prensa* entirely in June 1986.

An important test of the regime's sincerity in tolerating peaceful political opposition came when Alfonso Robelo resigned from the junta in 1980 and founded an opposition political party, the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (MDN). Harassment of Robelo and his supporters was continuous. In March 1981 the roads leading to the site of a government-authorized MDN rally were blocked by mobs, who attacked the MDN supporters. The mob violence left two people dead and several injured and resulted in the destruction of the MDN's headquarters in Managua. Since the FSLN originally had approved the rally, some of its apologists tried to argue that lower-echelon officials and organizers of Sandinista youths had disobeyed orders in unleashing the violence. The FSLN itself did little to substantiate these rationalizations, however; when Interior Minister Borge arrived with army units to disperse the mob (after the damage had been done), he declared that the MDN was to

[57] AP, Managua, 23 June 1984.

[58] An American correspondent noted recently that "Although only military information is officially subject to the knife, a recent sample of excised items ranged from praise for the private sector to accounts of plantain shortages and an account of a Cuban youth having tossed a grenade into a crowded dance hall in northern Nicaragua, killing four persons and injuring 18." The reporter added that "The government routinely cites *La Prensa*'s continued publication as proof that political pluralism exists . . . while telling friends that only CIA money keeps the paper going." See Joanne Omang, "Censored News Closely Read," *Washington Post*, 24 Sept. 1985.

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blame for "provoking the ire of the people" with its counter-revolutionary views.[59] Harassment of the MDN and its leadership increased during 1981, and in April 1982 Robelo went into exile in Costa Rica. Two months later, he announced the formation of a political alliance with Eden Pastora, the former Sandinista hero who had also broken with the FSLN.

In March 1982 the regime declared a state of emergency that further weakened actual and potential opponents of Sandinista rule. The emergency decree, justified as necessary to deal with military activities by the resistance forces, suspended *habeas corpus*, curbed the right to strike, and broadened censorship of the print and broadcast media. In April 1983 special judiciary bodies—the People's Tribunals—were created to handle cases against those accused of subversive activities. The state of emergency remains in effect.

According to Miguel Bolanos Hunter, a former high official in the Interior Ministry's General Directorate of State Security (DGSE), the security services undertook a two-year campaign to discredit democratic opponents of the regime by falsely accusing them of conspiring with American diplomats. Bolanos, who broke with the Sandinistas, was a counter-intelligence officer with responsibility for surveillance of US government personnel in Nicaragua. He arranged, *inter alia*, for the dissemination of films purporting to show US officials meeting Nicaraguans from democratic opposition groups, the church, labour unions, the press, and the private economic sector. The campaign climaxed with a bizarre accusation by the DGSE that an American Embassy official had plotted to poison the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister.[60]

Political neutralism has become impossible in Nicaragua. According to Wheelock: "Nicaragua is no longer divided between Somocistas and non-Somocistas. It is divided between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries."[61] If support for the regime meant fighting on its behalf against the resistance forces, a great number of citizens were counter-revolutionaries. Opposition to the military draft became so widespread that the Sandinistas resorted to rounding up young men from homes, schools, cinemas and nightclubs.

Only when the citizenry had been thoroughly cowed and dispirited did the FSLN—under severe pressure from Western governments and the Socialist International—agree to elections. In the late summer of 1983 a law on political parties was drafted. The parties that already had legal status included those in the FPR (the umbrella group controlled by the FSLN) and three anti-government parties forming the so-called Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator (CDN). Other groups were said to be eligible to receive legal status. The parties were guaranteed the right to recruit members, publicize their platforms, and field candidates if they

[59] *Washington Post*, 16 March 1981.
[60] Ibid. 19 June 1983.
[61] Ibid. 5 May 1982.

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pledged to "promote and support national unity and consolidate and defend revolutionary conquests."[62] Subsequently, Borge claimed that the regime was prepared to provide financial subsidies and guarantee TV and radio time to opposition parties in the electoral campaign. He added that the Sandinistas were willing to lift press censorship in the final stages of the four-to-six-week campaign. Borge also stated that the military would not challenge the authority of the election's winner, even if he were to turn out to be an opponent of the Sandinistas.[63]

Borge's rhetoric was impressive. However, the opposition parties were harassed in their recruiting efforts, their access to the media was restricted severely, and the few meetings they were permitted to hold to rally their supporters were broken up by the *turbas*. Most importantly, the government controlled the election machinery. Although voting was not compulsory, each voter identification card contained a space in which poll workers made a notation to indicate that the card-holder had cast a ballot. Many citizens feared that failure to vote would get them into trouble with their neighbourhood defence committees, which, as already noted, had the authority to supply or withhold rationed items.

Arturo Cruz, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Coordinator, was allowed to return from exile, but his freedom to campaign was virtually non-existent. As the *Washington Post* pointed out, "The Sandinistas have relaxed only some of the restrictions on opposition campaigning, and they keep the sword of emergency legislation in hand. Even with no restrictions, they would have the advantage conferred by five years of competition-free organizing of Nicaraguan society."[64] The *New York Times* editorial stated that . . . "the Sandinistas' claim to be organizing that country's first free election is nonsense. They seek only ratification of a five-year-old dictatorship."[65] Or, in the words of the Sandinistas themselves, they wanted only to "confirm revolutionary power."[66] Not the least of the ironies of the Sandinista-ordered electoral process was the selection of Arce to oversee it. His contempt for elections has been amply documented above.

At the end of July 1984, the Democratic Coordinator, which was the only opposition group with substantial popular support, withdrew from the electoral campaign. By that time, the Coordinator had come to represent four centrist and conservative political parties (the Social Democrats, Social Christians, Conservatives, and Constitutional Liberals), two anti-government labour unions, and COSEP (the association of private businessmen and landowners). The Coordinator and its presidential candidate, Cruz, were subjected to furious invective by the Sandinistas for the decision to withdraw—a decision that undermined the credibility of the regime's claim to be holding free,

[62] *Barricada Internacional*, 29 Aug. 1983.
[63] *New York Times*, 3 Feb. 1984.
[64] *Washington Post*, 3 July 1984.
[65] *New York Times*, 24 July 1984.
[66] *Washington Post*, 31 July 1984.

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unfettered elections. The Sandinistas, however, made no move to alleviate the campaign restrictions that brought about the withdrawal.

Following the Coordinator's move came an announcement by Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council in August that the parties belonging to the CDN had lost their legal status and their right to operate because they had failed to register their candidates by the assigned deadline of 4 August. The CDN's refusal to register came as a result of the FSLN's rejection of its requests to abolish the state of emergency, lift press censorship, and initiate a national discussion which would include leaders of the resistance forces. The ensuing period witnessed efforts by anti-Sandinista political groupings to postpone the elections in order to provide adequate time for free organizing and campaigning. However, the regime, having decided belatedly to hold the elections in response to domestic and international pressure, insisted on adhering to the scheduled date of November 1984. The CDN thus decided to boycott the voting.

A president, vice-president and 96-member National Assembly were chosen in the election. Approximately 80 per cent of the country's eligible voters cast ballots; the large turn-out was due partly to the enthusiasm of the newly enfranchised 16 to 18 year olds and partly to the feeling among adult voters that abstention could be counted against them by their neighbourhood defence committees.

Seven parties were listed on the ballot, but the choice offered to voters was considerably narrower than this number might indicate. Five of the parties were intimately linked with the FSLN, while the Independent Liberal Party had announced its withdrawal from the contest but was kept on the ballot by the Sandinistas, who wanted to maintain their pluralist façade for international consumption. The Sandinistas' candidate, Daniel Ortega, won handily as President, and the FSLN and its allies captured two thirds of the 96 seats in the National Assembly, which is empowered to draw up a constitution for Nicaragua by 1987. Sergio Ramirez was elected Vice-President, and Carlos Nuñez was chosen President of the Assembly. The Democratic Conservative Party, which split with the Conservative Party over the boycott of the election, won the largest bloc of opposition seats—14—in the Assembly. The Independent Liberals, some of whose junior members ignored the leadership's call for an electoral boycott, took nine seats.[67]

Although the Sandinistas undoubtedly can cope with the opposition forces within the Assembly, the extra-parliamentary opposition could be more troublesome. During an interview with the West German magazine *Der Spiegel*, Daniel Ortega was asked how the regime would deal with the opposition that boycotted the election. He replied that "we are trying to include it in the national dialogue. Alas, this opposition sabotages the National Assembly. Now it is in fact excluded from the political

[67] The Popular Social Christian Party took six seats, and the Popular Marxist–Leninist Action Movement, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, and the Nicaraguan Communist Party each took two.

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decision-making in this country." Asked whether it would have access to the media, Ortega answered: "It has its mouthpiece in . . . *La Prensa*. But it will not, of course, be government policy to promote this opposition's access to the media."[68]

The term "national dialogue" has been repeatedly invoked in Nicaragua since the elections, but it is not made clear what this term really denotes. Daniel Ortega has referred to a "national dialogue" in the context of peaceful engagement amongst representatives of the National Assembly and their constituents, aimed at consolidating the gains of the revolution. Others insist that a "national dialogue" must aim at restoring peace and tranquillity to the country. Without referring specifically to the resistance forces, they appear to be calling for discussions between the Sandinista regime and the insurgents.

On 18 January 1985, seven parties signed a document stating:

> The national dialogue does not attempt to detract from the sovereign integrity of the National Assembly, which has as its specific functions to legislate and draft a constitution, but is rather directed at reaching agreements of a national scope to unite all Nicaraguans in the search for peace, democratic stability, and the progress of the nation. . . . We will continue to maintain bilateral and multilateral contacts and consultations in favour of a national dialogue, aware of the fact that the general crisis in the land is worsening every day and that the uncontainable aggravation of the national situation will, in the final analysis, require abandoning intransigent atttudes to open a path to reach patriotic agreements of national consensus.[69]

The signatories of the document were the Independent Liberal Party, the Social Christian Party, the Communist Party of Nicaragua, the Constitutionalist Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, and the Unionist Central American Party—a listing that represents a notably broad spectrum of political opinion.

THE letter to the OAS written by the junta in 1979 promised not only to uphold a mixed economy, non-alignment, and political pluralism, but also to respect human rights: ". . . It is our firm intention to establish full observance of human rights in our country in accordance with the United Nations Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Charter of Human Rights of the OAS," the Nicaraguan representatives wrote.[70] Yet, the Sandinistas have targeted entire classes and groups as enemies of the revolution. These include the Miskito Indians (who traditionally have desired only to maintain their culture and way of life without interference from the central government in Managua); clergymen and worshippers who reject "liberation theology" and the "popular church"; Jews, who became a target as "Zionists," and private

[68] *Der Spiegel*, 31 Dec. 1984, pp. 78–83.
[69] *La Prensa*, Managua, 20 Jan. 1985.
[70] See FBIS—Latin America, 16 July 1979.

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entrepreneurs, resisting the Sandinista's attempts to change the Nicaraguan economy from a capitalist to a socialist orientation.

The Indians have the double fault of clinging to their relative autonomy in the face of a regime that demands active political support and mobilization, and of residing in a region near the Honduran border that the Sandinistas wished to depopulate and convert into a free-fire zone in the battle against the insurgents. The Indians were particularly incensed at the influx of Cuban teachers, doctors, and soldiers into their communities and their interference with the local power structure and cultural mores. When the Indians complained, they were driven from their homes and herded into squalid refugee camps. Not surprisingly, many of them joined the resistance forces.

Two organizations claim to represent the Indians. One is Misurasata, an appellation derived from the names of the Miskito, Rama, and Sumu tribes. Its leader is Brooklyn Rivera, a Miskito. He has met on several occasions with Sandinista representatives to attempt to negotiate a statute of autonomy for the Indian population, "which will permit them to develop their region, creating their own nation within the framework of the Nicaraguan state."[71] Misurasata is allied with the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), one of the two major resistance organizations. The other Indian umbrella group is Misura, which is headed by Steadman Fagoth Muller and is affiliated with the FDN, the other resistance organization. Fagoth, a former Sandinista commander, declares that Misura will never negotiate with the present regime in Managua.[72]

Sandinista relations with the Catholic church will be dealt with in the following section, but suffice it to state here that in trampling on religious freedom, the regime grossly violated the human rights of clergy and believers. One particularly outrageous incident occurred in August 1982 and involved a fake sex scandal perpetuated against the Rev. Bismarck Carballo, the spokesman for Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo. The section of the DGSE assigned to monitor the church enlisted a prostitute to pose as a penitent and try to seduce Carballo. While the two were engaged in conversation, a security agent, pretending to be the woman's husband, burst into the room, ripped off Carballo's clothes, and shoved him naked into the street where other security officials were waiting with cameras.

[71] AFP, Paris, 16 Nov. 1984. At the time of writing, peace talks between the FSLN and the Miskitos had reached a dead end. As described in a *Washington Post* report of 30 May 1985, "Misurasata leaders have pressed the Sandinistas to withdraw their soldiers from Indian towns, but the Sandinistas say this is impossible because it would give insurgents freedom to operate. . . . [But] the autonomy issue is perhaps more divisive than that of military control. The Sandinistas . . . have repeatedly stressed their determination not to accept any limitations on Government power in Indian areas."

[72] In September 1985 a new group called KISAN emerged. Its name is an acronym for Nicaraguan Coast Indian Unity, and it claims to represent 250,000 Indians and English-speaking blacks from the Atlantic coastal zone of Nicaragua. Wycliffe Diego, KISAN's leader, expressed the group's desire to join the Nicaraguan Opposition Union, the organization authorized to receive non-lethal military assistance from the United States. See the *Washington Times*, 19 Sept. 1985.

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Nicaragua's Jewish community, which numbered only about 50 families but played a role disproportionate to its numbers in the business and cultural life of the country, became a target of harsh persecution by the Sandinistas. The chief motivation behind the campaign seems to have been the close alliance between the FSLN and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[73] The campaign against the Jews began even before the Sandinistas came to power. In 1978, five young men shouting pro-PLO and anti-Jewish slogans set the front doors of the Managua synagogue alight with torches during Sabbath services. Meanwhile, the Sandinistas' clandestine radio announced that it would execute Max Najman, a Nicaraguan who served as honorary consul of Israel. Najman went into exile. Freddy Luft, the owner of a textile factory, fled Nicaragua when one of his employees who belonged to the FSLN warned him that he would be imprisoned after the revolution. Another Jewish factory owner, Abraham Gorn, was forced to flee after his enterprise was burned and the Sandinistas collected the insurance money. Inexplicably, he returned after the fall of Somoza. The Sandinistas accused him of stealing land and sentenced 70-year-old Gorn to sweeping streets. The regime subsequently confiscated the Managua synagogue on the flimsy pretext that it was Gorn's private property. The building is now festooned with graffiti excoriating Zionism.[74]

Both Jewish and non-Jewish businessmen and entrepreneurs have been subject to intimidation and arrest by the Sandinistas. In the autumn of 1981, for example, three members of the business community were jailed for issuing a statement that the government displayed "a definite Marxist–Leninist tendency." Businessman Alfonso Robelo and his MDN organization were assaulted by Sandinista-inspired mobs, as noted above. Jorge Salazar, head of COSEP, was murdered by agents of the FSLN.[75]

Nicaragua's democratic trade union confederations have also been major targets of government persecution. A number of members of the Nicaraguan Workers' Federation (CTN), which represents some 60,000 workers and is affiliated with political groups advocating democracy for Nicaragua, have been imprisoned for more than two years without having been accused of any crime. According to José Espinoza, secretary of the Confederacion de Unificacion Sindical (CUS), members of his organization have been incarcerated simply for exercising their right to join a union. Sandinista security forces have besieged the CUS headquarters and on May Day prevented members of the confederation from holding a peaceful march. Both the AFL-CIO and the International Labour Organization (ILO) have publicly expressed concern about the

[73] On the first anniversary of the Sandinista revolution, PLO chief Yassir Arafat was received in Managua by Tomas Borge. "We say to our brother Arafat that Nicaragua is his land," oozed Borge. See Shoshana Bryen, "The Sandinistas and the Jews," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 Aug. 1983.

[74] The home of one prominent Jewish family now serves as the embassy of Bulgaria. For further details on the plight of Nicaragua's Jews, see Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "Flight From Nicaragua," *Washington Post*, 18 Aug. 1985.

[75] The current president of COSEP, Enrique Bolanos Geyer, told a press conference that the Sandinistas had expropriated more than 90 per cent of his land. See the *Washington Post*, 18 June 1985.

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mistreatment of Nicaraguan workers and union officials, as well as about the Sandinistas' refusal to permit free collective bargaining.[76]

According to Maria Patricia Baltondano, until recently head of Nicaragua's Permanent Commission on Human Rights, professors and students have been expelled from universities for falling foul of Sandinista student and youth groups. The Commission, a politically independent body that has monitored human rights abuses under both the Somoza and Sandinista regimes, contends that the Sandinistas hold over 4,000 political prisoners, roughly the same number as had Somoza. "You don't see systematic killing or torture, as there was under Somoza, but the Sandinistas are developing an incredible system of control . . . based on fear," said Baltondano.[77]

IN A country as overwhelmingly Catholic as Nicaragua, broad support from the church would have given a tremendous boost to the Sandinistas' efforts to consolidate their authority. In fact, many clergymen were more than willing to give the new regime the benefit of the doubt, especially since some had participated in the Broad Front that helped give the revolutionaries a democratic aura during the last year of the struggle against Somoza. However, once in power, it did not take long for the Sandinistas to dissipate the goodwill of many religious believers. Broadcasts of Mass were curtailed and pastoral letters were printed in censored form. The regime sought to abolish religious instruction in schools and supplant it with classes in Marxist doctrine. Mobs disrupted church services. They also harassed and intimidated priests, many of whom began to be charged with unspecified "counter-revolutionary" activities. A number of foreign priests were expelled from Nicaragua, and the indigenous clergy came under growing pressure to adhere to the "popular church" and its philosophy of "liberation theology." Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega Mantilla, president of the Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference, spoke for most Catholics when he declared: "What is called the 'popular church' is neither popular nor a church. It is not a church because it does not lead to God, and it is not popular because it is allied with power instead of man."[78]

In addition to purely religious issues, the church clashed with the Sandinista regime on the question of military conscription. The church believes that a regime dominated by a single ideology should not draft its citizens into the army—particularly when they are being sent into battle against fellow Nicaraguans.

A watershed in church–state relations in Nicaragua came with Pope John Paul II's visit to Managua in March 1983. As described by a US journalist:

> The Pope was reported to be very upset with the treatment he received at the hands of the Sandinistas. They greeted him at the

[76] *Washington Times*, 20 Sept. 1985.
[77] *Wall Street Journal*, 20 June 1984.
[78] *New York Times*, 18 Dec. 1983.

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> airport with a lengthy anti-American harangue, refused to erect a cross where he was saying Mass, and put a claque of hecklers in the front of the audience, while keeping the faithful at a distance.[79]

The Pope's open-air mass for half a million people was drowned out by *turbas* shouting "Popular Power!" through microphones. The Pope tried to ignore the shouting but finally left the square without concluding the Mass. In the meantime, groups of devout citizens who had gathered at various churches to march together to the square were kept inside the churches by Sandinista hecklers until the Pope was gone.[80]

A new crisis erupted during Easter 1984. First, the traditional Good Friday procession in Managua turned into a demonstration by some 100,000 Nicaraguans of "their passionate solidarity with the Catholic Church and opposition to the Sandinista regime."[81] On Easter Sunday, a pastoral letter by the Catholic Bishops' Conference was read in the churches. It constituted the bishops' most comprehensive criticism of the Sandinista regime until that time. The letter condemned "materialistic and atheistic education," restrictions on religious freedom, press censorship, the detention of political prisoners, violence against Nicaragua's Indian communities, and the mismanagement of the economy.[82] It urged the regime to enter into negotiations with all its opponents, both inside and outside Nicaragua, including those "who have risen in arms against the government."[83] The reaction of the Sandinista regime was prompt and uncompromising. Daniel Ortega labelled the bishops "false prophets."[84] Tomás Borge said that "the pastoral letter seeks confrontation and violates the law of the land." He referred to the letter's advocacy of negotiations with the insurgents as a "criminal suggestion."[85] The Sandinistas also unleashed a media blitz, including a cartoon in the official daily *Barricada* that depicted "the portly figure of a bishop wielding a hammer and boards, converting a cross into a swastika."[86]

Not long after this series of events, the Sandinistas accused the bishops of conspiring to overthrow the government. In June 1984 the regime disseminated a videotape purporting to show a popular clergyman, the Rev Luis Amade Pena, meeting with agents of the resistance and handling explosives. He was placed under house arrest in a seminary in Managua to await trial. In response, Archbishop Obando y Bravo led a protest march of some 30 priests from the Managua diocese. The Sandinistas deported 10 foreign priests, some of whom had participated in the march. Following their deportation, Archbishop Obando declared that relations between the Sandinistas and the church hierarchy were

[79] *Washington Times*, 4 May 1984.
[80] *Washington Post*, 19 June 1983.
[81] *Washington Times*, 26 April 1984.
[82] Ibid. and *Washington Post*, 22 May 1984.
[83] *Washington Post*, 26 April 1984.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid. 22 May 1984.

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"worse than they have ever been."[87] The Pope also condemned the expulsions.

Relations between the Sandinistas and the Vatican had already been exacerbated over the participation of four priests in the Nicaraguan government: Foreign Minister d'Escoto; Fernando Cardenal, Minister of Education; his brother Ernesto Cardenal, Minister of Culture; and Edgard Parrales, Ambassador to the OAS.[88] The Vatican had decided as far back as 1980 that priests should not serve in governments. In 1981 a compromise arrangement permitted the four priests in Nicaragua to remain in public office but suspended their right to exercise their religious functions during their tenure in the government. In the autumn of 1983, Roman Catholic canon law was revised to prohibit priests from holding public office. The Vatican and the Nicaraguan bishops exerted intense pressure on the four priests to resign. Fernando Cardenal was expelled from the Jesuit Order for defying the papal ban on holding public office.[89]

Thus, the Nicaraguan church has been buffeted by two strong currents—the clash between the conservative hierarchy and the proponents of the "popular church" on the one hand, and the clash between the Vatican and the Sandinista regime on the other. Nevertheless, the church is holding its own and appears to have lost little of its vitality. Archbishop Obando, Bishop Vega, the Reverend Carballo, and other clergymen increasingly have become symbols of resistance to the regime, and some foreign observers speculate that the Nicaraguan church could become as potent a repository of nationalist and anti-government sentiment as the church in Poland.

The Sandinistas have manifested their concern over the power and popularity of the church by exiling the Rev Carballo and Bishop Vega. Carballo was barred from re-entering Nicaragua after he attended a religious conference in France in late June 1986. On 4 July, Bishop Vega was expelled from his country for alleged violations of the constitution. By resorting to such actions, the Sandinistas will not succeed in silencing the church.

NICARAGUA is non-aligned in name only, promises to the OAS notwithstanding. There are some 3,000 Cuban military advisors in the country, as well as about 4,000 civilians involved in construction, teaching, medicine, and similar programmes. The bulk of the civilians are younger men who have received some military training. There are twice as many Soviet bloc military advisors in Nicaragua as the United States has trainers in El Salvador. The Soviets and their East German allies were instrumental in establishing the intelligence and internal security networks for the Sandinistas. Nicaraguan pilots have undergone training in Bulgaria, while members of the PLO help to fly and maintain

[87] Ibid. 30 Aug. 1984.

[88] D'Escoto left Nicaragua when the Pope visited. Ernesto Cardenal was publicly scolded by the Pontiff, who warned him to "get straight with the church." See *Washington Times*, 4 May 1984.

[89] The Vatican suspended D'Escoto from the priesthood for the same reason. See *Washington Post*, 9 July 1985.

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Nicaragua's military and commercial aircraft. The Sandinistas have permitted a wide variety of insurgent and terrorist groups to establish offices in Managua. According to Bolanos, Nicaragua also provides training facilities on its territory for guerrilla fighters from El Salvador, other parts of Central America, and even further afield. The Sandinista leadership is openly proud to be part of the fraternity of nations promoting "anti-imperialist" revolutions throughout the Third World.

Aside from its increasing alignment with the Soviet bloc and radical regimes and movements in the Third World, Nicaragua has fostered the growth of its military establishment to the point where it already dwarfs the armed forces of its neighbours. Somoza's troops numbered a mere 10,000. By 1985, the Nicaraguan armed forces had grown to 62,000 personnel on active duty, with an additional 57,000 in reserves and militia. The Sandinistas' avowed goal is a 250,000-man force, of which roughly half would be regular troops and the rest would consist of reserves, militia, border guards, and troops of the Interior Ministry. Nestor D. Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Inter-American Affairs, has pointed out that Nicaragua's military build-up is "impressive in comparison with the mini-armies normal to the region and in relation to the population base. This is supposedly in response to a foreign threat; yet, the build-up began before any threat appeared on the Sandinista horizon."[90]

In the aftermath of the Nicaraguan revolution, the United States not only consented to provide emergency aid to the Sandinista regime but also left the door open for possible military assistance and training for FSLN forces. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo declared that any attempt to destabilize the revolutionary regime in Managua would be contrary to US policy, which sought "very intimate and friendly relations" with the new government.[91] Several million dollars' worth of humanitarian assistance reached Managua in the early weeks of the Sandinistas' accession to power. In early 1979 the House Appropriations Subcommittee voted, 7–3, to furnish the Sandinista regime not only with $8·8 million in new aid, but also with $31 million in loans from the Agency for International Development that was already in the pipeline and with funds that the State Department had cut off from Somoza during the previous two years. In April 1980 a supplementary aid grant of $75 million (60 per cent of it targeted for the private sector) squeezed through the House, with the caveat that Nicaragua must guarantee human rights. Daniel Ortega replied haughtily that "We expect the same kind of treatment you gave to Somoza: loans without preconditions. We are not obliged to give guarantees to any American congressman."[92] By this time, the Sandinistas had already dispatched their first high-level delegation to Moscow and the East European capitals. A whirlwind of visits has ensued in the past five years.

[90] Nestor D. Sanchez, "Revolutionary Change and the Nicaraguan People," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1984, p. 20.

[91] *Washington Post*, 29 and 31 July 1979.

[92] *Newsweek*, 14 April 1980, p. 41.

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In November 1981 Defence Minister Humberto Ortega spent more than a week in the USSR, where he met with his counterpart, Dmitri Ustinov, Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, and the head of the Main Political Administration for the Soviet Army and Navy, General Aleksei Yepishev.[93] The issue of military assistance evidently topped the agenda, but the discipline and political indoctrination of the Nicaraguan armed forces presumably were discussed as well, since these would have fallen under Yepishev's purview. On the heels of Ortega's visit came a journey to Moscow by Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto, who met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Premier Nikolai Tikhonov.

In May 1982 Daniel Ortega headed a delegation to the Kremlin, where he received VIP treatment and an audience with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. Among the agreements signed during his visit was an accord by which Nicaragua gave the Soviets access to the Pacific harbour of San Juan del Sur as a port of call and repair station for tuna vessels.[94] Interior Minister Borge visited the Soviet Union in September 1982 at the invitation of KGB officials.[95] The visit was publicized in Managua but not in Moscow. Two months later, Daniel Ortega returned to the Soviet capital for Brezhnev's funeral. The following month, Agriculture Minister Wheelock travelled to Moscow to participate in celebrations commemorating the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

In February 1983 Planning Minister Ruiz held talks with Soviet economic planners in Moscow. Daniel Ortega was back in the Soviet Union again in March 1983, as part of a journey that took him to Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, and the Seventh Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi. Ortega met with General Secretary Yurii Andropov. In June, Arce arrived in Moscow for talks on the implementation of the party agreement between the FSLN and the CPSU. He also went to Bulgaria, with whose Communist Party the FSLN has a similar agreement. In July, Wheelock was in the USSR to negotiate a new agricultural accord. At the same time, Ruiz travelled to Czechoslovakia, which granted Nicaragua a credit line to facilitate trade and the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment.[96]

The 1984 parade of Nicaraguan visitors to the Soviet bloc began in February with the journey of Daniel Ortega and d'Escoto to attend Andropov's funeral. They were received by the new General Secretary, Konstantin Chernenko, and by Gromyko.[97] The following month, Ruiz visited the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The intergovernmental protocol signed in Moscow stipulated that the Soviets would provide Nicaragua with technical assistance in creating "crude oil bases" and enlarging the textile industry.[98] In Prague, Ruiz was received by Czech Communist Party chief Gustav Husak—an indication that

[93] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 21 Nov. 1981.
[94] *New York Times*, 15 May 1983.
[95] Morris Rothenberg, op. cit. p. 10.
[96] Managua Sistema Sandinista de Television Network in Spanish, 7 July 1983.
[97] TASS, 15 Feb. 1984.
[98] Radio Havana, 23 March 1984.

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subjects beyond trade and economic assistance were on Ruiz's agenda.[99]

In April 1984, Humberto Ortega travelled to the USSR and North Korea, both of which have supplied military assistance to Nicaragua. He met with Ustinov, among other officials. In June, Daniel Ortega was back in Moscow once more. Both the Soviet and Nicaraguan media indicated that new agreements were signed, but no details were disclosed. Ruiz went to East Germany in November 1984 and to Czechoslovakia in January 1985; trade accords were reportedly initialled at both stops. After the United States announced its trade embargo against Nicaragua on May 1, Daniel Ortega declared that his country would "survive" with the help of "pluralistic assistance" from the "socialist countries, Western Europe, Latin America and the Arab countries."[100] With this objective in mind, he set out on a journey to the USSR and Soviet bloc nations but persuaded a few Western countries to receive him as well. Aid agreements were reportedly reached with Italy and Finland. In addition to Moscow's promise to furnish up to 90 per cent of Nicaragua's oil requirements, Ortega announced that all the East European countries would provide raw materials, consumer goods, and food to Managua.[101]

Up to the time of Ortega's most recent trip, Soviet economic aid to Nicaragua was modest and frequently involved symbolic gestures such as the donation of 20,000 tons of wheat in 1981 in the aftermath of Washington's suspension of economic assistance to Managua.[102] There are some 20 joint Soviet–Nicaraguan enterprises under construction, as well as a system of TV and radio communications that evidently will be tied into the Soviet bloc communications network. Cuban assistance covers some 1,000 projects in the fields of health, education and economic development.[103]

Soviet military deliveries have been substantial and have arrived in Nicaragua over the past several years on a steadily escalating scale in terms of both quantity and quality of equipment. The early cargoes were delivered by third-country ships, notably Algerian and Bulgarian, or were transferred from Cuba. Subsequently, the Soviets sent their own ships and allowed them to proceed directly to Nicaragua without stopping over in Cuba. Few details are available on the financial arrangements covering Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua, but Daniel Ortega declared during his interview with *Der Spiegel* that "We obtain our weapons through credits and donations. That is why we don't spend one dollar of foreign exchange on arms purchases."[104]

During 1981 Nicaragua reportedly received about $28 million worth of military equipment from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Cuba.[105]

[99] Ibid. 29 March 1984.

[100] *Washington Post*, 13 May 1985.

[101] *New York Times*, 21 May 1985. According to a report in *Washington Times*, 31 May 1985, East Germany promised to provide $54 million in credits to Nicaragua, including an $18 million cash grant.

[102] Robert Rand, "The USSR, Nicaragua, and the Crisis in Central America," Radio Liberty Research, RL 130/82, 17 March 1982, p. 2.

[103] See report from Radio Havana, 18 June 1983; FBIS Latin America, 20 June 1983.

[104] *Der Spiegel*, 31 Dec. 1984.

[105] US Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 1982, pp. 68–79.

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Among the acquisitions were 25 to 30 Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks, surface-to-air missiles, small transport planes, helicopters, trainers, and a large quantity of automatic rifles.[106] An estimated 7,000 tons of Soviet and bloc equipment arrived in Nicaragua in 1982. By 1983 the tonnage reportedly doubled, and it reached 18,000 in 1984. The new weaponry included BRDM-2 armoured fighting vehicles, BTR armoured personnel carriers, BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, ZIS-2 57 mm anti-tank guns, patrol boats, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, radar equipment, and—perhaps most significantly—MI-8 helicopters and AN-26 transport planes. The MI-8s are capable of carrying 24 troops a distance of 200 kilometres. The AN-26s can transport 40 soldiers and their combat equipment as far as 800 kilometres.[107]

Early in 1984 Nicaragua received its first consignment of Soviet PT-76 amphibious tanks, which are ideally suited for tank warfare across bodies of water or in swampy areas—the type of terrain where much of the fighting between the Sandinistas and the insurgents has occurred.[108] In mid-1984 a Bulgarian ship delivered a major consignment of tanks that virtually doubled Nicaragua's tank inventory. The greatest sensation of 1984, however, involved anticipation that Nicaragua was about to receive Soviet MIG-21 multi-role fighter aircraft, the acquisition of which clearly would belie Managua's repeated contentions that its growing arsenal was designed for defence against a US attack.

The MIG crisis erupted when the Soviet cargo ship *Bakuriani* set sail for Central America, taking a circuitous route around the Cape of Good Hope in order to avoid the Panama Canal, where it might have been subject to US scrutiny. The United States claimed that MIGs were aboard the ship and declared that their introduction into Nicaragua would not be tolerated. On 7 November the *Bakuriani* arrived at the Nicaraguan port of Corinto. The Sandinistas conceded that it carried military equipment—mainly ammunition and anti-aircraft defence batteries—and some "other general cargo," but not MIGs.[109] Ironically, however, it was soon revealed that Nicaragua had received Soviet MI-24 "Hind" helicopters—weapons that are at least as dangerous for the insurgents as MIGs would be. A statement put out by the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the largest and most important resistance organization, declared that the "MI-24s are so sophisticated and destructive that they do not form part of the Cuban arsenal, and for this reason we suspect that they will be flown by experts from the Soviet Union or [another] European country in the socialist bloc."[110]

Even as this statement was released, the controversy over the MIGs

[106] *New York Times*, 15 Feb. 1982. Nicaragua also signed an agreement with France around this time for the purchase of two helicopters, 45 trucks, two missile-firing patrol boats, 100 rocket launchers, and 7,000 rockets.

[107] *New York Times*, 2 July 1983.

[108] *Washington Post*, 9 March 1984.

[109] See AFP, Managua, 9 Nov. 1984.

[110] ACAN, Panama City, 12 Nov. 1984.

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continued. Orlando Castillo, Nicaragua's ambassador to Spain, asserted that his country "will buy Soviet MIG airplanes" since "it has the right to buy warplanes to defend itself."[111] None of the Sandinista leaders dissociated themselves from the ambassador's remarks. Other observers of the Nicaraguan scene, meanwhile, pointed out that it would require only an hour's flying time to transfer MIGs from Cuba, where they already are deployed, to Nicaragua, which has pilots trained to operate them and runways of sufficient length to accommodate them.

In addition to delivering weapons and military equipment to Nicaragua, the Soviets and their allies have emplaced infrastructure that is transforming the country into a potential staging area for offensive operations against its neighbours and even further afield. For example, the airfield at Punta Huete, across Lake Managua from the capital, has a 10,000-foot runway under construction that is sufficiently long to accommodate any Soviet warplane. The aircraft revetments, radars, communications equipment, and the general configuration of the fields built elsewhere in Nicaragua with Soviet and Cuban assistance reportedly are similar to those found at military airfields in Cuba. The same pattern appeared to be underway at the Point Salines airport on Grenada. This phenomenon suggests that the USSR views its allies in the Central American and Caribbean region within a single strategic context. According to Bolanos, two underground bases for Soviet SAMs are being constructed in Nicaragua—one at the international airport in Managua and the other about 12 miles from the capital.[112]

Bulgarian engineers are converting the Nicaraguan port of El Bluff, at which much of the Soviet bloc military equipment has been unloaded, into a major port. Miskito Indian villages in the region, which is situated along an isolated part of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, have been destroyed in order to depopulate the area and transform it into a military bastion. Some US officials have speculated that the USSR and Nicaragua signed a secret agreement for the construction of a new canal across the isthmus in that region.[113] Development plans for the San Juan del Sur area include construction of a new fish-packing plant, the purchase of six Soviet fishing boats, and the dispatch of Soviet technicians to train Nicaraguans in operating the new equipment. One of the two hotels in the region was refurbished to accommodate about 60 Soviet technicians.[114]

Nicaragua's growing weapons inventories and military installations must be viewed in conjunction with the continuing expansion of the country's armed forces, which now number some 119,000 in the active forces, the reserves and the militia. The active-duty troops are comprised of about 30,000 in the army, 1,000 in the navy, 2,000 in the air force, another 2,000 in the forces of the Interior Ministry, and 5,000 in the police

[111] AFP, Paris, 17 Nov. 1984.
[112] *Washington Times*, 22 June 1983.
[113] *New York Times*, 15 May 1983.
[114] Ibid.

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forces. In addition, there are 22,000 reservists and militiamen on active duty. There are also 15,000 reservists and 42,000 militiamen not on active duty.

Cuban advisors in the army reportedly are posted as low as the company level, and they also work alongside the troops that are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior.[115] Nicaraguan army officers involved in operations against the resistance forces in the northern part of the country have stated that their troops are accompanied by Cuban military advisors who wear Nicaraguan military uniforms and are armed with Soviet-made AK-47 rifles but who do not engage in actual combat.[116] The most alarming development regarding the Cuban presence in Nicaragua was a report in mid-1983 that General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez had been "secretly assigned to duty" there.[117] Ochoa played a key role in initiating and organizing the Cuban military build-up in Angola in 1976 and in Ethiopia in 1977. His duties at home evidently involve training and the improvement of the combat readiness of the Cuban armed forces. Ochoa, who was expected to rotate regularly between Cuba and Nicaragua, was apparently given the assignment to improve the combat proficiency of the Sandinista forces fighting against the insurgents, as well as to increase the numbers and responsibilities of the Cubans attached to those forces.

Many of the Nicaraguan troops battling the insurgents are members of the militia, border guards and other paramilitary forces; a large part of the regular army apparently is being held in reserve in case of a national emergency. The Sandinista leadership retains its commitment to a 250,000-man military apparatus, of which perhaps half will comprise regular standing forces. As the FSLN continues to allocate scarce resources to this build-up, it will alienate further its supporters in the West and thus become more dependent both economically and militarily upon the Soviet Union and its allies.

Although Nicaragua continues to seek economic assistance, trade, and diplomatic support from Western Europe, Latin America, and non-communist countries elsewhere, a steadily growing share of the country's international transactions over the past six years has been redirected towards the Soviet bloc. The Sandinistas now have party-to-party links not only with the CPSU but also with the communist parties of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Other FSLN-affiliated bodies have established working ties with their counterparts in communist countries; a leading example is the linkage between the committees for the defence of the revolution that have been created in Cuba and Nicaragua. Moreover, Nicaragua is affiliated with all the major international communist front organizations, from the World Peace Council (WPC) to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

[115] Ibid. 19 June 1983.
[116] Ibid. 20 March 1984.
[117] Ibid, 19 June 1983.

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Commander Olga Aviles Lopez has been selected as an executive vice-president of the WPC. Virtually all of the high-ranking officials who attended Daniel Ortega's inauguration as president on 10 January 1985 came from communist states. Taking into account all these circumstances, along with the Soviet and Cuban assisted military build-up, it is increasingly evident that the pretence of non-alignment to which Nicaragua still clings is hollow.

THE Sandinista revolution may not have devoured its children, but it has driven large numbers of them into a position desperate enough to warrant taking up arms against the regime. The combined forces of the armed resistance, or "Contras" as they are called in Sandinista propaganda and the media, total approximately 20,000. With greater coordination, they could pose a formidable challenge to the Sandinistas. However, the two major "Contra" organizations often appear to be working at cross purposes.

The Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) is the largest "Contra" organization, with some 15,000 guerrilla fighters in its ranks. The group's president is Adolfo Calero, and its military commander is Enrique Bermudez. The FDN operates mainly out of bases near the Nicaraguan–Honduran frontier. The Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) claims 7,000 to 10,000 armed men under its command and operates in the southern part of Nicaragua, near Costa Rica. The Misurasata organization of Nicaraguan Indians cooperates closely with ARDE, while the larger "Misura y Criollos Negros" (Miskito, Sumu, Rama and Black Creoles) is closer to the FDN.

Eden Pastora, the most prominent figure in ARDE, was wounded during an assassination attempt by Sandinista agents in the early summer of 1984. During his recuperation, it appears that several members of his organization who opposed his refusal to collaborate with the FDN took steps to undermine his position. On 20 July 1984 it was announced that Fernando Chamorro ("El Negro") had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of ARDE in Pastora's stead.[118] Pastora, whose exploits during the Sandinista struggle against Somoza had given him the status of a folk hero, scoffed at the news and predicted that "El Negro" would not command the allegiance of the guerrilla fighters. The situation within ARDE and its leadership structure remains unclear. To complicate the insurgents' politics further, Alfonso Robelo—chief of ARDE's political arm and leader of a faction of ARDE that seeks closer cooperation with the FDN—announced on 4 September 1984 from Costa Rica that his group, the FDN, and Misura had all joined to form a new anti-Sandinista organization called Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR).[119]

Throughout this recent flurry of activity, the basic incompatibility between the FDN and ARDE has persisted. A *Wall Street Journal* correspondent has noted that

[118] ACAN, Panama City, 20 July 1984.
[119] *Ibid.* 4 Sept. 1984.

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> On paper at least, it isn't apparent why the FDN and ARDE aren't staunch allies. Both Contra organizations say they seek . . . a new democratic government, prompt elections open to all parties, a mixed economy that respects private property, recognition of human rights (including freedom of the press), the breaking of alliances with communist countries, and creation of a non-partisan army and national police force.[120]

A Nicaraguan exile in Costa Rica told the *Journal* reporter, however, that "Even though it seems like everyone wants the same things . . . these groups are like oil and water—they just won't mix."[121]

Socio-economic, political, and personality differences between the two groups and their leaders that predate their disenchantment with the Sandinista regime explain their inability to cooperate in a common endeavour. The FDN, under Adolfo Calero, draws its leadership mainly from the Nicaraguan upper and middle classes. They remain strongly committed to private enterprise. By contrast, ARDE is composed mostly of people from the middle and lower classes—even though Alfonso Robelo is a self-made millionaire.

Pastora and Robelo both held high posts in the Sandinista regime. Pastora, who idolizes Ché Guevara, can best be described as a radical nationalist and populist who basically favours the revolution but objects to the overweening Soviet and Cuban influence in the country, to the suppression of all manifestations of democracy, and to the emergence of the Sandinista leadership as a new privileged class similar to the oligarchy it deposed. ARDE officials insist on calling themselves "dissident revolutionaries" rather than counter-revolutionaries. Pastora himself has proclaimed that "I am a Sandinista revolutionary. There . . . is a revolution that took place in Nicaragua, and this revolution is irreversible." He regards himself as the authentic voice of that revolution, as opposed to his former comrades who have stolen and misappropriated Sandino's mantle. Castigating them as "traitors" and "assassins," Pastora vows to "drag them with bullets from their mansions and Mercedes Benzes."[122] One FDN supporter has charged that Pastora

> . . . is still surrounded by socialists, he calls his army the Revolutionary Sandinista Front, he outfits his soldiers in red and black bandanas just like the Sandinistas, and he even makes them sing the Sandinistas' anthem. We don't trust his politics any more than we trust the Nicaraguan government.

Pastora's refusal to ally with the FDN stems from his contention that former members of Somoza's National Guard play prominent roles in the

[120] *Wall Street Journal*, 27 July 1983.
[121] Ibid.
[122] *Washington Post*, 16 April 1982.

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organization and its fighting forces.[123] However, some observers attribute his reluctance to collaborate with the FDN to a domineering personality and unwillingness to share the limelight.

BORGE evidently spoke for the entire Sandinista leadership when he vowed that "We will never negotiate with the Contras."[124] He did not differentiate between the FDN and ARDE. Daniel Ortega's interview with *Der Spiegel* shed further light on the regime's attitude:

> **Spiegel:** The national dialogue in the country that you desire has failed. . . . Why don't you talk with the Contras?
> **Ortega:** The Contras are represented in another dialogue: the talks with the United States in the Mexican town of Manzanillo. . . .
> **Spiegel:** This means that you are conducting a dialogue with the Contras via the United States?
> **Ortega:** That is correct.
> **Spiegel:** You had conferences with Brooklyn Rivera, a leader of the Miskito Indians who fought the Sandinistas with arms from abroad. Can you imagine yourself talking in this office some day with . . . Eden Pastora?
> **Ortega:** These are totally different. The Miskitos . . . never took part in the struggle against Somoza. . . .
> **Spiegel:** And you do not wish to talk with Eden Pastora?
> **Ortega:** Pastora . . . betrayed the Nicaraguan revolution. . . . We are conducting the dialogue with Pastora and Alfonso Robelo of the FDN via the boss of both—the US Government.[125]

In January 1985 President Ortega sent the newly elected National Assembly a draft amnesty law for all Nicaraguans who "are involved in counter-revolutionary activities, including armed counter-revolutionary activities."[126] The law stipulated that "Contras" operating inside Nicaragua could take advantage of the amnesty by surrendering their weapons to national authorities designated by defence and security officials. Those operating in Honduras or Costa Rica were instructed to turn their arms over to the authorities appointed by the governments of those countries or to the International Red Cross. The amnesty offer, however, failed to provide for any participation by the insurgents in the Nicaraguan political process. They were requested, in effect, to accept the permanence of the Sandinista regime and abandon any aspirations to challenge its monopoly of political and military power.

On 1 March 1985, Arturo Cruz, in conjuction with major groupings in the armed resistance, presented what amounts to a counter-offer to the

[123] Adolfo Calero rebuts contentions that Somoçistas exercise predominant influence in the FDN. He asserts that less than one quarter of the FDN's regional commanders and only one per cent of its fighting forces are former National Guardsmen. Furthermore, states Calero, FDN military chief Enrique Bermudez spent the past five and a half years in the United States. "Everyone who is familiar with Latin America knows the military gets rid of people by sending them to Washington. It means he was not part of the inner circle." See *Washington Times*, 20 March 1985, for Calero's comments.
[124] *Washington Post*, 26 April 1984.
[125] *Der Spiegel*, 31 Dec. 1984.
[126] ANN, Managua, 11 Jan. 1985.

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Sandinistas' amnesty proposal. Essentially Cruz's offer encompasses a plan for a unilateral ceasefire by the insurgents, followed by a political dialogue presided over by the Nicaraguan bishops. The dialogue would aim at bringing about a general amnesty, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and advisors from Nicaragua, and the cessation of control by the FSLN over the armed forces and government institutions. The proposal would permit Daniel Ortega to remain president of the country until new elections are called.[127] Among the signatories of the proposal are Cruz, Alfonso Robelo, Adolfo Calero, rebel leader Fernando Chamorro, and the self-exiled former editor of *La Prensa*, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. The document created a serious dilemma for the FSLN:

> The Sandinistas' initial response to the proposal was to bar Arturo Cruz from returning to Nicaragua [from Costa Rica] to announce it and to summon some of its local supporters to state security headquarters on grounds that they were participating in a US-sponsored plot to overthrow the Sandinista government. Think of it: an offer by the opposition to put down arms and to start talking about achieving the Sandinistas' own early promises is dismissed as a hostile conspiracy. How do the Sandinistas intend to explain to the Nicaraguan people a refusal to enter a dialogue on such a reasonable basis?[128]

In the summer of 1985, a new umbrella organization called the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) came into existence.[129] A coalition directed by Cruz, Robelo, and Calero, the UNO offered the possibility for greater cooperation among the resistance forces operating in the northern and southern parts of Nicaragua. The United States announced that it would use the UNO as the channel for funnelling into Nicaragua a sum of $27 million in "non-lethal" aid to the resistance that was approved by the US Congress for disbursement in fiscal 1986.

The Sandinistas admit to devoting a full 40 per cent of the government's resources to the military in order to fight the insurgency (others say the percentage is even higher).[130] For this reason, they refuse to discuss the proposals for peace put forward by the Contadora countries until the insurgency is brought to a halt.[131] Contadora, an island off the Panamanian coast, gave its name to an effort by Panama, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela to forge a negotiated settlement of the crisis in Central America. The effort dates back to 1983. Its first visible fruit was a draft peace treaty submitted in September 1984 to the five Central American countries (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala). The document called for a withdrawal of foreign military

[127] *Washington Post*, 22 March 1985.
[128] *Washington Post* editorial, 17 March 1985.
[129] *New York Times*, 4 Sept. 1985.
[130] *New York Times*, 17 and 19 March 1985, and David Asman, "Despair and Fear in Managua," *Wall Street Journal*, 25 March 1985.
[131] See *Washington Times*, 20 June 1985, for Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco's statement to this effect.

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advisors from the region, limitations of arms build-ups by Central American countries, and the cessation of support for local insurgencies. In addition, the draft incorporated provisions for free elections and the survival of private enterprise in Nicaragua, as well as for the protection of human rights and of refugees. The United States was reluctant to endorse the draft because it lacked a timetable for the withdrawal of the military advisors, failed to specify when limitations on the reduction of force size would be negotiated, and did not include a verification mechanism to ensure that the treaty's provisions would be implemented. Nonetheless, the Contadora "process" has continued on a sporadic basis. In 1985 border clashes between Nicaragua and Honduras on the one hand and Nicaragua and Costa Rica on the other added a new element of tension that bodes ill for the future success of a regional peace settlement in Central America.

As the Sandinistas marked their seventh anniversary in power, prospects loomed for a major increase in hostilities with the armed resistance. A $100 million US aid package for the Contras passed both houses of Congress, and the aid was expected to flow before the end of 1986. In addition, Washington ended the ban, dating from 1984, on CIA participation in arming, training, or assisting the Contras in any other manner except for intelligence-sharing and communications help.

While stepping up its funding and material assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance forces, the United States urged the Contra leaders to tighten their political cooperation in order to utilize the aid most effectively and to boost their standing in world public opinion. The FDN, headed by Adolfo Calero, continues to field the largest guerrilla forces in the US-backed United Nicaraguan Opposition. Calero's alliance with Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz reflects the personal and ideological frictions among the three leaders, all of whom are struggling for political control of the Contra movement. Reportedly, they managed to iron out some of their differences during four days of meetings in Miami in early October, but the organizations they represent still compete for power and influence among the growing anti-Sandinista community both inside and outside Nicaragua. Meanwhile, Kisan has emerged as the most significant Indian resistance organization. According to press reports, the Sandinistas place high priority on destroying the Indian fighting forces along the Atlantic coast before attempting to establish a "liberated" zone.[132]

THOSE who concur with the assessment that the Sandinista government is a communist regime in everything but name can point to the trappings of communist rule: the icons of Marx and Lenin that adorn public places in Nicaragua; the postage stamp that bears Marx's likeness and selected quotations from the Communist Manifesto; the adoption of the name Lenin Cerna by the head of the Interior Ministry's Department of State Security;[133] and the concept of the United States as

[132] See, e.g. *Washington Times*, 6 Oct. 1986.

[133] During an interview with the French Communist Party newspaper *L'Humanité*, Cerna was asked if

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the main enemy of the revolution, as invoked in the Sandinista anthem. In reality, the "new" Nicaragua is still groping towards totalitarianism As an American observer has noted:

> . . . Whatever their words, the Sandinistas give every sign of claiming a permanent monopoly on political power. At its most benign, this could evolve into a system like Mexico's one-party rule with token opposition. Or it can end in a Marxist–Leninist dictatorship on the Cuban model.[134]

Deputy Justice Minister Carlos Arguello Gomez has declared that "political pluralism should not boil down to the holding of elections every four or five years."[135] Nevertheless, Nicaragua retains a façade of pluralism, as witnessed in the seating of oppositionist parties in the National Assembly, the continued existence of democratically oriented trade unions, and the powerful role of the church. Even if all these anti-government forces coalesced, they would be unlikely to threaten the monopoly of power enjoyed by the Sandinistas, who, after all, are the only men with guns. The existence of opposition bodies merely helps to persuade international public opinion that political pluralism survives in Nicaragua.

If the Sandinistas made earnest efforts to revive the broad alliance of the middle classes, businessmen, clergy, peasants, workers and intellectuals that enabled their revolution against Somoza to triumph, they would garner broad support both at home and abroad and perhaps succeed in isolating the insurgents. The ruling commandantes, however, seem bent upon a policy of intimidation and retribution against their actual and potential enemies. During a speech to a crowd of supporters in Managua in autumn 1984, Daniel Ortega warned opposition leaders that if they continued to refer to the struggle against the "Contras" as a civil war, "they might just end up with such a civil war on their hands, and then whole classes of people will disappear. The people will obliterate some classes, and then these classes will know the fury of the public."[136] This warning was ominously reminiscent of Bayardo Arce's statement to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party during his infamous tirade on elections: "We haven't moved the mobs [*las turbas*] yet, because the time is still not ripe."[137]

The Sandinistas indeed appear to be playing for time, employing the international propaganda assets of the Soviet bloc to head off renewed US funding of the "Contras" while they rush to strengthen the armed forces and internal security apparatus in defence of the revolution. Even at this stage, the Sandinistas seem to have entrenched themselves sufficiently to

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Lenin was his Christian name or a *nom de guerre*. He replied: "It is my Christian name, the name my father gave me. My father was a Salvadoran, and his whole political attitude leaned toward communism. Our house was a shoemakers' shop and I was raised among shoemakers, all of whom supported the Cuban revolution." See *L'Humanité*, 21 Dec. 1983.

[134] "The Aims of Sandinismo," Editorial Notebook, *Wall Street Journal*, 2 July 1983.

[135] Interview with *La Repubblica*, Rome, 30 June 1983.

[136] *Wall Street Journal*, 12 Oct. 1984.

[137] *La Vanguardia*, 31 July 1984.

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ward off any significant threat to their power, short of all-out war in Central America or an international crisis that spills into Nicaragua. Eden Pastora cautioned during a recent visit to Washington that "People here think shortages will make the people rise up against the Government. But scarcity actually helps the Communists because they have total control over the supplies."[138] It is also worth pondering the judgment of a *Washington Times* editorial that "It is a mistake to underrate the power of a regime that is (a) clever at propaganda, (b) keeps close tabs on 'trouble makers' through neighborhood cadres, (c) is intolerant of its adversaries, and (d) has the media under wraps."[139]

[138] *New York Times*, 17 March 1985.
[139] *Washington Times*, 1 Aug. 1984.

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The Comparative Soviet Periphery: Iran and Finland

Karen Erickson

AN examination of the periphery of the Soviet Union is both timely and important. Recent history has shown the Soviet periphery to be increasingly volatile. We do not know when, or if, the Soviet Union might invade a border state that suffers internal chaos. The aftermath of the Soviet march into Afghanistan aroused speculation in many directions. Who would be next? How often have we heard "will the Russians move into Poland?" What indeed is the fate of the small nations on the Soviet border? Are the examples of the past three decades—Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968, and Kabul in 1979—harbingers of a similar Soviet effort in the 1980s? Sudden eruptions that are particularly prevalent in the least independent states of the Soviet periphery are not the only cause for concern. Gradual erosions that result from Soviet influence on the policies of the more autonomous periphery (e.g. Finland, Norway, Turkey, and Iran) may be equally critical.

The commitment of the Soviet Union to preserve and project its power in border areas is not questioned. But how far will it go? And are we operating with a strictly border phenomenon in which definitive Soviet action can be expected whenever conditions within the small peripheral states seem to warrant it? Or is the status of the actual borders less significant to the Soviet decision-maker than broader regional considerations of strategic and political security? What are Moscow's stakes, for example, in intervening in Iraq, Yugoslavia or Sweden compared with Iran, Poland, or Finland? For their part, do the small border states display qualities that are unique to them as a group? What distinguishes their relationship with the Soviet Union from the relations that small but non-contiguous states have with the Soviets? It has been suggested that, in its geographical environment, Iran may have more in common with Finland and Afghanistan (states contiguous to the Soviet Union) than with Iraq and Syria (non-contiguous states, but with common historical and regional characteristics).[1]

Physical adjacency is clearly a geopolitical factor of prime importance: the greater the proximity, the higher the rate of activity between states. More exchanges of every kind, including commerce and communications, as well as war and crises, take place between bordering states than between non-contiguous countries located some distance from one another. Influence varies with the distance from its centre of

[1] Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974), p. 33.

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origin:[2] "the most powerful ally is less alarming," writes Raymond Aron, "if it is remote."[3] Of the 12,564 miles that make up the Soviet Union's land perimeter, nearly two-thirds is shared with small states:

Norway	122 miles
Finland	816 miles
Poland	755 miles
Czechoslovakia	62 miles
Hungary	84 miles
Romania	812 miles
Turkey	383 miles
Iran	1,227 miles
Afghanistan	1,481 miles
Mongolia	2,138 miles
Democratic Republic of Korea	11 miles
(People's Republic of China	4,673 miles)

From the north-western reaches of the Kola peninsula, semicircling to the 11-mile point of contact with the Democratic Republic of Korea, the Russian land perimeter has persisted, perhaps more than any single factor, as the prime consideration in the foreign policy of the world's largest nation. The importance that the Soviets attribute to geography creates a living legend of their sensitivity towards borders. Events of international gravity occur with surprising inevitability along the more than 12,000 miles of Russian frontier. When the Russians shot down a jumbo jet full of passengers, killing all on board, on a Korean flight that moved into Soviet airspace, it tragically illustrated their readiness to secure Soviet space at all costs. Russia's borderlands are two-way streets: avenues of attack and roads to security; tinderboxes and targets, explosive and exploitable; areas of grave uncertainty and sources of great assurance.

The small-state land periphery of the Soviet Union is a continuum of attention and contention for the Russians. On the one hand, the USSR has enduring interests in the small lands of its periphery; on the other hand, it has persistent claims on them. The USSR anticipates ready access to its periphery. In the jargon of Soviet foreign policy, Moscow seeks friendly and trustworthy relations with its neighbours. It is equally important to note, however, that the Soviet notions of interest and access tend to be interpreted as "predominant influence" and "exclusive rights" in the border states; and the Soviets would like to equate peace, stability, and friendship with the neutralization of its periphery as well as with a political and economic "tilt" towards Moscow. The Soviet periphery is charged with a variety and richness of postures, actions, and policies that have evolved over time and that are worthy of investigation.

[2] Trygve Mathisen, *The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers* (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1971), p. 127.

[3] Raymond Aron, *Peace and War* trans. by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 1966), p. 97.

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From the small border states' perspective, the Soviet Union is an obstacle and an option. It dominates, controls, and suppresses; it also aids, supports and secures the small state in regional and international politics. As a sometime threat, the Soviet Union affects the very existence of each small border state; as a sometime friend or ally, Soviet power provides it with an identity in the international arena. Geographically tied to Russia and historically impregnated with Russian power, the small states of the periphery have nonetheless played many different roles through time. Certain historic attitudes towards the Russian presence have remained clear and permanent, but the political relationships between Russia and its peripheral states have fluctuated. In other words, while the border phenomenon represents a geopolitical factor that is immutable, the effects may vary. As one observer notes, "security geography is not a constant."[4] A study of the Soviet periphery today presupposes that the Soviet Union, as the dominant power, signals certain outer limits of action for the small neighbours at the same time that the Soviet presence does not necessarily establish the definitive position of the latter. There is a range of possible peripheral state action that is mainly circumscribed by how the leadership of the small state handles its options. In their case study of Iran's foreign relations, Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih note:

> . . . the instruments of pressure and influence in a small state's diplomatic armoury are necessarily limited. Yet a judicious use of timing and circumstances, and an understanding of the limits which external conditions set to maneuvering can considerably stretch these apparently meagre resources.[5]

As their policies are neither an inevitable product of external circumstances nor of decisions unilaterally taken in the Kremlin, small states have an incalculable area of manoeuvre around the perimeter of the USSR. Varying as they do in degree of autonomy and independence, the Soviet borderlands might be as significantly affected by the perceptions, predispositions, and policies of their own leadership as by the Soviet power drive. In a study of five crises on the Soviet periphery, for example, Jiri Valenta maintains that in each case the Soviets considered using force "primarily because they concluded that the leaders of the target country were untrustworthy or unable to maintain and exercise control."[6] The policies of the small-state leadership may have a positive or negative effect on Moscow but the possibilities of the peripheral states influencing the Soviets cannot be overlooked. This relationship of influence is described by Valenta who, noting that the Russians did not invade Poland at times when an invasion seemed imminent, explains:

[4] Erling Bjöl, "The Small State in International Politics," August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds.), *Small States in International Relations* (Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971), pp. 32–3.
[5] Chubin and Zabih, p. 45.
[6] Jiri Valenta, "The Explosive Soviet Periphery," *Foreign Policy*, No. 51 (1983), p. 86.

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> The expectations of military resistance have repeatedly given Soviet decision-makers pause . . . Moscow did not simply fear but knew in 1956 and in 1980–81 that *the Poles would fight* if the Soviets used direct military force.[7]

This is not to deny the weight of the external component in what happens to the small states on the Soviet border, but rather to suggest that the effect is not monolithic in nature. For example, the external influence is not necessarily restrictive; it could also enhance the small state's capacity to manoeuvre. It has been demonstrated that the degree of small-state influence tends to be expanded by the confluence of competing great-power interests. In her study of the wartime diplomacy of small European states, Annette Baker Fox concluded that the "good fortune" of the small power was directly proportional to the number of interested great powers which had demands on the state.[8] Analyzing Iran's deflection of Soviet encroachments in the post-war crisis of 1944–46, experts tend to agree that the keen interest of both superpowers in Iran affected Iran's capacity to influence them. Iran mustered US support that created a stand-off with the Soviets, and was probably the decisive factor in the final Soviet withdrawal from the northern provinces.[9]

Developments, thus, in Soviet–peripheral relations are not always most readily explained in terms of a sole focus on the role of the Soviet Union itself. The attention we have given that role is not directly reflected in our understanding of it. In fact, dealing with the periphery from the viewpoint of Soviet foreign policy has left us somewhat bereft of ideas concerning the direction and predispositions of the Kremlin towards the peripheral states. A change of focus appears to be in order. Since Russian interventions are responses to particular events that take place in the individual small states, it might be useful to examine the geopolitical small-power perimeter of the Soviet Union from the perspective of each of those states. The foreign policies of the small states are more likely to reveal greater detail about Soviet–periphery relationships than a concentrated focus on Soviet foreign policy would, because the small state has given nearly exclusive attention to the Soviet connection. The Soviet Union has not afforded the same priority to relations with each of the small peripheral powers as those powers have accorded relations with the Soviets. Policies towards the Soviet Union have dominated the small states' affairs; for the Soviets, the policy towards each small peripheral power is but "one among many."[10] Furthermore, in the scholarly work on Soviet-peripheral state relations, there has been a tendency to assess the role that the small state plays for the Soviet Union. We have been prone

[7] Ibid. p. 92. (Italics added).
[8] Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States; Diplomacy in World War II* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1959), p. 8.
[9] See e.g George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 4th ed. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1980), p. 183.
[10] Chubin and Zabih, p. 50.

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to ask what each of the states offers its great-power neighbour. What advantages and opportunities does it provide for the Soviets? What dangers does it represent? In addition, however, there is a need to stress the search for a systematic understanding of trends and predispositions within the small border states themselves. How are they likely to behave under changing international conditions? What, in turn, are the implications of small-state behaviour for Soviet action in the border areas?

The following study explores in a preliminary way conditions of contact between the Soviet Union and two of its small peripheral states, Iran and Finland. These countries which occupy, respectively, the third and fourth longest borders of the Soviet perimeter, are selected partly because their geographical location emphasizes that the Soviet periphery is not synonymous with "Eastern Europe"; and partly also because their widely different historical, political and cultural traditions would logically point to diverse foreign policies, too. However, the differences in location as well as internal development are not reflected to the extent that one might expect in their respective relationships with the Soviet Union. What mutual needs, risks, and advantages emerge in these bilateral relationships? How might they be explained?

As with the small border states, Finland and Iran can count the presence of the USSR as the chief independent variable in the formation of their respective foreign policies.[11] The two countries have maintained relatively autonomous positions on the periphery. Finland and Iran are among the five small states of the Soviet land perimeter that remained independent after the Second World War (the others are Turkey, Norway and Afghanistan). "Independence" nonetheless meant varying degrees of autonomy and different foreign policies for the five nations.

Iran has an historical fixation on neutrality as a viable, effective, multi-purpose security policy. Before the Second World War, Iran tried to steer a course of neutrality. Nevertheless, the country succumbed to a British–Soviet Allied occupation during the war, ending in the lesson, as Iran interpreted it, that neutrality does not pay. Iran alone lacked the military force to support an independent neutral position. To trust that the Soviet Union would restrain itself with regard to future demands would be to ignore a history of pressure on Persia from Russia. Iran therefore sought to ally itself in the post-war period with the United States. This was partly because America emerged as the dominant power in the region after the war and partly because the American and Iranian governments shared a mutual interest in wanting to preclude the Soviet Union from Iran's territory.

[11] There is a difference of opinion over whether the USSR or the US is the crucial constituent of Iranian foreign policy. See, respectively, Shahram Chubin, *Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf*, Adelphi Papers, No. 157 (The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1980), p. 10, and Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, (Penguin Books, 1979), p. 253.

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Finland, on the other hand, learned the opposite lesson. Despite protestations of neutrality, the Finns sought allies and aid from various sources during the interwar period in order to protect against a perceived Soviet threat. These included: (1) active negotiations for a defensive alliance between Finland and Poland, 1920–22; (2) a plan for military cooperation with Sweden in 1938, through joint refortification of the Aaland Islands; and (3) the establishment of a status as co-belligerent with Nazi Germany in 1940. Alliance, however, did not prevent the big powers from deciding at Tehran in 1943 that Finland's future position would be in the Soviet sphere of interest. This much feared limitation on their foreign policy was compounded by the harsh terms of the Armistice signed by the Finns with the Soviet Union in 1944. Given the lack of options after the war, the Finns turned to neutrality.

In the later post-war years, Iran moved towards modifying its policy of alliance, while Finland sought to develop an increasingly comprehensive and credible policy of neutrality. Although they started from different positions, both countries demonstrated a growing sensitivity to Soviet pressures and preferences. In the immediate post-war period, Finland and Iran both feared the extension of Soviet influence into their countries by incorporation, occupation, *coup d'état*, or concessions. In the process of securing its defence perimeter, the Soviet Union seemed to be pursuing expansionist objectives in the borderlands. Already in the autumn of 1944, the Soviet government had demanded oil concessions in northern Iran. The Russians further supported separatist movements and through the Iranian Communist Party helped establish the autonomous republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan (1945–46). In March 1946, when Soviet troops were due to leave the northern provinces they had occupied during the war, they refused to go. Iran accused the Soviets of aggression and interference in Iran's internal affairs.

For the Finns, the memories of the Winter War and the attempt by Stalin to establish a puppet regime at Terijoki on the common border (the Karelian Isthmus) were seen as proof that the Soviet Union ultimately sought the conquest of their small border nation. Losing the war, Finland was seriously weakened in 1944. The terms of the Armistice alone seemed to challenge the survival of the Finnish social and political system. In addition to the 13 per cent of their land that the Finns gave up at the end of the Winter War in 1940, they were now required to relinquish the Petsamo nickel mines in the north; to lease Porkkala on the Gulf of Finland as a naval base for the Soviets, giving the Russians transit rights through Finland to the base; and to pay a $600 million war indemnity to the USSR. To fulfil the economic demands was one thing, but the Finns were also ordered to purge the country of all "fascist-type" organizations (a provision that was applied to a large number of groups in Finland); to release political prisoners, which meant bringing the Communist Party to the surface as a major force in Finnish politics; and to open war crimes trials against its own citizens. Moreover, the Soviets were in charge of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, a body that

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assumed sufficiently broad powers for President C. G. Mannerheim to fear that the entire Finnish civil government would come under its control. Added to the pressures of the times was the psychological factor of having Russians in Helsinki and troops at Porkkala. It was the first time since Finland's independence in 1917 that Russian soldiers had been seen in the streets of Helsinki, and it made a deep impression on the Finns.

The fears harboured by Iran and Finland regarding Sovietization immediately following the war were not fulfilled. Despite the apparent opportunities, the Soviets did not move in to secure direct control in these two peripheral states. In the Iranian north, the Soviets might have had a surprising degree of local support. One account of the events of 1944–46 draws attention to reports at the time as indicating a "widespread popularity" of the communists in the north.[12] Yet Soviet troops withdrew from Iran in May 1946. In Finland, during 1944–45, the time seemed ripe for a Russian move to secure power; yet Moscow did not move. Finland's Minister of the Interior at the time, communist Yrjö Leino, recalled that the circumstances of 1944 were "more receptive than ever before or ever would be in the future for the establishment of a communist dictatorship."[13] The Russians may have regretted their decision. The Soviet head of the Allied Control Commission, Andrei Zhdanov, said in retrospect, "We made a mistake in not occupying Finland . . . everything would have been set up if we had."[14] The major reason for the Soviets' "mistake" of not pressing their grip on Finland and Iran between 1944 and 1946 was probably the interplay of superpower interests. This allowed greater leeway and freedom of manoeuvre than one might have expected for the small powers. The Russians feared, in the opinion of one expert, that they might tip the "precarious balance between apathy and moral indignation" in the West's attitude towards the post-war increase of Soviet power and influence in the territories around them.[15]

This is not to say that the Soviets lost interest in Finland and Iran after 1945. They continued to press Iran for the northern oil concession, to support communist agitation in the north, and to push for the inclusion of communists in the Iranian cabinet. The Russians also maintained a number of pressure points with the Finns. Nothing was to delay the immediate payment in goods of the Finnish war reparations debt. The Soviets monitored, and sought to interfere with, the war crimes trials in Helsinki. The Finns took Communist Party representatives into the government for the first time, and communists were elected to the first post-war parliament (the communist parliamentary wing, the Finnish People's Democratic League, won 48 seats in 1945, nearly a quarter of the total). However, as the post-war period moved on, the local response in Finland and Iran, in addition to the superpower stand-off, became

[12] Halliday, p. 259. The author uses the *New York Times* as his source.
[13] Yrjö Leino, *Muistelmia*, unpublished manuscript containing the Leino memoirs, p. 18.
[14] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, (Harcourt, Brace World, Inc., New York, 1962), p. 155.
[15] Adam Ulam, *Dangerous Relations* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1983), p. 20; see also, pp. 18–21. Cf. Chubin and Zabih, p. 46.

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important in blocking Soviet efforts to extend influence into those border states. By the end of 1947, the communist ministers of government in Iran had been dismissed, the separatist movements had been put down, and in spite of Soviet agitation, the Iranian parliament had refused to ratify the agreement that provided for a joint concession over the oil of the north with the majority interest in Russia's hands. In Finland, the year 1947 marked a watershed. Finnish constitutionalism was intact: the terms of the final Peace Treaty of Paris were approved with relief by the Finnish parliament; Finland's war reparations industry had paid off the first and the heaviest of the requirements (in 1948, 61 per cent of all Finnish exports were war reparations to the Soviet Union); and the initial popularity that the Finnish communists had enjoyed at the election polls seemed to wane as their election promises went largely unfulfilled. The head of the price section of the Ministry of Supply, also a member of the Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party, came to be called a "price dictator." The Finnish Social Democratic Party refused further discussions of cooperation with the communists, calling instead for "enough of false promises, price increases, coercive democracy."[16] The communists also lost popularity through the terrorist methods they employed when they were in charge of the security police.

A FURTHER opportunity that the Soviet Union might have had to intervene directly in Finland and in Iran to establish political control over those border states came in 1948. In Iran, conditions begged for reform, but the ruling elements seemed to be captive of a status quo that allowed them to maintain their positions of patrilineal advantage. Political extremism and repression, economic chaos, and the lack of food breathed new life into local communist party activities and paved the way for renewed Soviet agitation on the Iranian border, as well as intimidating moves towards the Iranian government. The Russians threatened to invoke the Treaty of 1921. According to this agreement, if there is an intent of attack on Persian territory or the threat of an attack on Russia through Persian territory that cannot be repelled by Persia alone, the Soviet government "has the right to send its army into Persia in order to take the necessary military steps in its own defence." In early February 1949, an Iranian communist tried to kill the Shah. Fear and confusion developed over the possibility that the Soviets were engineering a *coup d'état* in Iran. Sporadic fighting broke out between Iranian and Soviet troops on the border, and relations between the two countries fell to a critical low. However, when met with Iranian resistance in several forms, including an appeal for US support, the Russians did not press their possible advantage during the uncertain period from 1948–49.

The Soviets likewise had an opportunity for a communist takeover in Finland in 1948. By that time the Finnish Communist Party, in spite of a certain loss in popularity, was better organized and reportedly more

[16] Lauri Hyvämäki, *Vaaran vuodet 1944–48* (Otava, Helsinki, 1957), p. 136.

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willing than at any other time to attempt an overthrow of the government.[17] When, on 28 February 1948, Stalin's ambassador in Helsinki handed the Finnish president a letter asking for a friendship and mutual assistance pact, it appeared that the Russians had taken the first step down the path to control of Finland. Coming a week after the Czech coup of 22 February, it was possible that the Soviet Union had in mind to strike down both Prague and Helsinki in one blow before world reaction could take effect. The treaty suggested by Stalin stated that Finland would repel, with Soviet assistance if necessary, an attack on Finnish territory or an attack on the Soviet Union through Finnish territory from Germany or an ally of Germany; in the event of a threat of such an attack the two nations would undertake joint defence consultations. The Finns believed that the military advantages from the proposed treaty would go to the Soviet Union, not Finland. Reports of an impending communist *coup d'état* filled the political air with unrest in Helsinki during the spring of 1948. Communist Interior Minister Yrjö Leino writes that "unrest, or possibly a more serious encounter" had been a real danger.[18] At the end of April, the Chief of Finland's Defence Force (the Armed Forces remained loyal to the President) told the nation that precautionary measures had been taken to secure the nation, although they were "not directed against any one political group."[19] If indeed the Finnish communists had entertained thoughts of seizing power in 1948, the plan was still-born due, probably, to the lack of support, first and foremost, from Moscow.

Given the immediate post-war circumstances which seemed conducive to the Soviets making greater inroads in Finland and Iran than they actually made, why did Moscow not exercise an all out effort to impose satellite rule in those areas of its periphery? The answer goes to the heart of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the states that border it. Soviet foreign policy has been characterized as low-risk.[20] But one should keep in mind that Soviet foreign policy is also highly goal-oriented. A guide to Soviet foreign policy might be summarized: prepare with care; probe for the soft spots; and move with prudence, determined but not dogged, convinced but not committed, steady but not stubborn, always holding major objectives and interests clearly in sight. A goal-oriented, low-risk policy means that the Russians strive to attain their objectives at the least possible cost. They must, therefore, be particularly sensitive to developments in the small border states which, in turn, makes the behaviour of these small states a crucial conditioning factor for Soviet foreign policy action.

[17] Leino, p. 110.

[18] Ibid. p. 148. Leino had been a leading member of the Finnish Communist Party. He defected when he brought to the attention of the Finnish defence forces a secret plan for a possible *coup d'état* in Finland. The manuscript containing his memoirs was withdrawn from publication in 1958 due to the Finnish government's view of Soviet sensitivities.

[19] Gen. Aarne Sihvo, radio speech in Helsinki, 29 April 1948. (Mimeographed).

[20] Hannes Adomeit, "Consensus Versus Conflict: the Dimension of Foreign Policy," Seweryn Bialer, ed., *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Westview Press, Boulder, Col., 1981); pp. 49–64.

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The Soviet Union did not seek satellite rule in Finland and Iran as a prime objective in the immediate post-war period because each of these nations was more important to Moscow for its instrumental rather than its intrinsic value. Soviet policy in Iran from 1944 to 1946 was primarily dictated by "global considerations," and Stalin was keen on an accommodation with the West where possible.[21] Finland, for its part, was of use in helping the Soviets to repair a war-torn internal economy. The Russians wanted Finnish war reparations to be paid in machines and metal products. The Finns responded by revamping vital aspects of their own economic and industrial structure. The majority of Finnish exports up to that time had been paper and wood products, but in order to pay the war reparations, the Finns created an entirely new metal industry. It was so efficient that Zhdanov noted with satisfaction: "Everything on time, expertly packaged, and of excellent quality."[22] This conditioning process that takes place between the Soviet Union and its peripheral states warrants a closer look.

WHEN the policy objective is not satellite status, the Soviets can afford, and indeed have shown, a high degree of flexibility and adaptability towards the peripheral Finland and Iran. The conditional status of the Soviets' advance-retreat posture applies both to means and to objectives. The Russians have proved to be adaptable when it comes to choosing the support structure for their operations and in selecting the basic framework for decision-making with regard to the periphery.

Turning first to the support structure, the Russians are not inextricably bound to the local communist parties. Although the communist parties theoretically provide the Soviet Union with a channel of advocacy, Moscow seems, in fact, to reap few measurable benefits. The Tudeh, or Iranian Communist Party, did not secure sufficient support in 1944–46 within Iran to make a success of the separatist cause. As the Party was banned after 1949, it was unable to create within the political arena a viable opposition to the Shah. The Party has sometimes been seen as standing in the way of Soviet cooperation with the Iranian government. When the Soviet Union wants to emphasize relations with the prevailing government, it may do so "even at the expense of the local communist party."[23] In the 1960s, improved relations with the Shah diminished Soviet support for the Tudeh. As if to underline the point, the Soviet Union reportedly returned some Party members to Iran from refuge in the Soviet Union. It has been suggested that the Soviets were reluctant to provide support for the Iranian communists to come to power because they felt that a communist regime would be especially difficult to deal with and local communism could be "most resistant to Soviet influence."[24]

[21] Halliday, p. 260.
[22] Djilas, pp. 154–5.
[23] Chubin, p. 41.
[24] Ibid. p. 50, note 116.

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The Soviets showed no greater ideological allegiance towards the Finnish communists. After the war, Moscow, probably monitoring the degree of political strength the Finnish communists would be able to muster, was reluctant to provide support for them. In reply to a suggestion that the CPSU assist the Finnish Party financially, Zhdanov was clear: "Ideology is an entirely different matter from finance."[25] At the Paris Peace Conference, differences in demands between the Russian and Finnish communists became evident. The Soviet Union was "more interested in the price of the war—in barges, trawlers, frame houses, motors and cables— than in the accomplishments of the Finnish People's Democratic League"[26] (the parliamentary umbrella of the Finnish Communist Party). The Soviet Union also began to give increasing attention to developing contacts with non-communist party leaders in Finland. A concerted effort was made in the late 1950s to give support, including financial aid, to a group of social democrats who broke away from the main party and established an opposition social democratic party in parliament. The opposition group, known as the Social Democratic League, became an object of concentrated, if relatively brief, attention by Moscow. The Kremlin's assiduous courtship of non-communist parties also included the Centre Party, especially in the period from 1958–66. The Soviet interest was a contributing factor in the long-term stalemate between the Centre and the Social Democratic Parties. The Social Democrats were kept out of office until 1966, while the Centre Party ruled as a minority coalition. From the 1960s on, the Soviet Union worked systematically from one major party to the next, inviting representatives to Moscow and establishing direct lines of communication between the CPSU and the non-communist Finnish leaders. With energy and impunity, the Russians cultivated relationships with members of the Conservative, Liberal, and Swedish People's Parties. Particular attention seemed to be given Finnish business and industrial leaders. The wide chain of contact that the Soviet Union succeeded in establishing with non-communist figures allowed Moscow an important means of penetration of the Finnish political system.

THE basic framework that determines the direction of Soviet activity in Finland and Iran displays a pattern of adapting ideological preferences to policy needs that are deemed more pressing than ideology. In its contacts with Iranian and Finnish officials and politicians, the Soviet Union gravitated towards nodes of power and authority regardless of the ideological identity. The Soviet Union has also displayed an inherent flexibility towards ends in its policies towards Finland and Iran. The flexibility derives from not specifying those ends; rather, the Soviets have sought to achieve an overall position of influence that would create the basis for a broad range of compliant behaviour. Influence is a diffuse

[25] Leino, p. 111.
[26] Hyvämäki, p. 132.

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phenomenon that depends on "a certain ambience" for decisions rather than an articulation of decisions.[27] Through the influence relationship, the Soviets want to have the assured cooperation of the peripheral governments in order to be able to pursue any interest that the future would demand. The result would be assured access to the respective political systems.

In the late 1950s, and with particular respect to the U-2 affair in May 1960, the Soviets unleashed, through diplomatic notes and the media, a barrage of threats and claims on Iran and its Western link. In the process, the Soviets were not precise as to what concerned them most—they used doctrinal rhetoric and generalizations to denounce everything as equally dangerous or unfriendly. References to foreign military aid, bases, advisors, and military equipment tended to be used interchangeably to indicate that Iran's behaviour was disapproved of by the Soviet Union and was inimical to its interests. With Iran, however, the Soviets were unable to develop the relations of influence in the first two post-war decades that they achieved in high degree with Finland. The extensive influence that the Soviet Union has commanded in relations with Finland has been based on the predictability that the Russians were able to attribute to the actions of the Finnish leadership. Moscow seemed to operate on the assumption that the more uncertain they could make the Finns feel about Soviet behaviour, the more certain they could be of the Finns' behaviour. The Finns did develop a pattern of response to Soviet actions: when they were subjected to increased anxiety, they conformed to Soviet wishes; to ward off impending sanctions, the Finns anticipated Soviet moves. Operating in the belief that it is better to prevent than to cure, the Finns sought to prevent the use of negative reinforcement by trying to meet implicit as well as explicit wishes of the Soviets.

In the Note Crisis of 1980,[28] the Soviets were not specific about what they wanted, beyond the general call for "consultations" with the Finns on mutual security. They seemed to underline the non-specific stance in the diplomatic exchanges that followed the delivery of the note by refusing to give clear-cut details as to what they wanted. The Finnish leadership therefore undertook a number of pre-emptive moves in anticipation of the Soviet intent. President Urho Kekkonen dissolved the Finnish parliament and called for new elections six months earlier than scheduled. In what turned out to be a careful orchestration of the influence relationship, Moscow let the Finns know that the dissolution of Parliament was not what the Kremlin had in mind; at the same time, the Soviets did not say what they did have in mind. Further anticipating Soviet wishes, Kekkonen's chief opponent in the presidential race resigned his candidacy. The crisis ended when Kekkonen travelled to the Soviet Union in order to meet personally with Premier Nikita

[27] Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1963), p. 199.

[28] The text of the note can be found in English in the *New York Times*, 31 Oct. 1961, p. 12.

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Khrushchev. Whether or not the Kremlin indeed had a specific objective in mind or whether it simply sought to reassure its own leaders on the general condition of influence in Finno–Soviet relations is an open question.

THE process by which decisions are made in foreign policy are basic to perpetuating or changing patterns of relationships between powers. The course of foreign policy decision-making in Iran and Finland helps explain some of the comparable developments in these countries' relations with the Soviet Union. The model of decision-making in Iran and Finland, however, does not coincide with many of the models that have been established in the field. For example, for a small state on the border of a great power, the distinction between crisis and non-crisis decisions is probably not relevant.[29] Nearly all foreign policy concerns for small states adjacent to great powers are critical. The very process of foreign policy-making for the small peripheral power is characterized by a singular focus and direction, which are also the earmarks of crisis decision in large states. The small power's decision-making domain is intensive, whereas for the great powers it is extensive. A small state tends to be preoccupied with a narrow range of foreign policy problems. And in the case of small neighbours of great powers, the preoccupation is often with the single large neighbour.

Internally, the small state on the great-power periphery tends to make foreign policy the function of closed dimensions. Foreign policy takes on hallowed contours that give it a distinct character apart from, and above, domestic politics. Post-war Finnish leaders, presidents Paasikivi and Kekkonen, continually emphasized the primacy of foreign over domestic policy. Iran, also, can be characterized by the kind of decision-making that enjoys relative insulation from domestic limitations. The leadership has tended to equate the success of its foreign policy with the very stability and survival of the regime. The concentrated focus that marks the foreign policies of the small state on the Soviet periphery derives from a perception of a threat that is all-encompassing. The small nation sees the challenges to it as jeopardizing its very existence. When Finland was given no other choice than to sign the Armistice of 1944 with the Soviet Union, President Mannerheim sent a personal letter to Hitler, explaining why Finland, a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany, could no longer maintain that status:

> I wish to emphasize particularly that Germany, even if Fate should not grant your weapons success, will still continue to live. A similar assurance no one can give about Finland.[30]

[29] The crisis–non-crisis distinction is the basis, for example, of the "iceberg" theory of decision-making. According to this notion, most decisions are made "subsurface in a routine, non-innovative manner by a huge and highly differentiated bureaucracy" and the "visible, or critical decisions are made by the political leaders." Richard W. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and A Case Study* (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1977), p. 9.

[30] Carl-Gustaf Mannerheim, *Muistelmat* (Tammi, Helsinki, 1952), pp. 412–3.

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Dangers are viewed as imminent, and nothing else counts. The sense and assessment of pending danger lead the small state to "concentrate its collective mind wonderfully."[31] The standards of what is relevant are questioned by none, and the task of decision-makers is recognized by all. The issues are few, restricted mainly to the adjacent areas and focused on the survival of the state itself. The effect of perceiving foreign policy in these reductionist terms is noted by one analyst:

> If anything, the relative simplicity of the small state's external and defence problems and the ease with which they may be reduced to the central question of national survival are in themselves great sources of strength. They can induce a siege mentality such as is relatively infrequent in the history of great powers.[32]

For its part, a large power can hardly afford to have a narrow focus of operations. It needs to disperse energies and resources. In addition to the global outreach, the great power is subject to the cross-pressures of large bureaucracies and intra-governmental power struggles at home. Due to the sheer numbers of interests involved, the domestic tensions and conflicts are not as readily subordinated to "foreign policy considerations" as they are on the small-power stage. The struggle among competing interests makes the development of foreign policy in large states less a goal-oriented than an adaptive effort. Decisions, for the most part, are not made; they result. The Braybrooke and Lindblom model of "disjointed incrementalism" is standard for large bureaucratic organizations.[33]

The high level of concentration that permeates the foreign policies of small border nations affects the type of expertise that the state develops. Due to its focused efforts, the small state emerges with firstly a superior knowledge of its immediate geographic area; and secondly a collective evaluation of the condition and intentions of its great-power neighbour. The small nation on a great-power border has the indefinable advantage of giving generations of leaders a fundamental political education in the great power's performance and proclivities. The concentration of effort in foreign policy also affects the way foreign policy is made and who makes it. Making foreign policy in the small border states tends to be little influenced by bureaucratic advice and procedure. Neither Finland nor Iran has a sizable bureaucratic structure. These countries could not afford the contingencies of bureaucratic politics because it would mean sacrificing the capacity to focus resources and to act with deliberate speed in a coherent, singular fashion. Nor is decision-making in the small border states a product of rational calculation. The smaller countries simply do not possess the wherewithal to make rational choices. Along

[31] David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967), pp. 30–1. A. Fox also reminds us that a small state displays the ability "to concentrate on the main goal *at the expense of other values*." Fox, p. 184. (Italics added).

[32] Vital, p. 118.

[33] David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process* (The Free Press, New York, 1970), pp. 61–110.

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with a limited institutional capacity go limited resources, limited influence, and a limited position in the international order. One observer of small-state behaviour suggests that an alternative to the rational actor model of decision-making must be found in order to accommodate the limited ways of small states.[34] As it has developed up to the present, it is doubtful that decision-making analysis is important or relevant to foreign policy-making in Iran and Finland.

The fundamental features of the foreign policy procedure in Finland and Iran reflect the reduced role of bureaucracy and the exclusive role of one authority. Foreign policy is totally entrusted to a single source that concentrates the forces of nationalism and steers what comes to be known and accepted by the people as the only policy possible for a nation "like" Iran or Finland. The "national actor" model differs from the rational model in that foreign policy is personalized, not neutralized, and the emphasis is on promotion rather than on development of policy. Foreign policy for both Finland and Iran illustrates the major characteristics of a national actor model of policy-making. In Iran, taking the example from the Shah's time, foreign policy is "largely personified in the king . . . the personal nature of Iranian foreign relations is its chief characteristic, and what the monarch believes is of primary significance."[35] The Shah made the decisions with no intervening or formal policy process. There were no interest groups or mass media to influence the conduct of foreign policy. Non-associational groups, such as families and friends, advised the Shah, but the measure of their influence is speculative. Influence in foreign policy-making depended on the degree of access to the Shah. The Shah extended his personal domain in foreign policy also to the Iranian foreign ministry. In effect, the Shah was his own foreign minister, with his policies derived from a "personal synthesis of diverse views held within the structure of national power."[36]

As with Iran, foreign policy decisions in Finland have been largely determined by the predispositions of the nation's heads-of-state. Former Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti wrote in 1938: "the President of the Republic determines the nation's foreign policy in its entirety."[37] The post-war period witnessed conditions that required strong leadership and, hence, reinforced the existing tendency to concentrate foreign policy decisions in the chief executive. At any one time, foreign policy decision-making is confined to a relatively narrow elite group whose membership includes key members of the cabinet and certain party leaders, as well as leading persons in trade and industry outside of official

[34] Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, Robert M. Rood, and Richard A. Skinner, eds., *International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy* (University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, South Carolina, 1975), pp. 160–3.

[35] E. A. Bayne, *Persian Kingship in Transition: Conversations with a Monarch Whose Office is Traditional and Whose Goal is Modernization*, pp. 197–9, quoted in Chubin and Zabih, p. 10.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Väinö Tanner, *The Winter War* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1957), p. 6.

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government circles. Unlike Iran, the limitations on foreign policy-making in Finland have been those normally found in a democracy. The cabinet, the parliament, and public opinion have all had a role to play. The last of these, public opinion, was the chief obstacle for former President Kekkonen. At the war's end, Kekkonen wrote that it was often necessary in foreign policy matters to "work against" the people's opinions, but the government that ignored public opinion did so at its own peril. Although he lamented the problems that a democracy creates for foreign policy, Kekkonen demonstrated during a quarter of a century in office that the "handicaps" of democracy could be overcome to leave the president with the overwhelming control and direction of foreign policy.

A crucial long-term effect of the foreign policy dominion held by the Shah and Kekkonen was the depoliticization of foreign policy. The already weak institutional structure in Iran, marked by a lack of competing groups and no formalized means of access to decision-making, was further thrown into jeopardy by the Shah's conscious effort to diffuse power and redirect it towards his personal domain. Fractionalization and divisions, even within the elite, contributed to the overall strength of the Shah's mediating and dominant role. The work of the regime was accomplished by the extension of the Shah's power and personality into the nooks and crannies of policy. This was especially true of foreign affairs where the vital nature of the subject matter foreclosed a forum, and justified a monopoly on decisions. The depoliticization of foreign policy in Finland took a somewhat different form from that in Iran. Acting in the firm belief that Finland was, of necessity, a nation alone in trying to achieve a secure status next to the Soviet Union, President Kekkonen came to deal with that necessity in nearly religious terms. Support of the country's official foreign policy was to be accepted by the people as an article of faith; a breach of the faith would promise untold consequences for the nation. Kekkonen achieved in his time a sense of conviction among the Finnish people that his presidentially directed and controlled foreign policy was the valid course for Finland. The Finns, in the Kekkonen scheme, were not merely to make the obligatory response to Soviet wishes but were to believe in that response as the morally appropriate position. What was—and remains—a major political question (i.e. how to deal with the Russians) acquired in Kekkonen's time the quality of an ethical exercise.

From the Soviet view, the attempt to depoliticize foreign policy in Finland had the effect of making the behaviour of an already relatively secure neutral neighbour even more predictable. This would, of course, provide further grounds for the growth of Soviet influence in Finland. The depoliticization of foreign policy in Iran had, in many ways, an opposite effect. It set the stage for making an already unpredictable behaviour pattern even more uncertain, a condition the Soviets like to avoid. Iran was too weak internally, however, to reap from its acquired unpredictability any sizable benefits in terms of a stronger position with Moscow.

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TO summarize, the conditioning processes that govern the perceptions of the small-state leadership and the general course of development in relations with the Soviet Union are sufficiently similar in countries as diverse as Iran and Finland that they can be said to comprise a phenomenon of the small-power periphery. The existence of patterns of peripheral relationships has been given little systematic attention in scholarly research. Less attention yet has been given to the importance of the predispositions and actions of the small-state leadership in determining Soviet behaviour on its borders. What do the Russians view as necessary for control and stability on their periphery? And what are the limits of small-state tolerance of constraints by Moscow? A study of the small-state Soviet periphery as a whole may reveal trends that will explain the eruptions we have already witnessed in certain areas, and help us understand the problems that may be developing, gradually, elsewhere on Soviet borders. In the long run, we may add a new dimension to our current approaches to answering the question "what will the Russians do next?"

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Zion in Siberia

Benton Arnovitz

"Ye are to pass over this Jordan, to go in to possess the land, which the Lord your God giveth you."
Joshua I:11

"To the land of the Jews!"
Soviet slogan shortly after Birobidzhan was reserved for Jewish settlement

"SHOW me!" I said to Vladimir S_____ that day in Leningrad. My sheltered roots were in a Pennsylvania mill town, and so despite reports that I had read I was genuinely sceptical that in a country which had fought for its life against the Nazis, a citizen would have to carry with him, available for the authorities to examine, a government document which proclaimed that he was a Jew. S_____ opened his brown internal passport. It read: "Nationality: *Yevrei*"—Jew.[2] So I had been naive; it was true after all. But what did it mean? How had it come about?

For one thing it meant that like most other Soviet citizens Vladimir too had a "homeland," a regional "homeland" inside the Soviet Union. Not that he had ever been there, nor had any of his forebears, nor did he speak its official language, nor even did he have a sentimental attachment for the place. It was necessary that as a Jew he should have a right to that homeland in order to conform with one of the requirements of the nationalities policy as set out by Vladimir Lenin and elaborated upon by his Commissar of Nationalities and successor, Joseph Stalin. Shorn of its dialectical embellishment, this policy aimed at the long-term assimilation and Russification of the various Soviet ethnic groups. It sought to achieve this by tendering the outward trappings of national autonomy in exchange for allegiance to the Soviet state and Marxist system that foreswore any extra-Soviet affinities.

Lenin had called national cultural autonomy "the most refined and therefore the most pernicious kind of nationalism" and believed that while satisfying the nationalist petty-bourgeois and intellectuals it contravened the internationalism of the proletariat.[3] After Lenin's death in January 1924, Stalin, a member of a national minority himself, appeared to conclude that the burgeoning Soviet edifice might be more securely held together if each significant ethnic minority had its own

[1] H. H. Ben-Sasson, (ed.), *A History of the Jewish People*, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p. 973; and Zvi Y. Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917–1930* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1972), pp. 433, 470.

[2] Personal visit to the Soviet Union, Leningrad, late March 1976.

[3] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (second Russian edition), Vol. 17, p. 118, cited in Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1972), p. 426.

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tangible stake in the new imperial arrangement by "possessing" its own territorial national home within the borders of the Union.[4] Stalin had earlier spelled out the attributes of nationhood in the Soviet context: a shared religion was not one of the requirements; contiguous territory and a shared language were.[5] Stalin's personal willingness to accord a people national rights was the only will that counted, despite previous Party and juridical acknowledgements of the Jewish community's status as a nationality—acknowledgements that dated from before the inception of the Soviet state. As early as March 1914, Lenin had equated Jewishness with "national descent," and the 10th Party Congress in 1921 adopted a resolution that referred to the "equality of nationalities" and "the right of national minorities to free national development" while specifically citing the Jews as an example. In January 1918 a Commissariat for Jewish National Affairs had been established and in the prescribed functions of the Communist Party's "Jewish Sections" (*Yevsektsii*), Yiddish was conceded to be integral to the legal definition of Jewish nationality.[6]

Not only was the nationality status of the Jewish community fixed in law, so too, ultimately was that of individuals born of Jewish parents. The latter legal definition was rendered on 27 December 1932 when the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars decreed the internal passport system that still exists. All passports were to indicate the nationality of the bearer. National identity was not a matter of choice: if your parents were Jewish you were Jewish, just as the child of, say, Georgian parents was Georgian.[7]

Yet notwithstanding their legal grounding, the Jews were to conform to Stalin's own definition of a nation, and in order for this to come about, he acceded to doing what the tsars, Kerensky, and even Lenin had not done. He "gave them land."

With few exceptions individual Jews had been denied land in the Russian Empire; neither had they possessed it as a people. Confined, for the most part, to the Pale of Settlement, they gravitated to those vocations open to them by law. And these tended to be occupations that the revolution ultimately would stigmatize as "unproductive." Following the havoc and dislocations wrought by the First World War, the October revolution and the Civil War, a great many Jews found themselves unemployed and in abject poverty.[8] The brief of the Party *apparatchiki* who administered the New Economic Policy (NEP) and its precursor programmes was to bring the country as quickly as possible into sound

[4] George St. George, *Siberia: The New Frontier* (McKay, New York, 1969), p. 322.

[5] J. V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, a collection of articles (London, 1936, reprinted 1942), p. 35, cited in Ilya Levkov, "Self-Determination in Soviet Politics," in Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Freidlander, (eds.), *Self-Determination: National, Regional, and Global Dimensions* (Westview Press, Boulder, Col., 1980), p. 165.

[6] William Korey, "Soviet Law and the Jews," in Ronald I. Rubin (ed.), *The Unredeemed: Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union* (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1968), pp. 61–2.

[7] Ibid. pp. 62–3. If one's parents are of differing nationalities, at age 16 the child may select either of those two nationalities as his own.

[8] Thomas E. Sawyer, *The Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union* (Westview Press, Boulder, Col., 1979), p. 87.

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material order, and to do so within the parameters of the Marxist pre-eminence of labour. Shop-keepers, small money-lenders and middlemen, to say nothing of religious and cultural functionaries, found their situations even more precarious when their livings were not destroyed altogether. Those who had been forced to live by their wits, *Luftmenschen*, had no place in a system that mandated industrialization and communal agrarianization. Individualism was a pariah trait in a rapidly collectivizing society.

The Jewish masses were starving, and the Soviet government took recourse to a tsarist tactic: to "normalize" the Jews by settling them on the land. To this end, the authorities founded "Komzet," an acronym for *Komitet po Zemelnomu Trudyashchikhsya Yevreyev*—the Committee for the Rural Settlement of Jewish Toilers—in late 1924 or early 1925,[9] and "Ozet"—The Society for the Agricultural Settlement of Jewish Toilers—an ostensibly private organization charged with enlisting both domestic and foreign support for the rural colonization schemes.[10] Focusing on the Ukraine and the Crimea, where Jewish agricultural settlement had been attempted before, the projects quickly fell foul of their own success. The traditional anti-semitism and envy of Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar peasants wrought sufficient unrest for the Soviet authorities to search elsewhere for a place to concentrate the Jews.[11] If inter-ethnic competition for land was to be avoided, the colonists would have to settle a relatively unpopulated territory; the Soviet Far East, not long before the scene of battles between Red and White Guards, lay open and beckoning.

SOME have suggested, and many in European Russia believe today that Stalin personally selected Birobidzhan for Jewish settlement. These Soviet citizens hold that he intended to separate younger Jews from the religious influence of their families and older generation, thus supplanting theological tradition with dialectical materialism.[12] Others have attributed the plan to the Jewish communists who staffed the *Yevsektsii* and Komzet, some in the service of a benign vision of Jewish "statehood" and preservation of national culture,[13] and others were like Aleksandr Chemerisky, the secretary of the *Yevsektsii*, who boasted in 1928 that "the autonomous Jewish territory will be the heaviest blow to the Zionist and religious ideology."[14] The best evidence, which relies

[9] Ibid. p. 87; and Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, 3rd ed., (Praeger, New York, 1952), p. 171.

[10] Guid G. Goldberg, *Zionism Under Soviet Rule (1917–1928)* (Herzl Press, New York, 1960), p. 111, cited in Sawyer, p. 99.

[11] Sawyer, p. 85; Kolarz, pp. 172–3; and Ben-Sasson, p. 972.

[12] St. George, p. 323.

[13] Ben Ami, *Between Hammer and Sickle* (The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1967), pp. 232–3.

[14] Aleksandr Chemerisky, "Biro-Bidzhan: Der Grosser Onzog," in *Oktiabr*, 30 March 1928, cited by C. Abramsky, "The Biro-Bidzhan Project" in Lionel Kochan (ed.), *The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1970), p. 69, cited in Sawyer, p. 88.

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upon the testimony of Jews who were high in the *Yevsektsii* apparatus at the time, is that the initiative for the selection of Birobidzhan came from "representatives of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the RSFSR supported by experts from the People's Commissariat of Defence, the Agricultural Academy, and the Russian scientist Vladimir Komarov. [Soviet President Mikhail] Kalinin also claimed to have been the first to propose the project."[15] Another *Yevsektsii* activist of the late 1920s testified as recently as 1966 that his organization had not originated the programme, but that it had come from "the highest Party organs," and that Stalin had supported the idea against much opposition.[16]

The land itself was distant, more than 5,000 miles from the traditional centres of Russian Jewish culture. Located in what is now called Khabarovsk Krai in the Soviet Far East, nestled in a crook of the Amur River on the Chinese border, the attributes of the territory would allow it to meet a number of pressing needs of the regime, and accordingly it was marked out for examination. In early summer 1927 a team of technicians was sent for six weeks to explore the area then called Bureya, after one of its mountain ranges. The name was later changed to Biro-Bidzhan, after the two principal rivers that drain the territory. The whistle-stop Tikhonkoye station, later Birobidzhan City, on the route of the Trans-Siberian Railway, was virtually the only concession to civilization in the entire area; to call it a frontier settlement would be to glamorize it. The region was duly noted to have forbidding extremes of temperature; vast swamplands and forests covered most of the area, and little of it was fit for agriculture, but promising deposits of iron, coal, graphite, tin, copper, and even gold were suspected.[17] The foreseeable difficulties of settlement notwithstanding, the commission's positive recommendation was accepted and on 28 March 1928 the Jewish Autonomous Raion (District) was set aside by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for settlement by Jewish working people. Variously reported as being between 25,100 square miles[18] and the more commonly ascribed 13,900 square miles,[19] the area was in any case a great deal larger than British Palestine. Now that the title deed had been passed what purpose was the structure to serve?

Soviet President Kalinin's attitude seems to have been motivated at least in some small measure by compassion. At the first convention of Ozet in November 1926 he sketched his vision of a Jewish national home on Soviet soil:

> The Jewish people faces a great task, that of preserving its

[15] Gitelman, p. 431, citing Semyon Dimonshtein in *Forpost*, 1936, No. 1, p. 124, quoted by Yaakov Lvavi (Babitzky), *HaHityashuvut HaYehudit BeBirobidjan*, (Jerusalem, 1965), pp. 41–3.

[16] Gitelman, p. 431.

[17] Ben Ami, p. 235, and Solomon Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N.Y., 1951), p. 174.

[18] Erich Thiel, *The Soviet Far East: A Survey of Its Physical and Economic Geography*, trans. by Annelie and Ralph M. Rockwood (Praeger, New York, 1957), p. 301.

[19] *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Micropedia, s.v. "Yevreyskaya Autonomous Oblast" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, 1974), p. 817, and *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, trans. of 3rd ed., s.v. "Jewish Autonomous Oblast" (Macmillan, New York, 1975), p. 289.

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> nationality, and this requires the transformation of a considerable part of the Jewish population into a compactly settled agricultural peasantry numbering in the hundreds of thousands at least. Only on this condition can the Jewish masses hope for the survival of their nationality.[20]

Many Jewish communists believed as did Commissar for Jewish National Affairs Semyon Dimonshtein a few years later:

> The Jews in Moscow will have to assimilate. . . . In ten years' time Biro-Bidzhan will become the most important guardian of the Jewish national culture and those who cherish a national Jewish culture must link up with Biro-Bidzhan. . . . We already consider Biro-Bidzhan a Jewish national state.[21]

The agrarianization of the Jews to alleviate their economic plight, the desire to "normalize" the social status of the Jews vis-à-vis the other Soviet nationalities, and the wish to preserve the secular elements—not the religious elements—of Jewish national culture constituted, then, some of the goals of the project's advocates and sponsors.

There is much evidence, too, that Birobidzhan was cast as a counterweight to Herzl's brand of Zionism. Despite the denials of those like Chemerisky that the plan was not intended to compete with Palestine—that it would be a Jewish republic that would not have to displace an indigenous population—the slogan "Next year in Bureya (Birobidzhan)," paraphrasing the traditional Jewish prayer "Next year in Jerusalem" was quickly taken up as the rallying cry of the Jewish pioneer groups leaving for the Siberian "land of promise." Indeed, groups of the Left Poale Zion Party, a one-time labour party with Zionist leanings, changed their name to Poale Birzhan. A troop of 162 of them left Moscow for Birobidzhan only days after the Jewish district was proclaimed.[22]

IF Kalinin's attitude was at all motivated by solicitude it was also motivated by the material and propaganda interests of the Soviet state. At the Ozet conference in which he invoked concern for Jewish national survival he also reasoned with the delegates:

> The Jews . . . are one of the most lively and influential peoples, politically speaking. . . . We should therefore consider if, under the existing conditions of capitalist encirclement, it is important that the mass of Jews display the warmest attitude towards the Soviet Union. If the petit-bourgeois masses . . . outside [our] borders . . . display warm feelings towards the Soviet Union will this be of any value to the Revolution? Of course it will. And if so, it is clear from this point of view as well, the establishment of a Jewish republic will be of tremendous value. . . .[23]

[20] *Pravda*, 26 Nov. 1926, quoted in Schwarz, p. 174.

[21] Semyon M. Dimonshtein (ed.), *Yidn in F.S.S.R.* (Zamelbuch, Der Emes, Moscow, 1935), pp. 31–8, as cited in Abramsky, pp. 72–3, in Sawyer, pp. 86, 99.

[22] "Urge Soviet to Aid Unemployed Jews: Bureya Colony Is Goal," *New York Times*, 29 April 1928, III, 8:5.

[23] Ben-Sasson, p. 972.

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But more important than humanitarian, ideological, or public relations concerns, the Soviets' rush to populate the almost uninhabited regions of the Far East, particularly those on the border, had another motivation. Recalling the *débâcle* of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, and the fact that the Soviets still had no advanced logistical base in the Far East, a populated and economically vibrant Birobidzhan would help resolve a military problem.[24] More than 3000 Koreans already lived in the territory,[25] and Chinese wetbacks were scampering northwards across the Eastern Siberian Amur River border at a rate that seemed to threaten the Soviet hold on those lands.[26] Moscow's planners had attempted to anchor the Birobidzhan area with a few thousand Russian and Ukrainian settlers in 1926 and 1927, but their numbers were insufficient.[27] A year or two later Kalinin would combine several of these themes in shaping a proposed solution. James Marshal, an American attorney who met Kalinin in 1929, reported that the Soviet leader "also had in mind that the Jews were less likely to merge with the Manchurian population than other peoples. Jews, therefore, would be especially desirable as a border population. . . . Speed was desirable in order to give the Jews a quick majority. Speed depended on cash. He would like to see Americans investigate the project."[28] From 1926 to 1929 Kalinin was consistent on this point; if foreign scrutiny was necessary to attract foreign resources to the project he would welcome it. But other official spokesmen, not so lofty but closer to the day-to-day affairs of the colonizing venture, seemed to bar the door to outsiders. In what would be only one example of the Soviet government's seemingly perpetual ambivalence about Birobidzhan and how it should be promoted, if indeed it was to be promoted at all, a dispatch from a settlement society took the opposite course. In it, Ozet officer Samuel Weizman, brother of world Zionist leader Chaim Weizman, said that the Soviet government would *not* welcome a commission of foreign experts to investigate the territory.[29]

The March 1928 decree had officially closed Birobidzhan to all except Jewish settlers, yet even larger numbers of other settlers continued to arrive.[30] And by the end of that year only a third of those Jews who had arrived remained in the district. The experience was repeated in 1929.[31] Brave statements had appeared in the press when the first Jewish pioneers reached the district in May 1928. The *New York Times* reported that the settlers were met on their arrival by Ozet representatives and housed in barracks. "The pioneers immediately began work in the experimental fields of Birsk and are said to be feeling well after their long journey," the dispatch went on.

[24] Ibid. p. 972; and Salo W. Baron, *The Russian Jew Under Tsars and Soviets* (Macmillan, New York, 1954), p. 233.
[25] Kolarz, p. 174.
[26] Baron, p. 232.
[27] Kolarz, pp. 173–4.
[28] James Marshal, letter to Zvi Gitelman, 2 Dec. 1970, cited in Gitelman, p. 434.
[29] "Urge Soviet to Aid. . . .," III, 8:5.
[30] Schwarz, p. 176.
[31] Ibid. p. 176.

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A delegation from ICOR, a US-based organization, admitted by the Soviets in order to encourage private American aid, did reach Birobidzhan in autumn 1929. Viktor Fink was a member of the visiting commission, but what he witnessed did not appear in the official report:

> In the settlement near the [railroad] terminal . . . the Jewish settlers have collected in a bottleneck. They live in barracks. In an incredibly crowded and dirty place . . . people . . . lie around helter-skelter in double-decked wooden bunks. The Birobidzhan settler barracks . . . would disgrace a jail. Instructions are that the settlers are not to stay in the barracks more than three days. Actually, they hang around for . . . months, first because no land has been prepared for settlement, and secondly because there are no roads. Birobidzhan is just not the Crimea, where you can walk long distances, live in a temporary hut, or even sleep under the sky in summer. You need solid buildings in Birobidzhan, and you have to build roads through the taiga. As long as neither has been done, people cannot leave Tikhonkoye. . . .
>
> Some. . . . live in extreme poverty. I have seen a family so sunken in misery that other settlers were moved by pity to take up a collection for these people, though they were themselves half-starved. . . . Single women, finding themselves helpless, are driven to prostitution.[32]

Finding themselves in an area completely unprepared to receive them, townsmen unaccustomed to the conditions they were to face were set to what one non-Jewish Russian authority would call "pioneering work which would have been beyond even Siberian Cossacks."[33]

But even that was not the whole story, for in a small article in the 10 June 1928 *New York Times* there was a report of an age-old phenomenon, even in deepest Siberia: "There are some anti-Semites in the Bureya district . . . where efforts are being made to establish a big Jewish colony. . . . At a general meeting of the settlers it has been decided to 'take severe measures' against a small number of hooligans who were molesting them."[34]

The net Jewish population of Birobidzhan increased only slightly in the first few years—2,672 in 1930, 5,125 in 1931 out of a total district population of 38,000 and 44,574 respectively in those same years.[35] The project was sputtering and the Soviet authorities knew it. By the second half of 1930 the *New York Times* would report:

> Present methods of colonizing Bureya, where the Soviet government planned a Jewish republic have been pronounced unsatisfactory by the Soviet Land Commission after a hearing of the special commission sent to . . . investigate conditions.

[32] Viktor Fink, "Birobidzhan," in *Sovetskoye Stroitelstvo*, pp. 118f, quoted in Schwarz, p. 190.

[33] Yuri Semyonov, *Siberia: Its Conquest and Development*, trans. by J. R. Foster (Helicon Press, Baltimore, 1954, 1963), p. 386.

[34] "Hooligans in the Bureya District," *New York Times*, 10 June 1928, III, 6:4.

[35] A. Kantorovich, *Perspektivy Birobidzhana* (Emes Publishers, Moscow, 1932), pp. 78f, cited in Schwarz, pp. 177, 190–1.

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> The commissariat . . . recommended that . . . practical measures [be taken] to effect immigration of 50,000 working Jews to Bureya within the coming year. The . . . commissariat said immigration there had been conducted without plan. . . . It recommended that houses be constructed and land parcelled off so that on the arrival of the immigrants they will not be dismayed and decide to return to their old towns.
>
> The government has requested that Bureya be separated so as to form an independent economic center with its own executive committee supervising the work. . . .
>
> Increased immigration appears to be the main aim and this increase will not be confined to Jews.[36]

The dispatch reflected a number of course changes beyond mere official acknowledgement of the validity of the settlers' complaints. No longer were the Soviets intent on turning most of the Jews into farmers; they wanted quick settlement of the region and were willing to consider upgrading the administrative status of the area and even to re-encourage non-Jewish immigration if that would help populate and develop the territory.[37] It all betrayed an increased nervousness by the regime about the security of the eastern marches.

THE Russians and the Japanese had long maintained conflicting interests in China's Manchurian province—the Japanese hold over southern Manchuria recognized in the 1905 US-sponsored treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese War, and the Soviet foothold in the north. The latter was actually contested by the Chinese themselves in an undeclared war in 1929. Japanese military leaders eventually came to believe that their treaty rights in the area were being threatened by both the Soviets and the Chinese, and during the last four months of 1931 their forces seized the entire province, converting it into a puppet state called Manchukuo.[38] Expansionist Japan was now on the Soviet doorstep—and across the Amur River from Birobidzhan.

In spring 1932 the Soviet government directed accelerated Jewish immigration to Birobidzhan.[39] The settlers were sent off with proclamations that "the masses of the Jewish toilers, who are permeated with loyalty and devotion to the Soviet regime, are going to Biro-Bidzhan. . . . They are not only fighting for their country, not for a new fatherland . . . but for the strengthening of the Soviet Union in the Far East."[40]

In the early '30s Semyon Dimonshtein would echo:

> It is important to protect our Far East against any outside intervention. One of the main elements in this undertaking is to

[36] "Soviet Acts to Push Colonizing of Bureya," *New York Times*, 16 Aug. 1930, 6:6.
[37] Schwarz, p. 177.
[38] Richard N. Current, et. al. *American History* (Knopf, New York, 1961), pp. 640, 642, 757.
[39] Directive of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, 7 April 1932, in *Tribuna*, No. 10–11 (20 April 1932), pp. 8f, cited in Schwarz, pp. 177, 191.
[40] *Tribuna*, No. 9, 1932, as cited in Abramsky, p. 69, quoted in Sawyer, pp. 87–8, 99.

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> settle the region as densely as possible with reliable, persevering elements. The stronger we are in the Far East, the more remote becomes the danger of war.[41]

But who would want to move his family 5,000 miles to colonize a battlefield? Russian Jewish settlement of Birobidzhan continued to lag, and while the American press explained to its readers that the area was "in the theater of possible military operations in the event of a war in the Far East,"[42] the Soviets were so anxious to populate the area against the Japanese that they announced that even Jews from other countries would be welcome.[43] Indeed, some Jewish communists from Europe, Latin America, even the United States and Palestine had moved to Birobidzhan shortly before.[44] The original 1932 plan to encourage foreign Jewish immigration foresaw fully one-quarter of the settlers coming from capitalist countries. The goal for 1936 was 40 per cent. Yet the number of those immigrants lagged, too, and the admission of foreign Jews was ultimately deemed an unacceptable political risk.[45]

As early as autumn 1931, with the Japanese advancing through Manchuria, the Soviet government promised to upgrade the Jewish area from a *raion* (district) to an *oblast* (region or province), one rung below a union republic, and to invest it with a greater degree of autonomy, if only the Jews would meet the population and economic development goals set by the regime.[46] The legal requirements for "promotion" of the territory's status were not met, but the government's need to lure Jews to the area was so great that the rules were waived to enhance the appeal of immigration. As a demonstration of what it hoped would be taken as a show of good faith, on 7 May 1934 the Jewish Autonomous Oblast was created by decree of the Central Executive Committee. Soviet propaganda trumpeted that decree as the "Kalinin Declaration," contrasting it with the as yet unfulfilled "Balfour Declaration," which held out to traditional Zionists the vision of a Jewish National Home in British Palestine.[47] Kalinin went further and proclaimed his hope that "when 100,000 Jews have settled" in Birobidzhan the Soviet government might declare the area a "Soviet Jewish Republic."[48]

The lure finally seemed to work. In the absence of actual hostilities in the Far East and the Soviet government's new quasi-constitutional down payment on statehood and on a refuge for Jewish national culture, more Soviet Jews and potential foreign contributors were converted from sceptics to believers. By the end of 1935 the Jewish population of the

[41] Dimonshtein, *Yidishe Avtonome Gegend* (Moscow, 1934), quoted in Baron, p. 233.
[42] Harold Denny, "Soviet to Settle 12,000 in Far East," *New York Times*, 10 May 1934, p. 16.
[43] Ibid. p. 16.
[44] Ben Ami, p. 237, and *Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, No. 52, July 1934, p. 25, cited in Kolarz, pp. 178, 180.
[45] Kolarz, p. 178.
[46] Directive of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of 30 September 1931, in *Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, Oct.–Nov. 1931, pp. 73f., cited in Schwarz, pp. 177, 191.
[47] Kolarz, p. 174.
[48] Dimonshtein, *Yidn in F.S.S.R.*, pp. 31–8, quoted in Sawyer, pp. 87, 99.

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region reached 14,000; collective farms were established and Jews took an important part in building local industry. Talented and experienced foreign Jews, even non-communists, were courted as long as they would agree to abide by Soviet law, and for their contributions they would be accorded the opportunity to remain alive, no small reward in a world that was becoming increasingly hostile to them.[49]

Jewish educational institutions from kindergartens through to research academies were set up. The language of instruction was Yiddish; Hebrew had been banned by the Soviet authorities. A Yiddish book publishing house, a newspaper, theatre and other cultural organizations sprang up, too.[50]

TO allay the fears of those foreign investors who were still apprehensive about the danger of a Japanese invasion, something the Soviet government could hardly deny,[51] pro-Soviet propagandists were pleased to be able to quote the statement of Britain's Lord Dudley Marley, Vice-Chairman of the House of Lords and Chairman of the World Committee to Aid Victims of German Nazism:

> Speaking as a member of the British General Staff and as one who has been all his life a soldier, I can tell you that no general staff would ever dream of attacking Biro-Bidzhan, because it would be a sheer waste of time. I should think that Biro-Bidzhan would be about the safest place in the world in case of war, because it is entirely self-contained and, if it were cut off, it could live comfortably on its own produce.[52]

While the Soviets saw a thriving Birobidzhan as a bulwark against the Japanese, the colonization project had one fascinating implication that is little-known today, and that was not really brought to public light until Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz published their book, *The Fugu Plan*, in 1979.

As a consequence of their ever-closer affiliation with the German leadership, some members of the highest councils of the Japanese government had read and been influenced by the spurious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Convinced of the purported secret powers of world Jewry, and enamoured of the financial acumen of the Rothschilds, Bernard Baruch, Jacob Schiff and others, a secret policy was devised between 1934 and 1940 to enlist Jewry in establishing what was to be a Japanese-controlled Jewish buffer state in Manchuria opposite Birobidzhan. The Soviets were engaged in an extensive road-building programme in Birobidzhan—manifest evidence of Soviet military

[49] Oswald Garrison Villard, "Russia Aids the Jews," *The Nation*, 28 Aug. 1935, 141: 231.

[50] Ben Ami, p. 238.

[51] William Zuckerman, "A Jewish Republic Rises with Soviet Aid," *New York Times*, 26 Aug. 1934, VIII, 16:1–2.

[52] Dudley L. A. Lord Marley, *Birobidjan as I Saw It* (ICOR Library, New York, 1934), II, and "Birobidjan, the Jewish Autonomous Territory," (American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan (Ambijan), New York, 1936), p. 8, quoted in Baron, pp. 233, 392.

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ambitions, the Japanese were convinced. In 1934 the Japanese Foreign Ministry journal published an article entitled "A Plan to Invite Fifty Thousand German Jews to Manchukuo," and the piece was reported in the Japanese newspapers and in the Jewish press around the world. And although the plan was finally shelved in the wake of weightier wartime matters, a December 1938 secret meeting of the Japanese Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Army Minister, Navy Minister, and Finance and Commerce Minister did agree that Japan should seriously consider setting up a Jewish enclave near Birobidzhan, the area they were convinced was the spring-board for the Russian-Jewish invasion of Manchuria and China.[53]

Foreign threats notwithstanding, such was the enthusiasm for Birobidzhan slowly gathering in the Soviet Union and among foreign supporters of the venture, that one Jewish communist abroad wrote in 1936:

> The Jews have gone into the Siberian forests. If you ask them about Palestine, they laugh. The Palestine dream will long have receded into history when in Biro-Bidzhan there will be motor cars, railways and steamers, huge factories belching forth their smoke. . . . These settlers are founding a home in the taigas of Siberia not only for themselves but for millions of their people.[54]

By the end of the year there were still only about 20,000 Jews in Birobidzhan,[55] a small minority of the population of the territory, but the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR was proud to proclaim: "For the first time in the history of the Jewish people its burning desire for the creation of a homeland of its own, for the achievement of its own national statehood, has found fulfilment. . . . Birobidzhan has completely justified the status . . . which has been granted it."[56] And then came the storm.

ALONG with virtually all of the rest of the Birobidzhan Jewish communist leadership and intellectual elite, beloved figures, such as the administrator Professor Joseph Liberberg, as well as the locally powerful Matvei Khavkin, and even Semyon Dimonshtein, were arrested, imprisoned, exiled or liquidated in Stalin's purges that swept through Birobidzhan and the whole of the Soviet Union from the latter half of 1936 to 1938. So rapidly had the political climate changed that *Forpost*, the official organ of Birobidzhan, carried a glowing report of the

[53] Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz, *The Fugu Plan* (Paddington Press, New York, 1979), pp. 9, 51, 57–9.

[54] Otto Heller, quoted in J. Leftwich, *What Will Happen to the Jews?* (London, 1936), pp. 137, 149, cited in Laqueur, p. 427. Several years earlier Heller had written *Der Untergang des Judentums* (*The Downfall of Jewry*) (Vienna, 1931).

[55] *Encyclopedia Judaica*, s.v. "Birobidzhan" (Macmillan, New York, 1971), p. 1049.

[56] *Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, Nov. 1936, pp. 146f., quoted in Schwarz, pp. 181, 192. The Central Executive Committee statement was made on 29 Aug. 1936. Also *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, s.v. "Birobidjan," by Avraham Yarmolinsky (Universal Jewish Encyclopedia Co., Inc., New York, 1948), Vol. 2, p. 374.

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region's progress, signed by regional Party secretary Khavkin, and in the *same issue* a denunciation of Khavkin as a "wrecker."[57] The leadership was charged with bourgeois nationalism and Trotskyism. The foreign volunteers who, only months before, had been invited to populate the border territory were now charged with coming to that sensitive area in order to commit sabotage and to spy for international Zionist interests, the Japanese, and other "imperialist powers." The *London Telegraph* and *New York Times* of the period carried a number of articles about Birobidzhan, quoting snippets of Soviet publications alleging "a separatist conspiracy," "Jewish conspirators" operating "schools for spies," the "unmasking" of "a Jewish counter-revolutionary and Zionist organization," as well as an occasional list of those shot.[58] Birobidzhan's Jewish cultural organizations were padlocked and immigration, so long zealously fostered by the state and Party, was restricted. One now needed NKVD permission to move to Birobidzhan.[59]

An almost impenetrable veil drifted over Birobidzhan as the purges gathered momentum, and despite a few public suggestions from Moscow and in the West that Birobidzhan might prove a refuge for Jews fleeing the Nazis,[60] the Soviets permitted virtually no one to visit the area let alone settle it as world war drew near. Now Soviet and Japanese troops tested each other in border clashes in 1938 and 1939, but although in the neighbourhood, Birobidzhan was not touched directly by the combat.

Situated in the heart of the *Gulag*, hundreds of thousands of slave labourers began to be shipped to Birobidzhan and nearby territories in the late 1930s and 1940s to work for Dalstroy, the Far Eastern Construction Trust. Under one of Birobidzhan's elected representatives to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, General Ivan Fyodorovich Nikishov, widely characterized as "one of the cruellest and most merciless of men," literally millions are calculated to have died working the gold fields far north of the JAR where "the winter temperatures are among the lowest in Siberia."[61] The Jewish population of Birobidzhan did not grow during the war,[62] but at least 10,000 of the region's population (the individuals' nationalities are not stated) are acknowledged by the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* to have "gone to the front," and nine became Heroes of the Soviet Union.[63]

Nevertheless, small glimpses of wartime Birobidzhan are possible. European Jewish refugees passing through the region by train on their way to Japan in late 1940 or early 1941 were warned by a Birobidzhan Jew

[57] *Forpost*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1936, cited in *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, p. 374.

[58] Joel Cang, *The Silent Millions: A History of the Jews in the Soviet Union* (Taplinger, New York, 1969), pp. 143–4; Kolarz, p. 117; *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, pp. 374–6; *Encyclopedia Judaica*, p. 1048; Schwarz, p. 182; Ben Ami, p. 238.

[59] Cang, p. 144.

[60] Vladimir de Korostovetz, "Where to Settle the Jews," *The Spectator*, 6 Jan. 1939, Vol. 162, p. 20. This writer thought the area of Birobidzhan "larger than France and Germany."

[61] Eric Newby, *The Big Red Train Ride* (St. Martins, New York, 1978), pp. 236–7.

[62] *Encyclopedia Judaica*, p. 1049.

[63] *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 9, p. 289.

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at the railway station "No one aboard here will ever leave the Soviet Union alive."[64] And in his 753-page history of Siberia, Erwin Lessner, who travelled through the Eastern territories in spring 1941, allows himself one sentence about the Jewish Autonomous Oblast: "And the faces of the perished prisoners, dumped on the tracks in Birobidzhan, were dull, even in death."[65]

IN February 1944 a delegation from Birobidzhan travelled to Moscow to attend a meeting of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, a show-piece organization which the Soviets employed in their campaign for Western wartime support. While in the capital the representatives were received by Kalinin, who assured them of his continuing support for the Jewish Autonomous Region despite all the previous setbacks. In the course of the Moscow conferences Israel Emiot, a Polish-born Yiddish journalist who attended the meeting, was convinced to move to Birobidzhan as a newspaper correspondent. By early 1945 he saw signs of a revival of Jewish culture in Birobidzhan, and in January 1946 he was privy to a Kremlin decree again encouraging Jewish immigration to Birobidzhan. The Soviet government was to subsidize the project. Rail transportation was free, and those who agreed to settle on the land could expect loans at a concessionary rate. Not only experienced farmers came, but a whole spectrum of qualified professionals in virtually every vocation—at least 10,000 men and their families.[66] While domestic propaganda stressed Birobidzhan's role in the first post-war Five-Year Plan and also highlighted the "Jewishness" of the region,[67] a large percentage of the immigrants made the journey because they felt they had no stake left in the lands made virtually *Judenrein* by the Nazis and their collaborators during the occupation; because of a revival of Jewish national feeling; and because renewed anti-Semitism in the western Soviet Union, particularly in the Ukraine, let the war's few Jewish survivors know that their continued survival was more probable elsewhere.[68]

For Western consumption, in March 1946 New York newspapers sprouted a crop of three-quarter page fund-raising advertisements praising the Jewish Autonomous Region as the "Pearl of the Far East." On the same latitude as Duluth, Minnesota, "but with lots more sunshine," the replete beauties and economic virtues of the province were set out in detail confirmed "according to scientific surveys." Innocent American luminaries—New York's Mayor O'Dwyer, Secretary

[64] Tokayer and Swartz, p. 108.
[65] Erwin Lessner, *Cradle of Conquerors: Siberia* (Doubleday, New York, 1955), p. 753.
[66] Israel Emiot (pseud. of Israel Yanovsky-Goldwasser), *The Birobidzhan Affair: A Yiddish Writer in Siberia*, trans. by Max Rosenfeld (The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1981), pp. 5–9.
[67] Yehoshua A. Gilboa, *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry: 1939–1953*, trans. by Yosef Shachter and Dov Ben-Abba (Little, Brown, Boston, 1971), p. 241.
[68] Cang, p. 144; Kolarz, p. 177; Schwarz, p. 187; and *Encyclopedia Judaica*, p. 1047.

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of Commerce Henry Wallace, and Senator (later Vice-President) Alben Barkley—lent their names and stature to the seemingly benevolent cause, and endorsed Birobidzhan. At least one shrewd American journalist for a major news magazine noted the timing of the campaign, suggesting that the Soviets were bidding for Arab support in the UN by spotlighting their "substitute Zion."[69]

Like rain in a desert the shower of new settlers stimulated a new blossoming of Jewish communal culture in Birobidzhan. Yiddish publishing houses, a theatre, and schools were reborn. Jews built factories, founded farms, and rebuilt their own shattered lives.[70] By 1948 the Jewish population of the region reached 30,000 and perhaps more; it had never been higher.[71] Nor would it ever be as high again.

WHEN Israel Emiot was being interrogated by the MGB in 1948 or 1949, in the bowels of the *Gulag*—despite the Kremlin's still echoing public support for Birobidzhan—the writer was accused of "artificially fostering Jewish culture in a region with a predominantly non-Jewish population." Emiot's inquisitor patiently enlightened him: "Everything has its special time. In our country, policies change frequently. Our dialectical approach is dictated by life itself. What was correct yesterday may be incorrect—even criminal—today."[72]

The new wind that had blown through Birobidzhan in late 1948 was a stale wind come again. In the year of Tito's break with the Kremlin, of the Berlin blockade, of threats of cold war turning hot, Israel's first minister to the Soviet Union, Golda Meir, arrived in Moscow that autumn. Thousands upon thousands of Jews crowded the streets to welcome her, and a paranoid Soviet leadership perceived that Jewish loyalty lay with a foreign state. "It was a matter of self-preservation," one Soviet Jew said when he told years later of many of his fellows "losing" their internal passports in terror of a latter-day version of "The Great Terror."[73]

In December 1948 Birobidzhan was completely shut off from the rest of the world. A few months later even the Jewish communist press in the United States had to admit that it could not find out what was going on there.[74] The Jewish character of the region was systematically being rooted out in a fashion that exceeded even the purges of the 1930s. Cultural institutions were shut down and the local political and intellectual leadership was imprisoned or shot. Its crimes were allegedly its attempts to expand the local Yiddish newspaper, the *Birobidzhaner Shtern*; plans to set up a Yiddish-language university; and welcoming Jewish newcomers to the region with more enthusiasm than was seemly.

[69] "Cultured Pearl," *Time* Magazine, 18 March 1946, Vol. 47, p. 34.
[70] Gilboa, pp. 192–3.
[71] *Encyclopedia Judaica*, p. 1047.
[72] Emiot, p. 48.
[73] Harrison E. Salisbury, *To Moscow—And Beyond: A Reporter's Narrative* (Harper & Bros., New York, 1960), pp. 72–3.
[74] Schwarz, p. 188.

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Even the 70-year-old Ber Slutsky, director of the regional museum, was to die in prison for the offence of including Jewish historical artefacts among his exhibits. And all of the crimes were linked to an alleged Jewish "plot" to turn the region over to a foreign power. No longer the Japanese, this time the spymasters were said to be American. The plans, asserted the Soviets, had been laid as far back as 1943 when a small delegation of the Soviets' Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee visited the US.[75] At least 200 of the Jewish elite of Birobidzhan were consumed in the political firestorm.[76]

Although it was not reported anywhere, one authority has based his evidence that the Jewish Autonomous Region was actually abolished in 1948, not to be recreated until 1954, on the observation that any designation of the province disappeared from official Soviet maps for that period.[77] Still, it seems likely that the legal fiction was not extinguished even then; the second edition of the *Bolshaya* (the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*), published in 1950, allowed Birobidzhan a one paragraph entry,[78] and in the same year Birobidzhan did elect five deputies to the Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities; one of the five was a Jew.[79]

This is not the only puzzle concerning events in Birobidzhan during Stalin's "anti-cosmopolitan drive." One expert on Soviet affairs reports that as many as 25,000–30,000 Jews were deported to Birobidzhan between 1949 and 1952. "As of the latter date," he writes, "much of the 'Jewish homeland' consisted of all-Jewish forced labour camps. No one was allowed to enter or leave Birobidzhan without special permission, and no resident could be absent from his domicile for longer than twenty-four hours."[80] Yet in his June 1954 visit to Birobidzhan, American correspondent Harrison Salisbury found evidence that the deported Jews had been sent to such places as Yakutia in Eastern Siberia, but not to Birobidzhan. Prisoners of other nationalities had been sent to the Jewish region. His picture tallies in another respect:

> This, of course, was the heart of MVD-land. The telltale guard towers, ramshackle wooden ones but easily recognizable, were mounted at the construction sites in Birobidzhan. . . . I was travelling in MVD-land . . . and being in its center gave me a pervasive sense of fear. . . . Never, in my stay in Russia, had I experienced such surveillance. Nor could I recall any other foreigner having such an experience. . . . There were a minimum of twenty agents assigned to my visit. . . . They even followed me to the wooden toilet, outside the hotel, and occupied one of the two booths every time nature called. . . . The hotel manager was the local secret

[75] Gilboa, pp. 195–6.
[76] Ellsworth Raymond, *The Soviet State* (Macmillan, New York, 1968), p. 140.
[77] Ibid. pp. 140, 253–4.
[78] Maurice Hindus, *House Without a Roof: Russia After Forty-Three Years of Revolution* (Doubleday, New York, 1961), p. 307.
[79] Gilboa, p. 196.
[80] Warren Bartlett Walsh, *Russia and the Soviet Union: A Modern History*, new ed. (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1968), pp. 534–5.

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> police chief. . . . I was the first outsider to come there in many years, probably since before World War II. . . . There must have been secrets indeed in . . . Birobidzhan to justify the use of so many agents.[81]

That there were to have been further mass relocations of Jews to Eastern Siberia in 1953 is hardly in doubt. The public hanging of the "doctors' plot intriguers" was to have triggered the evictions, and only Stalin's death in March of that year prevented the implementation of the plan.[82]

THE post-Stalin period brought few significant changes to Jewish life in Birobidzhan. Israel Emiot, who was released from prison camp only weeks after Stalin's death, returned for a while to Birobidzhan. Amnestied, but not "rehabilitated," his life there was a continuing challenge because anyone who dealt with him was open to suspicion. Emiot found that many Jewish officials he had known in 1948 were gone—rumoured to have fled the region—and that the Jewish Autonomous Region was virtually devoid of Jewish culture. The new government bookshop sold volumes in every language spoken in the USSR—except Yiddish, the official language of the province.[83] The *New York Times*' Harrison Salisbury found the situation little different during his closely-watched visit the next year, and he observed that the Sholom Aleichem Library, once famous for its substantial collection of Yiddish works, had only a few dusty books in that language, and most of those were locked away.[84] A few years later another Western visitor would be told by the librarian that the Yiddish section "is part of the department of foreign books." The whole section consisted of perhaps 150 volumes, mostly from the 1920s and '30s—Yiddish translations of Marx and Lenin, Jules Verne and Mark Twain, and little else. Others were said to be in a storeroom, but "readers are not interested." A Jew of about 60, overhearing the conversation, sighed deeply and fixed the visitor with a sad gaze.[85] Fearing to accept Jewish books, even as a gift, from the visitor, the librarian must have considered them dangerous indeed; Soviet law proscribed "the storing of literature calculated to produce national or religious hostility or discord" and provided a punishment of up to two years in prison.[86]

Georgi Malenkov was Premier in the autumn of 1954, but Nikita Khrushchev was moving up quickly in the contest for pre-eminence after Stalin's death. On his way back from negotiations in Peking, Khrushchev stopped off in Birobidzhan. He had witnessed the population pressure in

[81] Harrison E. Salisbury, *American in Russia* (Harper & Bros., New York, 1955), pp. 280–1, 284–5.
[82] Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956* (Harper & Row, New York, 1973), p. 92; and Roy Medvedev, *Blishnevostochnyi konflikt i yevreiskii vopros v S.S.S.R.* (The Near Eastern Conflict and the Jewish Question in the U.S.S.R.) (Moscow, (*samizdat*), May 1970), cited in Sawyer, pp. 88, 99–100.
[83] Emiot, pp. 194–6.
[84] Salisbury, *American in Russia*, pp. 282–3.
[85] Ben Ami, p. 242.
[86] Cang, p. 145.

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China and he had seen the emptiness of the Soviet Eastern Siberian lands. Within weeks of his return to the capital he sponsored a renewed public campaign for legions of young men and women to settle the territories.[87] Twice burned—thrice shy, the Jews would not join the transports. Israel Emiot, for one, had foretold the reaction. "The Soviet Government" would "no longer be able to lure Jews to Birobidzhan and then accuse them of nationalism. . . . The Jews in the Soviet Union know better."[88]

Harrison Salisbury had been assured by the deputy mayor of Birobidzhan that Yiddish was still used in the schools; teachers and pupils denied it. He was shown a small synagogue, "founded in 1947," said the cantor—there was no rabbi. Before that there were only "illegal" congregations, the religious functionary volunteered.[89] Two years later the synagogue burned to the ground; a few of the elderly worshippers plunged into the burning building to rescue the Torah scrolls.[90] In 1959 *New York Times* reporter Max Frankel would pay a visit to the rented "shack" that served perhaps 30 worshippers for weekly Sabbath services, but which was the focus of 400 the previous Yom Kippur.[91]

AS the Jewish population of Birobidzhan continued to drop, now-Chairman Khrushchev unburdened himself on the subject on several occasions. In August 1956 he told J. B. Salzberg, a Jewish socialist who was a member of a visiting Canadian parliamentary delegation, "The majority of Jews has already assimilated . . . into the general stream of Russian life. That is all to the good. For integration is a historical process while separation is reactionary." He enumerated among Jewish "negative" qualities: "whenever a Jew settles in a place he immediately builds a synagogue."[92] In May 1956 a delegation of French socialists had heard similar comments,[93] and in 1957 a visiting group of American professional men were told by First Secretary Khrushchev: "If [the Jews] want to create a state within our borders, like Birobidzhan, nobody is against this and it exists to this day. . . . They could have their own language, school and traditions. The state language would be Yiddish."[94]

By the spring of 1958 new rumours were circulating in the Soviet Union and in the West, suggesting that the Soviet authorities were planning a new campaign to settle Jews in Birobidzhan. The appointment of Lieutenant General Kreiser, a Jew, as Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in the Far East seemed to lend credence to the belief. The French

[87] Salisbury, *To Moscow—And Beyond*, p. 248.
[88] Emiot, p. 200.
[89] Salisbury, *American in Russia*, p. 283.
[90] Emiot, p. 199.
[91] Max Frankel, "Jewish Birobidzhan Found Quiet Corner in Brisk Siberia," 1 May 1959, pp. 1, 10; "Visit to a Promised Land," *Time* Magazine, 11 May 1959, Vol. 73, p. 29; and Ben Ami, pp. 240–1.
[92] J. B. Salzberg in a series of articles in *Morgen Freiheit* (New York), Nov.–Dec. 1956, cited in Cang, pp. 133–5.
[93] Cang, p. 136.
[94] Interview quoted by Alvar Alstedal, et. al. "Report of an International Socialist Study Group on the Situation of the Jews in the USSR" (Socialist International, London), April 1964, cited in Cang, pp. 137–8.

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editor of *Le Figaro*, Serge Groussard, was visiting Moscow at that time and was able to question Khrushchev about the matter. Groussard was told that Jews once had "left en masse for Birobidzhan. They were raving enthusiasts. They rushed there from every corner of the Soviet Union and . . . from all European countries. . . . And then very few remained. Lately . . . departures exceed arrivals. . . . We would have to state that Jewish colonization in Birobidzhan was a failure." Asked to explain this failure, the Soviet Premier had a ready reply:

> Jews don't like collective work, group discipline. They have always preferred to be dispersed. They are individualists. . . . The Jews are essentially intellectuals. They never consider themselves sufficiently educated. As soon as they can manage it, they want to attend the university. . . . The Jews are interested in everything, probe deeply into everything, debate everything. . . .[95]

But in suggesting that a failure of such magnitude could occur under Soviet aegis, even Khrushchev seemed to have overstepped the bounds of ideological propriety. The propaganda machinery of the state was cranked up and, the *New York Times* took note, "This was followed by sudden publicity in the Soviet press in praise of Birobidzhan, where Jews were said to live a normal life and to enjoy their Jewish identity." That Soviet campaign added fuel to the fires of speculation, and a large-scale resettlement of Jews to Birobidzhan was said by the American Jewish Committee to be on the agenda of the Soviet Communist Party Congress for late January 1959. A public outcry went up in the West against the prospect of the "reappearance . . . of a Jewish pale of settlement, a vast official Soviet ghetto,"[96] and several days later Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan, visiting New York, played down the concern with a strangely worded statement that "the reported plans for the *re*-creation (italics added) of a Jewish state in Birobidzhan and the transfer of the Jewish population in Russia to that area is without foundation."[97]

When he visited Birobidzhan two or three months later, journalist Max Frankel thought that perhaps half the region's estimated population of 160,000 was Jewish, and half to three-quarters of the 60,000 who peopled the city of Birobidzhan. These proportions were almost certainly far too high. But one thing Frankel could see for himself was "the absence of youngsters."[98] The large nearby Siberian city of Khabarovsk, just the other side of the provincial border, offered far better employment opportunities. The developing Siberian cities also offered a degree of individual anonymity; Birobidzhan was not a home an aspiring Jewish youth would be proud to claim.[99] Higher educational institutions, too,

[95] Serge Groussard, *Le Figaro*, 9 April 1958, reprinted in *The New Leader*, 14 Sept. 1959, p. 8; quoted in Cang, pp. 138–40; Hindus, p. 306; and Herschel and Edith Alt, *The New Soviet Man: His Upbringing and Character Development* (Bookman Associates, New York, 1964), p. 50.

[96] Irving Spiegel, "Jews' Resettling by Soviet Is Seen," *New York Times*, 11 Jan. 1959, p. 22.

[97] Irving Spiegel, "Mikoyan Denies Exiling of Jews," *New York Times*, 16 Jan. 1959, pp. 1, 4.

[98] Frankel, pp. 1, 10.

[99] Ben Ami, p. 240.

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were outside the province, swelling the exodus. Of Jewish culture it could be said that the *gefuellte* fish and cheese *blintzes* were good and that Yiddish could still be seen on the old street signs; at the railway station, the hotel, and on the cinema hoarding, but in a five-hour walk around the city no more than four or five Yiddish conversations were heard. Khrushchev had denounced Stalin and Stalinism at the 20th Party Congress three years before, but Birobidzhan's Jews took no heart from that; they had felt the wind shift suddenly before and they knew it could do so again. Frankel observed "no one says much and if anything is said it is said softly."[100]

When Harrison Salisbury visited Birobidzhan and other Eastern Siberian territories in 1954 he noticed something else besides the fact that the entire area was a vast prison. He saw that it was also a garrison state: enormous Soviet forces were posted along the border of communist China, Moscow's staunchest ally. "The frontier . . . was guarded as vigilantly as the demarcation line in Berlin."[101] In that year the Chinese had published a map entitled "The Seizure of Chinese Territory by the Imperialists in 1840–1919." Birobidzhan and much else were among the lands the Chinese felt the Russian tsars had stolen in a series of "unequal treaties," including the 1858 Treaty of Aigun.[102] The issue smouldered until 1963, when verbal fireworks began.[103] By 1969 the unresolved territorial dispute had taken on deeper meaning because of the ideological schism that had developed between the two communist giants. The Soviet military build-up along the border had been steady since 1966, and in March 1969 Chinese and Soviet troops clashed on Damansky (Zhenbao) Island in the Ussuri River.[104] The frontier between China and the Jewish Autonomous Region was also at issue, partly over shifts in the main channel of the Amur due to flooding and silting, but particularly over a rather large island at the confluence of the Amur and the Ussuri, abutting the city of Khabarovsk and the eastern apex of Birobidzhan province. A number of significant incidents occurred there.[105] For the citizens of Birobidzhan it meant deepened isolation; the Jewish region was again closed to foreign travel.[106]

WHILE the Party-controlled *Birobidzhaner Shtern* reprinted "irritated" letters from Soviet Jews who had received "unwanted" gifts of Passover food sent from abroad,[107] the Soviets launched still

[100] Frankel, pp. 1, 10.
[101] Harrison Salisbury, *War Between Russia and China* (Norton, New York, 1969), pp. 100–1.
[102] The map appeared in Liu-Peihua's book *Hsientai chungkuo chienshih* (*A Brief History of Modern China*) (Peking, 1954), cited in K. Pavlov, "At the Meeting Place Between Two Communist Empires," *Bulletin* (Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich), Jan. 1964, Vol. XI, No. 1, p. 4.
[103] Pavlov, pp. 4–17.
[104] Frederica M. Bunge, et. al. (eds.), *China: A Country Study* (Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1981), p. 38.
[105] Thomas J. Plummer, Jr., et al. *Landscape Atlas of the USSR* (US Military Academy Department of Earth, Space, and Graphic Sciences, West Point, NY, 1971), pp. 178–81; and Bunge, pp. 49, 496.
[106] St. George, p. 319.
[107] *Birobidzhaner Shtern*, March 1964, quoted in Joshua Rothenburg, *The Jewish Religion in the Soviet Union* (Ktav, New York, 1971), p. 87.

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another publicity campaign in the West to paint the Jewish Autonomous Region in glowing colours. Novosti Press Agency's monthly digest, *Sputnik*, featured a two-page illustrated spread with a bit of text about "the country known since ancient times as 'the blessed land,'" and with photos of smiling Jews reading their Yiddish newspaper from a street showcase, imposing government buildings, a knitwear factory, the fields of the "Testament of Lenin" Collective Farm, and a portrait of a man whom jaundiced Westerners might be tempted to call an "Uncle Tevyeh," Lev Shapiro, whose full title was First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Soviet Communist Party of the Jewish Autonomous Region.[108] Shortly after, the aforementioned L. Shapiro was seen as the author of a glossy *Soviet Life* magazine feature picturing the ubiquitous Soviet tractor as well as a half-dozen happy-go-lucky Jews singing and dancing their way through a little theatre production of a Sholom Aleichem work. In lieu of Ol' Massa, the plantation house, and the sweet smell of magnolias, the reader was treated to a list of the province's achievements, capped by the claim that in 1967 the Jewish Autonomous Region had "received the Order of Lenin, the country's highest award, for 'outstanding progress in economic and cultural development.'"[109] Despite the fact that there remained only 11,425 Jews in Birobidzhan out of a total provincial population of 172,449, according to the official 1970 census,[110] the Shapiro article's every reference to nationalities, languages and cultural activities in the region listed Jews and Yiddish first. A foreign reader could have been thoroughly misled about the character of the area.

Still other large articles in *Soviet Life* claimed for Birobidzhan a Jewish population 40 per cent more numerous than the official census figures[111] and trotted out several Soviet Jews to tell the readers that the folks back there in Birobidzhan were just as content as can be.[112] Meanwhile, for domestic Soviet Jewish consumption, Moscow's Yiddish monthly *Sovietisch Heimland* (its editor, Aaron Vergelis, is a native of Birobidzhan) advertised the Jewish province as a "land of milk and honey."[113]

In early 1978 another Western correspondent wrangled his way into Birobidzhan. "To get [there] is no simple matter," he reported. "Permission is not readily granted to bourgeois journalists, and may take up to half a year or longer. (There are sudden 'adverse weather conditions' or 'military maneuvers near the China border' which close off the area.)" He found it a thriving place, with "Stalin's 'national home for Jews' . . .

[108] "The Soviet Far East: A World of Change," *Sputnik* (Novosti Press Agency, Moscow), Aug. 1971, pp. 80–1.

[109] Lev Shapiro, "Thirty-Eighth Anniversary of Jewish Autonomous Region," *Soviet Life* (Novosti Press Agency, Moscow), May 1972, No. 5, (188).

[110] Sawyer, p. 86.

[111] Solomon Rabinovich, "How Jews Live in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Life* (Novosti Press Agency, Moscow), July 1971, pp. 36–40.

[112] "How Many Jews Are There in the Soviet Union?" *Soviet Life* (Novosti Press Agency, Moscow), July 1972, p. 53.

[113] *Sovietisch Heimland*, Jan. 1968, cited in Cang, pp. 146, 230.

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show[ing] not the least sign of fading away." Amidst the harvester factories and textile mills he found Jewish religious culture certainly dying out, but professed to see at least some signs that secular Jewish culture was holding on at a low, officially sanctioned, level. He quoted champions of Birobidzhan that other Soviet national minorities are also minorities in their own territories, and pronounced the region's Jews "loyal and patriotic Soviet citizens."[114] The Kremlin has not always been certain on that point.

The region was closed again to foreigners that year;[115] another border clash occurred in May 1978, down the Ussuri from Birobidzhan, not far from the site of the 1969 combat.[116] By 1980 American analysts had concluded that Chinese offensive capabilities against the Soviets in the area were limited. The Chinese People's Liberation Army was thought to be able at least temporarily to cut the Trans-Siberian Railway where it runs close to the border, as it does in Birobidzhan; Soviet troop concentrations and major Far Eastern cities such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok were also deemed potential targets.[117]

For their part, the Soviets had 46 divisions deployed along the Chinese border—a quarter of the Soviets' ground forces and tactical aviation and 11 per cent of its military spending was aimed at its former ally.[118] The vulnerable Trans-Siberian was being supplemented by a new, more northerly railway line, scheduled for completion by 1985. More capable commanders were posted to the military districts along the border and they were granted enough operational autonomy to function if the Soviets found themselves in a two-front war against China and NATO. The preparations package was topped off with a modern communications network, ICBMs, SS-20 IRBMs, and TU-22 bombers.[119]

LITTLE has been heard from the battened down Jewish Autonomous Region in the past six years. In her *From the Yaroslavsky Station*, Elizabeth Pond was able to offer a report of "especially vicious flies, mosquitoes, and gnats" as her train entered the province, confirmation that the station sign at Obluche was still in Yiddish as well as Cyrillic, that a Birobidzhan Yiddish Musical Chamber Theatre had opened in 1977, and that both Jews and gentiles of the Soviet Union still considered Birobidzhan a place of exile.[120] Moscow and Leningrad Jews confirmed that sentiment to me in a visit to those cities in 1976. At the time young

[114] Albert Axelbank, "Jewish Autonomous Region," *The Progressive*, July 1978, Vol. 42, pp. 35–6.
[115] *Facts on File*, 20 Jan. 1978, p. 39.
[116] Bunge, p. 408.
[117] Ibid. pp. 496–7.
[118] *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969–1978* (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, 1980), p. 160, table 4, cited in Rajan Menon, "China and the Soviet Union in Asia," *Current History*, Oct. 1981, p. 329.
[119] John Erickson, "The Soviet Strategic Emplacement in Asia," *Asian Affairs*, Feb. 1981, Vol. 12, Part 1, pp. 10–13, cited in Menon, *Current History*, Oct. 1981, p. 329.
[120] Elizabeth Pond, *From the Yaroslavsky Station* (Universe Books, New York, 1981), pp. 40, 265; and Leona and Jerrold Schechter, *An American Family in Moscow* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1975), p. 395.

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Jews were finding their access to institutions of higher learning more restricted than at any time since the tsars, and a rumour was beginning to spread that the Soviet authorities were planning to open such institutions, for Jews, in Birobidzhan. Those who wanted an education would have to settle there. The schools did not open in Birobidzhan, but neither were matriculation restrictions lifted elsewhere in the country. One Soviet school administrator is reported to have hissed at a disappointed would-be student "We're not training people for Israel." But few of those Jews were allowed to emigrate to Israel in any case.[121]

Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel has been a major issue since the mid-1960s, and Birobidzhan was recently cited to buttress the Soviet case. At a 6 June 1983 forum called by the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public, one of the committee of honoured Soviet "house Jews" told the UPI correspondent:

> Our experience in the creation and development of the Jewish Autonomous Province . . . has been successful. It will be useful for the participants in the press conference to learn that in the nearly 50 years of its existence, not one person of Jewish nationality has left there to go to Israel.[122]

Yet Emiot knew of one such *émigré* in 1956,[123] and native Israelis know a number of Jewish former residents of Birobidzhan who now live among them.[124]

Recently, too, a Western novelist, Fernanda Eberstadt, caught a glimpse of as much of Birobidzhan as one can see from the railway route. Hers is the last available picture of the Jewish Autonomous Region, and as such her colourful report deserves to be quoted at length:

> The [new] factories . . . look as if they might have employed Decembrists. There are few houses and no people, cows, or chickens to be seen, but innumerable timber mills, their yards clotted with white birch rotting into compost. . . .
>
> Birobidzhan today could be said to be precisely the sort of homeland the Palestinian Arabs might have wished for the Jews: a frozen swamp bounded by hostile Mongols, in which the Jews are far outnumbered by their historical enemy, the Ukrainians.
>
> In our train ride across the Jewish Autonomous Republic, the station signs, whose Hebrew lettering is said to be this rat-trap's last remaining claim to Jewishness, had reverted to Cyrillic. When the train stopped at Bira station, in halting Yiddish [we] asked the waitress for a pickled egg. She gave us a look of stony enmity and pointedly turned to help the Russian standing behind us.
>
> There remained one vestige, however, of the glorious dream on

[121] Personal visit to the Soviet Union—Leningrad and Moscow—late March and early April 1976.

[122] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 22 June 1983, pp. 11, 15, quoted in "Soviet Anti-Zionists Talk to the Press," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), 27 July 1983, Vol. XXXV, No. 26, pp. 9–10.

[123] Emiot, p. 195.

[124] Personal conversation with Lt. Col. (Res.) Dan Bavly, whose mobilization assignment is with the Israeli Office of the Military Spokesman, 13 Feb. 1984.

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> which Birobidzhan had been founded. . . . On the sky-high posters featuring steel-limbed . . . workers standing shoulder to shoulder against a scarlet backdrop, the young people depicted were a little swarthy, the noses distinctly hooked. They bore no resemblance to anyone in the villages we passed, whose natives looked as Ukrainians always have: pallid, sharp-boned, straw-headed.[125]

WHY did the dream fail; why is the Jewish Autonomous Oblast still, officially at least, alive today; and what are its prospects?

One commentator notes that Moscow has never been sure whether it should deal with the Jews as enemy aliens or as assimilated Soviet citizens whose loyalty lies with the revolution. The vacillations in Kremlin policy are said to reflect either official schizophrenia or disagreements within the leadership about whether a pro- or anti-Jewish stance best serves Soviet interests.[126]

There is certainly some truth in the official Moscow position that the Jewish population of the region failed to grow significantly because economic opportunities for Jewish youth opened up elsewhere in the Soviet Union during the 1930s.[127] But poor government planning was also responsible,[128] as were the facts that no prominent communists of Jewish origin (such as Lazar Kaganovich) ever encouraged the project,[129] and that the Jews attached no sentiment to the place.[130] More important, unlike other Soviet nationalities whose culture is allowed to flourish within their autonomous regions, Jewish culture in Birobidzhan was never permitted expression for more than a few years at a time before being suppressed. That rendered the project a failure from the Jewish point of view.[131]

But Jewish immigration to Birobidzhan has long continued to be "state policy,"[132] and there must be reasons for this.

One is ideological. To acknowledge the failure of a long held tenet is to jeopardize the validity of the whole Soviet canon.

Another is propaganda. Both the West and Soviet citizenry can be told that "the Jewish problem" is solved in the USSR, not without sacrifices by the entire Union to the welfare of this historically oppressed people. It is also a continuing demonstration to the Arab world of the Soviets' anti-Zionism, their 1947 UN vote in favour of the creation of the state of Israel notwithstanding.

Reluctance to abolish the province may also derive from the fact that its

[125] Fernanda Eberstadt, "Siberian Holiday," *Commentary*, Feb. 1984, Vol. 79, No. 2, pp. 38–9.
[126] Nora Beloff, *Inside the Soviet Empire: The Myth and the Reality* (Times Books, New York, 1979), p. 94.
[127] Ben-Sasson, p. 973, and Cang, p. 146.
[128] Laqueur, p. 427.
[129] Kolarz, p. 179.
[130] Hindus, p. 307.
[131] Cang, p. 146.
[132] Sawyer, p. 88.

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existence is mandated in the Soviet Constitution;[133] it would be a messy and unsettling business to change it.

And the final reason would seem to be the reserve value of the region's official status—"because no one knows what can happen" in the near or distant future. Domestic or foreign events might one day whisper to the Kremlin that Soviet Jews should again be directed "to the Jewish land," and however rickety the existing structure it will be easier to remodel it than to build from scratch.[134] Birobidzhan remains an implied threat to Soviet Jewry. I have seen the disquiet the very name evokes when mentioned to Jews in Leningrad and Moscow.[135]

The prospects are probably for more of the same slow, steady decline, but for the continuation of the official fiction of the Jewish Autonomous Region. A query to the Soviet embassy in Washington in December 1983 about the present and future of the province produced several thick books about Soviet nationalities and Siberia, but only a few sentences about Birobidzhan.[136] It is a sensitive topic, no doubt.

But one more or less ominous straw is in the wind. In a back page of the 1 May 1983 *New York Times* is an article entitled "Soviets Wooing Moslems to East." It reads:

> The Soviet Government, in an effort to populate a Siberian region initially intended as a homeland for Jews . . . is now offering inducements to other would-be settlers, these from Moslem Central Asia. Advertisements promising free rail fares, the moving of up to 4,000 pounds of household goods at no cost and loans for buying a cow . . . have appeared. . . . The campaign is intended to further populate the so-called Jewish Autonomous Region. . . .
>
> Three county-level districts were listed as the destination without specifying that they were in the Jewish region. . . . The districts include almost all of the Jewish region's farmland.[137]

The irony is as inescapable as Siberia.

[133] Gilboa, p. 197.
[134] Ben Ami, p. 246.
[135] Personal visit to Soviet Union.
[136] Supplied by the Soviet embassy were:
Eduard Bagramov, *One Hundred Nationalities—One People* (Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1982). It contains three sentences on Birobidzhan, p. 73.
Abraham Resnick, *Siberia and the Soviet Far East* (Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1983). It contains 13 sentences on Birobidzhan, p. 133.
Novosti Press Agency '83 Yearbook USSR (Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1983). It contains no mention of Birobidzhan.
Ruvim Groyer, "Statistics About Soviet Jews" (Novosti Press Agency and Information Department of the Embassy of the USSR). This four-page photocopied paper does not mention Birobidzhan.
[137] Theodore Shabad, "Soviet Is Wooing Moslems to East: Ads Luring Settlers to Further Populate Siberian Area Set Up as Home for Jews," *New York Times*, 1 May 1983, p. 10.

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Nationalism and Class Struggle: Two Forces or One?

Liah Greenfeld

> *"Nationalism and class struggle have been determinant factors in the evolution of the modern world. . . . The social revolution, often dividing nations against themselves and transcending national boundaries, was vastly complicated by the simultaneous nationalist revolution, equally unprecedented in scope and intensity. While the social revolution was growing ever more international in outlook and its most activist forces were marshalled under the flag of the socialist 'International', the nationalist revolution was gaining some of its most substantial victories. . . . Curiously, just when nationalism seemed to reach the apogee of its achievements, when during the First World War it succeeded in breaking up Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Czarist Russia and in securing ever-wider recognition of the principle of 'national self-determination', the socialist International achieved its first major victory in the Communist Revolution."*[1]

IT seems appropriate to use this quotation as an epigraph to this essay since it presents the puzzle with which the essay intends to deal. How can nationalism and internationalism fight in the same wars against the same enemies? Why do nationalism and Marxism—explicitly opposed to each other as they are—so frequently go hand in hand? What explains the appeal of Marxism to nationalist movements and the nationalistic leanings of Marxism in power? The puzzle is complicated by an equally mysterious peculiarity in the original Marxist thought, namely Marx's treatment of national phenomena. While nationalism is recurrently found by the side of Marxism, it is almost entirely disregarded in his mature writings, and if mentioned at all, treated as entirely unimportant. In the context of the burgeoning passionate nationalism of the first half of the nineteenth century, Marx's pronouncements specifically on this question in some of his more famous writings as well as his overall vision of the world seem to be totally exceptional and enigmatic. To put it in a somewhat exaggerated form, a person would have to be an autist (which Marx was not), or to blind himself and others deliberately to what was

[1] Salo W. Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (Harper and Brothers, New York and London, 1947), p. 1.

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happening around him (which he probably did not) to write what Marx wrote at the time that he wrote it. What was then the reason for his failure to at least take note of possibly the most significant social force of his age?

This paper attempts to suggest a tentative answer to this question, which, it is hoped, may also prove helpful in supplementing the accounts for the appeal of Marxism and specifically for the remarkable affinity between it and nationalistic movements in the contemporary world.

> The bourgeoisie has . . . given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country . . . it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. . . . In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.[2]

These lines in the *Communist Manifesto* are likely to pass unnoticed in our day. First, one would only expect this downplay of the nationality from a founder of the International. Second, the view seems plausible. But written as it was in 1848, this description of the situation is in flagrant contradiction to the facts.

In 1848 national sentiments—and nations—were too young to die. The phenomenon in Europe was not yet a century old. In Marx's native Germany it was hardly a decade older than Marx himself, and being young, it was militant, passionate and articulate. It was in the period between the Napoleonic wars and 1848 that nationalism had come to dominate the public mind of the educated classes.[3] As a general sentiment national feeling was unknown in Germany until 1813. In the beginning of the century it existed only among a few intellectuals, high bureaucracy and top military officers, and was stimulated—at least among the latter—by the Napoleonic invasion and the defeat of Prussia.[4] The first German nationalists, however, were the Romantics—poets, critics, historians.[5] The national literature in Germany as in many other countries, in fact, emerged simultaneously with Romanticism. The collections of folk songs and tales so characteristic of German Romanticism and expressive of its preoccupation with questions of national identity began to appear in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Ludwig Tieck published his *Minnelieder aus dem schwäbischen*

[2] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," *Marx-Engels Collected Works* (International Publishers, New York/Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), Vol. 6, p. 488.

[3] Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History* (Harper and Row, New York, 1968), p. 9.

[4] See J. G. Gagliardo, *From Pariah to Patriot* (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1969); F. Meinecke, *The Age of German Liberation 1795–1815* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977)

[5] H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1951).

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Zeitalter in 1803. The first collection of folk-songs edited by Arnim and Brentano appeared in 1805, and the "folk-song fever"[6] reached its peak in the next decade when the famous collections of the brothers Grimm, the *Kinder und Handmärchen* and the *Deutsche Sagen* were published in 1812–15 and 1816–18 (the year of Marx's birth) respectively. In 1812 F. Schlegel considered it necessary to spend some effort in persuading his public in a novel thesis that "every literature must and should be national; this is its vocation and this alone can give it its true and full value,"[7] and he devoted to it a series of lectures and his periodical *Deutsche Museum*. The age was leaving *Weltliteratur* behind and moving speedily towards national literatures; the claim that the development was in the opposite direction was eccentric at the very least.

The patriotic zeal of the poets was complemented by that of the philosophers. Hegel considered "nation" to be the embodiment of true individuality.[8] For Fichte it represented the moral totality, the eternal in this world.[9] For both the human individual, man, could only be free and wholesome if he was subsumed under and conformed to this higher individuality. Coarser voices of popular authors such as Goerres and Arndt preached the gospel of patriotism to the wider public.

IT was clearly the preoccupation with the honour of the German nation which inspired the liberal reformers of the period—Stein, Hardenberg, Humboldt, and their counterparts in the military, such as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz. These leaders explicitly stated their motives. Stein wrote that the reforms he wished to introduce were intended to create a "civic spirit" among the Germans, aiming at "the revival of sentiment for the fatherland, at independence and national honour"[10] and at imposing "the obligation upon the people of so loving king and fatherland that they will gladly sacrifice property and life for them."[11] Clausewitz proclaimed fatherland and national honour two earthly deities he felt himself obliged to serve.[12]

The idea of the German nation grew in importance in the years following the Wars of Liberation, national unity being increasingly considered a crucial factor in politics. As a result, liberalism and even radicalism in the German context were logically related to nationalism. Only a united nation could be strong, only citizens could create a united nation. To be citizens people had to participate actively in their society;

[6] J. G. Gagliardo, op. cit. p. 147.

[7] Quoted in Hans Kohn, "Romanticism and the Rise of German Nationalism," *The Review of Politics*, XII (1950), pp. 443–72, p. 462.

[8] G. Hegel, "Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" in *Werke*, I, pp. 531–3; *Phenomenology of the Mind*, p. 497; *The Philosophy of History*, p. 53.

[9] J. G. Fichte, "Ueber Macchiavelli als Schriftsteller," "Der Patriotismus und sein Gegenteil," in *Nachgelassene Werke* (Marcus, Bonn), III, pp. 420–8, and pp. 226–9; *Reden an die deutsche Nation*.

[10] F. Meinecke, op. cit. p. 80.

[11] Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition* (Beacon Press, Boston, 1957), p. 148.

[12] F. Meinecke, op. cit. p. 64.

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they could not remain slaves. The leaders of the Prussian state administration and the military understood and willed this as much as any—that is why they staunchly advocated the emancipation of serfs (Stein), the abolition of restrictions on economic activity (Hardenberg), the reconstruction of the army along the lines of *levée en masse* (the generals), in short, a revolution—from above—as thoroughgoing and radical as was the French Revolution. Civil freedom was considered a necessity for the achievement of the national goal. However, freedom in Germany was conveniently defined as part and parcel of national independence and security, the ability of the nation as a whole to resist a foreign oppressor.[13] Arndt, for example, saw it as a condition "in which no foreign executioner can order you around and no foreign slave-driver can exploit you" (native executioners and slave-drivers were apparently all right).[14]

This, of course, was in harmony with the tradition, by then established in German philosophy and letters, of defining freedom in collectivistic terms which had little in common with the Western concept of individual freedom. Thus, citizenship, which was a corollary and the basis of national existence, was in a circular fashion defined as a dedication to the national purpose which in its turn was increasingly conceptualized as "regeneration" or "revival." This meaning of the national cause in Germany probably derived from the political and military defeat of German states, particularly Prussia, by the French.[15] But the idiom was not dropped when the victorious Wars of Liberation rendered the reasons which gave rise to it obsolete, and it was used even much later, carrying—outside its initial context—clearly conservative connotations.

The national appeal of German statesmen and military commanders, as well as of poets and publicists in the period of the Wars of Liberation and the growth of national sentiments among wider sectors of the population led, among other things, to the change in perspective on political participation among large groups of middle-class intellectuals. They now regarded such participation both as nationally, and therefore ethically imperative, and as their right. Since in the aftermath of the victory over Napoleon reaction set in in the German lands, this right could not be adequately realized and the rising expectations of the intellectuals were frustrated. Radicalism in the 1830s and later may well be interpreted as one result of this situation. However, radicals in Germany were as nationalistic as were their conservative compatriots,[16] and national unity leading to greatness was as much the goal of the former as of the latter.

[13] L. Krieger, op. cit. p. 207.

[14] H. Kohn, "Arndt and the Character of German Nationalism," *The American Historical Review*, LIV (1949), pp. 787–803, p. 797, quoting from Arndt's "Katechismus fur den Teutschen Kriegs- und Wehrmann . . . ."

[15] J. G. Gagliardo, op. cit. p. 182.

[16] See L. Krieger, op. cit. pp. 216–341.

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THE '30s and '40s—towards the end of which Karl Marx prophesied the disappearance of nations—were the years of *Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*. Notwithstanding the widespread and intense Gallophobia newly awakened because of the war scare of 1840,[17] the patriotic excitement of these years was still tied to the desire for liberal reforms. The German Revolution of 1848 was a liberal revolution.[18] Yet one must bear in mind that it was nationalist first and liberal only second. The Germans wanted "Unity and Law and Freedom"—in this very order—and all of them together not for their own sake, but "For the German Fatherland." The liberal values which became supreme in the Anglo-Saxon countries and to a slightly lesser degree in France were valued in Germany only as tools, as means for the achievement of different values that were considered supreme—national unity and strength.

One young radical, Friedrich Engels, lucidly expressed this complex attitude. His views—remarkably similar to those of generals Scharnhorst and Gneisenau several decades earlier, as well as to the ideas of numerous Romantic poets and publicists in the first 40 years of the nineteenth century—exemplified the nationalistic (and on a more restricted level anti-French) character of typical German liberal, radical and explicitly pro-French sentiments. In an article devoted to Ernst Moritz Arndt, written at the end of 1840 and published in 1841 in *Telegraph für Deutschland*,[19] (who would think nowadays that Friedrich Engels actually wrote a passionate panegyric to this great propagandist of German nationalism and xenophobia?) Engels opposed German patriotism to cosmopolitanism which he unequivocally rejected. He emphasized that he subscribed to the view of many (including Arndt) that the reconquest of the left bank of the Rhein was a matter of national honour and the Germanization of independent (or in Engels' own words "disloyal") Holland and Belgium whose independence he deeply regretted—a political necessity. "Shall we let the German nationality be completely repressed there," he asked rhetorically, "while the Slavs are rising ever more powerfully in the East? Shall we give up the Germanness of our most beautiful provinces to buy the friendship of France . . .?"[20] He confessed his sympathy with what he called "the Germanizing negation" of foreign influences and agreed that there was "plenty to be sent home over the Alps, the Rhine, and the Vistula."[21] (Among the

[17] Gordon A. Craig, *Europe since 1815* (Holt, Reinhart and Winston, New York, 1961), pp. 61–4.

[18] There is some disagreement on this point. Kohn is of the opinion that "after 1830 the majority of European continental liberals grew more nationalist than liberal," and in the revolutions of 1848 which initially waved the two banners, nationalism proved much stronger. H. Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism*, op. cit. p. 11; and J. S. Mill, reflecting on the European situation in 1849 wrote: ". . . in the backward parts of Europe and even (where better things might have been expected) in Germany, the sentiment of nationality so far outweighs the love of liberty that the people are willing to abet their rulers in crushing the liberty and independence of any people not of their race and language." Ibid.

[19] *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, op. cit. Vol. 2, pp. 137–50.

[20] Ibid. p. 149.

[21] Ibid. p. 150.

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foreign borrowings to be sent home were included pentarchy, papism, Bellini, Donizetti and Rossini whom arrogant Italians tried to make out greater than Mozart and Beethoven, French haughty opinions about Germans, vaudevilles and operas, as well as "all these crazy foreign habits and fashions" and "superflous foreign words.") Yet Engels vehemently opposed another side of the Germanizing negation—its Gallophobia, the hatred of the hated French (that is of the French he hated as much as the Gallophobes). Not France and its liberalism, he insisted, was the great enemy to be feared by Germany now. The "French-eating fury" would only "give the Russians enough additional land and the English enough trading power so that they can get us Germans in a vice and crush us to smithereens!"[22] Indeed another conflict between France and Germany was inevitable, but to be able to face it and to prevail over France, Germany had to adopt the French liberalism. To be beaten the French had to be imitated. And the most important thing the Germans had to borrow from France and develop among themselves was national unity based on active political participation—civic freedom.

BY the 1840s nationalism "developed into an important emotional bond which absorbed the continuing loyalty of increasing numbers of individual Germans."[23] It was speedily becoming the framework of the deepest, overriding individual and collective identity, and as such informed both liberal and conservative thought. What were the basic tenets of the nationalist attitude which rendered these usually contradictory political approaches so similar to each other in Germany? Among the most important of them belonged the following: (1) the view of the modern world as meaningless, worthless and evil; (2) the view of a modern man as fragmented, alienated from society and from his true nature; (3) the definition of social nature as the true nature of man and the belief that the real, objective man is possible only through a "fusion of individuality" in a collectivity, through the renunciation of all claims to particular autonomy and being essentially a member of a larger whole imbued with spirit (in the beginning of the period the words "nation," "state" and "community" were used rather indiscriminately to denote this larger whole)—only the individual who became one with a community was considered to be his true self and thus both rational and free; (4) the yearning for the transformation of society making the real man possible, usually to be accomplished through a violent war or revolution; (5) the emphasis on the primacy of intellectuals in bringing about this transformation.

The nationalist attitude was the response to the existence of a new value centre (in Shilsian terms)[24] or the new normative canon of the

[22] Ibid. p. 148.
[23] L. Krieger, op. cit. p. 277.
[24] Edward Shils, "Center and Periphery," in *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975), pp. 3–16.

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supra-societal European system. It was called "the West." The core of this canon or centre was the idea of a people as a nation, which until the end of the eighteenth century was realized only in England; England alone was a nation in Europe before the eighteenth century.

England defined itself as a nation because of certain thoroughgoing social, economic and political changes, and the word "nation" in the application to the English people meant "an elite of representatives."[25] It therefore had its necessary counterpart in the idea of and high value ascribed to the individual defined as a rational actor, whose most important characteristic, or definitive faculty, was reason, and who therefore had the right to exercise the autonomy of his consciousness, or to enjoy individual liberty. He also had to be considered equal to everyone else in regard to this right of independent judgment and fundamental human worth. (Thus everyone was one's own representative—thus the nation—a group of representatives.)

National community, equality and freedom (which in England were defined by their relation to reason, to human rationality) became the most important values of the eighteenth century and subsequent ages, but in many societies, including Germany, they were redefined in a way that made them absolutely unrecognizable and certainly in no way similar to the English source. In Germany this redefinition took place for the following reason. While belonging to the system in which these were the central values, Germany did not have the social conditions from which these values sprang and which they reflected. The very fact that Germany (that is, the educated in Germany) belonged and wished to belong to this system, made her claim proximity and loyalty to these values. To put this in a simplified manner, the educated Germans had to believe and claim: we too are a nation, we too have freedom and equality. The reality contradicted these claims, if the values meant what they did in England.[26] To escape this inconsistency, they were transvalued.[27]

As the first step in the process of transvaluation, reason or rationality—in the English definition of the term as a capacity for independent judgment based on consideration of available data—was reduced to "calculation" and rejected as evil. Social forms that embodied this kind of rationality, such as the modern capitalist enterprise which significantly, no other major country but England at this time possessed, were rejected as embodiments of evil. Western capitalism, in the words of the principal political philosopher of Romanticism, Adam Müller, was "the most general manifestation of that anti-social spirit, of that arrogant egotism,

[25] For the history of the changing meanings of the word "nation" see G. Zernatto, "Nation: The History of a Word," *Review of Politics*, VI (1944), pp. 351–66. For a concise description of the development of national consciousness in England see H. Kohn, "The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, I (1940), pp. 69–94.

[26] The reaction against the indefinite "West" started before the French Revolution. The French invasion and the defeat of Prussia intensified these tendencies and brought them to an early fruition, but they did not create them and did not change their character.

[27] The related concepts of "transvaluation" and "*ressentiment*" are used here in the original meaning proposed by Nietzsche in *The Genealogy of Morals* and later developed by Max Scheler in *Ressentiment*.

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of that immoral enthusiasm for false reason and false enlightenment."[28] The individual (as a rational actor) was seen as a false, egoistic, fragmented and alienated man, whose nature was anti-social, and therefore not human. A society, or a nation, constituted by such individuals, was nothing but an atomized mass, a contract, in which calculation was substituted for genuine attachment, a nation only in name, while a true nation, or society, was a "fusion of individuality" and existed above its individual members. In addition, since Germany lacked a developed middle class, it was the peasant who soon became the personification of the national spirit and the bearer of specifically German virtues.[29] Peasantry was the *Volk* in the original meaning; now it merged with Germanness itself. This led to the idealization of agriculture through which man, allegedly, more than through any other activity, became a creator and therefore an active and a free being[30] and reinforced the antipathy towards trade and industry (of which Germany anyway did not have much to show off) and anti-urban sentiments. Since national unity was the supreme goal, efforts were made not to antagonize the bourgeoisie and to find a place for it within the German people. Yet this was done reluctantly; Arndt, for example, believed that burgher and peasant stood in "natural contrast" to each other.[31] This too contributed and in part accounted for the anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois character of German nationalism. Very soon, in place of the claim "we too are a nation," German philosophers were prone to declare that only they are a nation. Fichte wrote in the Eighth Address to the German Nation that "Only the German . . . really has a people and is entitled to count as one, and he alone is capable of a real and rational love of his nation. . . . To have (national) character and to be a German undoubtedly means the same thing."[32] But this confidence was based on profound reinterpretation of rationality, individuality and freedom in collectivistic terms.

THIS transvaluation of values—a product of *ressentiment* felt by the German intellectuals, of the humiliation they experienced as members of an entity remote from the central values—the periphery, of the realization that they are not and cannot be accepted as equals of those whose values these were—was the matrix of German nationalism. It was in these terms, determined by their *ressentiment*, that the German intellectuals were to define Germany as a nation, and in which the national consciousness and identity of the Germans were later moulded.

[28] Adam Müller, *Ausgewahlte Abhandlungen* (Jena, 1921), p. 21. It is possible that identification of the West with capitalism was created by the French who saw England in these terms. See, for example, Jules Michelet, *Historical View of the French Revolution from its Earliest Indications to the Flight of the King in 1791* (London, 1890), pp. 430–56.

[29] J. G. Gagliardo, op. cit. p. 172 and further.

[30] Ibid. pp. 181–4.

[31] Ibid. p. 208.

[32] J. G. Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation* (The Open Court Publishers, Chicago and London, 1922), p. 130.

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This was one of the three possible responses to the perception of difference between Germany and the centre, "the West." The acknowledgement of the West as the model, and thus of Germany's inferiority, was one possibility. This would lead to efforts to become like the West, to westernize. The other two possibilities were to refuse to recognize the West as the model, and thus German inferiority. Of these two the first was the claim that Germany and the West were incomparable; and each one was good in its own way: a position of cultural relativism. This was the position adopted, though not consistently, by Herder. But the archetypal response, discernible in German thought at least from Hegel on, took the form of the transvaluation of values. The West was represented as the anti-model (thus as clearly inferior to Germany), as evil. This however, did not make actual Germany, Germany as it existed at the moment, the model. What took the place of the model was some ideal image: past or future. The values embodied in the image in both cases were extremely similar (they, indeed, were the reversal of the Western values), but the placement of the ideal in time and the means believed to be necessary for its attainment differed, and therefore, the institutional forms of the values and the terminology differed too. Left and right, radicals and conservatives could adjust to this matrix equally well. In both cases the present society had to be changed to achieve the ideal. And in both cases Germany was much closer to the ideal than the West, either because it was less estranged from the ideal past, or because it was better prepared to make the leap into the ideal future.

This archetypal response was the basis of German Romanticism; and it is also found at the basis of Marxism. In fact one of the finest encapsulations of its cognitive structure is Marx's "Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right." Close reading may be of some help here. The essay starts with what was indeed the starting point of the archetypal nationalist response: comparison of Germany with the West and the realization that it is unfavourable. Early in the beginning of the essay Marx declares that it deals with Germany. He proceeds to describe the German situation: "If one were to begin with the status quo itself in Germany, even in the most appropriate way, i.e. negatively, the result would still be an anachronism. Even the negation of our political present is already a dusty past in the historical lumber room of *modern nations*. If I negate the German situation of 1843 I have, according to *French* chronology, hardly reached the year 1789, and still less *the vital center of the present day*."[33] This short passage reveals a number of points. First of all, there is here an awareness that "the vital center of the day" lies outside Germany, somewhere among the "modern nations." Germany, accordingly, is not a modern nation. This realization

[33] The quotations are from the text in R. C. Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader* (Norton, New York, second edition, 1978), pp. 53–65.

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and the comparison between Germany and the modern nations at the centre are clearly humiliating.

Marx goes on to describe the unacceptable situation of Germany, rejects in passing the position of those who look for salvation in Teutonic forests and declares war upon the state of affairs in Germany, because "This state of affairs is beneath *the level of history*." In order to give the nation courage to revolt against and change this state of affairs, he wants to make it terrified of itself and deny it an instant of illusion and resignation.

Germany, says Marx, will not change only for itself. "Even for the modern nations," he says, "this struggle against the limited character of the German status quo does not lack interest." Actually, Germany would be performing a world mission, "for the German status quo is the open consummation of the *ancien régime*, and the *ancien régime* is the *hidden defect of the modern state*." Germany would be actually curing the defects of other, modern nations, at the vital centre of the present day.

Marx characterizes the existence of the *ancien régime* in Germany as "comic," while it was "tragic" in the modern nations. Yet it will be Germany which will finally destroy the hated remnants of the *ancien régime*. "Why should history proceed in this way?" he asks. "So that mankind shall separate itself gladly from its past. We claim this joyful historical destiny for the political powers of Germany."

He stresses again that "genuine human problems" are those concerned with "*modern* (that is, not German) social and political reality," and again returns to the point of the humiliating backwardness of Germany, which "like a raw recruit, has so far only had to do extra drill on old and hackneyed historical matters," in comparison to the modern nations. He now names them; those are France and England.

UP to this point Marx lamented the German inferiority in comparison to the advanced nations. Now he changes the direction of the argument and declares that this is not so much an inferiority as an advantage. Germany is, after all, not so bad—especially if compared to some less fortunate nations—and, in fact, its present backwardness and difference from the modern nations contains the guarantee of its future greatness. This turn of thought also was an element of the archetypal structure of the nationalist response. It had numerous parallels in earlier and contemporary literature. Novalis, for example, in an article published in *Athenaeum* in 1798, expressed it in this way: "The German has long been the 'Little Hans'. But he might well soon become the Hans of all Hanses. It is with him as it is said to be with many dumb children: he will live and be wise when his precocious siblings have long mouldered, and he now alone is master in the household." In a similar vein Marx wrote:

> If the whole of German development were at the level of German political development, a German could have no greater part in contemporary problems that can a *Russian* [italics in the original]. . . .

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> Fortunately, we Germans are not Scythians.
>
> Just as the nations of the ancient world lived their prehistory in the imagination, in mythology, so *we Germans* have lived our post-history in thought, in philosophy. We are the philosophical contemporaries of the present day without being its historical contemporaries. German philosophy is the ideal prolongation of German history. When, therefore, we criticize, instead of the *oeuvres incomplètes* of our real history, the *oeuvres posthumes* of our *ideal history—philosophy*, our criticism stands at the center of the problems of which the present age says: that is the question. That which constitutes, for the *advanced nations*, a practical break with modern political conditions, is in Germany where there conditions do not yet exist, virtually a critical break with their philosophical reflection. The German philosophy of right and of the state is the only German history which is *al pari* with the *official* [italics everywhere in the original] modern times. The German nation is obliged, therefore, to connect its dream history with its present conditions, and to subject to criticism not only these existing conditions but also their abstract continuation.

The German speculative philosophy of the right, says Marx, was raised to the level of science. Its criticism, also science, would be both an extremely significant development in philosophy and the critical analysis of the modern (not German) state and of the reality connected with it. Why should one criticize this modern reality? Because it is fundamentally evil, much more so than the present German reality. Modern state, says Marx, which for Germany remains in the beyond, "leaves out of account the *real man* [italics in the original], or only satisfies the *whole man* [italics in the original] in an illusory way." He continues: "In politics, the Germans have thought what other nations have done. Germany has been their theoretical consciousness. The abstraction and presumption of its philosophy was in step with the partial and stunted character of their reality. If, therefore, the status quo of the German political system expresses the consummation of the *ancien régime*, the thorn in the flesh of the modern state, the status quo of German political science expresses the imperfection of the modern state itself, the degeneracy of its flesh."

Germany compares unfavourably with France and England, but the question for it, says Marx, is not whether it can catch up with these modern nations. For these nations are corrupt, they disregard the real man, and their social flesh is degenerate. The question for Germany is: can she overcome these nations. He asks rhetorically: "can Germany attain a practical activity *à la hauteur des principes*; that is to say a revolution which will raise it not only to the *official* level of the modern nations, but to the *human level* which will be the immediate future of these nations."

Marx's answer to this question is: yes, it can. Germany had already proved itself capable of such revolutions in the past, and in the past too it did so with the help, and under the leadership of ideas. As it did in the

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Reformation, so it will lead the world again on its road to the revolutionary transformation of society now. It has what other nations lack—philosophy developed into science. It also experiences the most urgent need in the revolutionary transformation, which the other, advanced nations do not experience. For Germany, watching the development of the modern nations from outside, went through all the pains of this development, without sharing in its pleasures. "And one fine day Germany will find itself at the level of the European decadence before ever having attained the level of European emancipation." Therefore, "Germany, as the deficiency of present day politics constituted into a system, will not be able to demolish the specific German barriers without demolishing the general barriers of present-day politics. . . . In Germany complete emancipation is a condition *sine qua non* for any partial emancipation."

PHILOSOPHY and a need for a transformation, however, are not enough. For a revolution to take place there must exist a mass to carry the prescriptions of the philosophy through. "A class must be formed," says Marx, which will fight not for partial interests and benefits, as the revolutionary classes in advanced nations did, but for the complete emancipation of man. This class is the proletariat. It is only beginning to form itself in Germany, says Marx, but since partially revolutionary classes cannot exist in Germany anyway, it will surely be formed in the nearest future. And "once the lightning of thought (German philosophy) has penetrated deeply into this virgin soil of the people (German proletariat), the *Germans* will emancipate themselves and become men. . . . In Germany no type of enslavement can be abolished unless all enslavement is destroyed. The emancipation of Germany will be an emancipation of man."

The essay concludes with an enigmatic statement: "the day of German resurrection will be proclaimed by the crowing of the Gallic cock." It is interesting that Marx is speaking here about German "resurrection"—invoking the conventional idiom for the national cause. And what is the function of the Gallic cock—a modern nation, France—in this process? Does it mean that any of the French revolutions preceding the German one would be merely a precursor, a herald of the salvation brought to humanity by Germany?

This outburst of patriotism does not necessarily show that Karl Marx was a passionate German nationalist. If nationalism is to mean the governing passion of one's life, when the glory of the nation becomes the very basis of one's personal honour and well-being, like it was for Fichte in the period of the *Addresses to the German Nation*, or for Arndt, Marx cannot be defined as a nationalist at all. His life was undoubtedly governed by other, probably less altruistic passions,[34] and his personal

[34] For some description of the passions that governed Marx's life see Peter Demetz, *Marx, Engels and the Poets: Origins of Marxist Literary Criticism* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967), and Leopold Schwarzschild, *The Red Prussian: The Life and Legend of Karl Marx* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1948).

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well-being needed more than the well-being of the nation as its basis. However, at the time of Marx's early adulthood nationalism had already acquired the character of a deeply embedded cognitive blueprint and in fact became a "convenient cultural frame"[35] for the expression of ideas in the most diverse areas. The fact was that Marx inherited the nationalistic attitude *in toto*, that far from being unaware of it—as his later writings were to suggest—he shared in it fully. He accepted it unreflectively, without a shade of the sceptical "suspension of commitment."[36] No element of this perspective was for him as much as questionable, this was the very prism through which he to the end of his life saw and related to the world.

This is not as surprising as it may seem. After all Marx was a Romantic poet. Some, indeed, have already perceived this as the very basis of his theory, claiming that "Marx's version of *scientific socialism* is essentially a metamorphosed poetry," that his "discovery of the proletariat—a key element in the edifice of *scientific socialism*—had its impetus in Marx's early poetic interests of 1836 and 1837."[37] This paper does not subscribe to the position that "the proletariat constitutes the incarnation of Romantic irony": this hypothesis implies a view of the generation of ideas that is absolutely independent from their creators and the outside world, and such an internalist position which may be applicable in mathematics in all the other areas seems untenable. But as far as German Romanticism itself was essentially a "metamorphosed" nationalism, Marx's youthful poetic endeavours cannot be considered inconsequential. The nationalist attitude created by Romantics but shared by many others formed the foundation of Marx's thought, and if it was never mentioned as such but went unacclaimed and unnoticed, perhaps it was that very fundamental, natural character of this vision, self-evident for Marx, that explained this lack of recognition.

MARX'S early writings indeed bear remarkable resemblance to the general spirit of the German letters of the first half of the nineteenth century, informed by the *ressentiment* against the West. One finds in them the reiteration of all the essential elements of the nationalist attitude: the curious blend of chauvinism and cosmopolitanism in the vision of the German mission; the emphasis on the essentially social nature of man and collectivistic definitions of freedom and individuality; the emphasis on the *whole* man and the inability of the anti-social decadent West to allow his self-realization; the pride in German letters and the belief in the special salvationary power of German philosophy. The differences which exist between Marx in his early writings and the Romantics amount to no more than differences in terminology. For

[35] L. Krieger, op. cit. p. 327.
[36] Robert C. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1961), p. 22.
[37] Leonard P. Wessell, Jr., *Karl Marx, Romantic Irony, and the Proletariat: The Mythopoetic Origins of Marxism* (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London, 1979), p. 1.

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example, the ideal society is called the "Kingdom of God on Earth" by Schlegel and "communism" or "socialism" by Marx, but both mean the state of what Marx in *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844 calls "transcendence of human self-alienation." But even this choice of vocabulary still may, and probably should, be interpreted as an expression of Marx's youthful patriotism. Friedrich Engels, in an article written in English for an Owenite newspaper in 1843,[38] before he and Marx became collaborators and friends, made it clear that communism had a special significance for the Germans. This was due to its connection to German philosophy. The Germans, unlike the English and the French, explained Engels, arrived at the idea of communism by a philosophical path; it constituted the fulfilment of Hegel's philosophical principles. Hegel's philosophy was the crowning achievement of German philosophical thought, and philosophical thought was the pride of the German nation. To believe in and propagandize the idea of communism was the patriotic duty of a German. Engels wrote: "The Germans are a philosophical nation, and will not, cannot abandon communism, as soon as it is founded upon sound philosophical principles; chiefly as it is derived as an unavoidable conclusion from their *own* philosophy. And this is the part we have to perform now. Our party has to prove that either all the philosophical efforts of the German nation, from Kant to Hegel, have been useless—worse than useless; or, that they must end in communism; that the Germans must either reject their great philosophers, whose names they hold as the glory of their nation, or that they must adopt communism."[39]

Communism thus took the place of the "Kingdom of God on Earth," without in any way changing the reasons for which this new form of society had to be advocated. Philosophy and national glory were connected, and to be a Hegelian philosopher in the 1840s was to be a German patriot in the same way as at the beginning of the century to be a Romantic poet meant to be a German patriot.

Since the 1844 *Manuscripts*, though, while the structure of the argument remained exactly the same, the idiosyncrasies evident in Marx's early writings (such as the idea of the proletariat, the alleged predominance of the economic factors and motives over all others) developed into major propositions of the Marxist theory and gave it a look which on the face of it had little in common with Romanticism and the conventional expression of the nationalist attitude. This development away from the explicitly nationalist problem seems to be related to a certain conflict which Marx, given his acceptance of this attitude, necessarily faced.

Marx had no principal disagreements with the Romantic nationalist attitude, and retained it throughout his life. As his correspondence attests, German chauvinism was not foreign to him, and neither was the

[38] *Marx-Engels, Collected Works*, op. cit. Vol. 3, pp. 401–8.
[39] Ibid. p. 406.

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idea of the wholesale comparisons between peoples. In these comparisons he always took the side of Germany, as he did also in cases of military conflicts: even outright German aggression was in his eyes justified by the fact that Germany was the carrier of civilization. He held most unflattering views of the English, the French, the Russians. Yet this nationalist attitude which Marx wholeheartedly shared was most certain to put him in a vulnerable and unpleasant position. It was certain to turn against him, to place him outside the society to which he desired to belong and which he desired to lead, to define him as inferior and evil, as a pariah. The nationalist thought in Germany was potentially racist; from the outset it emphasized particularistic and primordial factors of which blood was the consummate expression, and in Marx's time it emphasized such factors increasingly. As an intellectual, Marx did not find this tendency disconcerting, but Marx was Jewish. He was Jewish though he was a Christian by denomination and an atheist by persuasion. In Germany this was no contradiction, and for a person who accepted the nationalist perspective this must have presented a problem.

IT is possible that Marx tried to take care of the problem of his national identity in the "Essay on the Jewish Question" which would remove this annoying obstacle to his participation in the German cause. (Significantly, the "Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" was written immediately after this essay, which leads one to think that for the time being at least he considered the problem to be resolved to his satisfaction.) What is generally considered the substantive part of the essay is the discussion of the fragmented nature of man and social life in the *politically* emancipated perfected state, and thus the inability of such (democratic, free, Western, not German) states to claim the achievement of *human* emancipation. This discussion constitutes the bulk of the first part of the paper and is not connected in any meaningful way to the Jewish question. It might be that Bruno Bauer's two essays, which incidentally dealt with the Jewish question, merely served as a pretext for Marx to expose his view of the politically emancipated state, and that had Bruno Bauer or someone else written an article raising similar theoretical questions on a totally different subject, Marx's dissatisfaction with the fragmented nature of modern reality would also be expressed in a paper unrelated to the Jewish question. But the Jews figure prominently throughout the essay, while the passionate anti-Semitism breathing through its lines, particularly in the second part, leads one to wonder whether the explanation of the loose connection between the philosophical argument and the subject of the essay was not the opposite. It seems at least plausible that it was the philosophical argument which was used as a pretext, a respectable wall on which Marx could hang his opinions—not on the Jewish question, indeed (that is, the question of the political equality of the Jews in Germany), but on the nature of the Jewish national identity.

However this might be, in this essay Marx made his position in relation

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to the Jews—and the identity to which he aspired—completely clear. He was not a Jew and could not be one. This was proven in a twofold manner. First of all, Marx dissociated himself from the Jews, stating in unequivocal terms what he thought about these repugnant characters. The line he took was an old and tested one. It went back to the fathers of the Church. As early as the fourth century, St John Chrysostom, in questioning the real nature of Judaism, had claimed that the synagogue was not a temple of God, but a home of idolatry. "The Jews," he believed, "live for their bellies, they crave for the goods of this world."[40] This in the nineteenth century became a favourite theory of many learned professors. A philosopher, Professor Fries of Heidelberg University, for example, in 1816 published a treatise, "On the menace of the Jews to the Welfare and Character of the German," which was an instant success and in which, among other things, he claimed that "Jews are a social pest which owes its rapid spread to money and is accompanied by misery, tyranny, and taxes. . . ."[41] Marx entirely agreed with this opinion. "Let us seek the secret of the religion (Judaism) in the real Jew. What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money."[42] (This postulate raises a question which Marx did not consider and which would and in fact was to thwart his efforts. If not defined by religion, but defining it himself, what was the real Jew? A member of a peculiar biological, psychological group—a race?) Marx continued: "We discern in Judaism a universal *antisocial* element of the *present time*, whose historical development, zealously aided in its harmful aspects by the Jews, has now attained its culminating point. . . ." The emancipation of the Jews was actually the emancipation of the world from Jews, and in fact, claimed Marx, "The Jew has already emancipated himself in a Jewish manner." To this effect he quoted from Bauer: "The Jew, who is merely tolerated in Vienna . . .[43] determines the fate of the whole Empire by his financial power. The Jew, who may be entirely without rights in the smallest German state, decides the destiny of Europe." And Marx thundered: "What was, in itself, the basis of the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism. . . . Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no other god may exist. . . . The bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew."

As if such open-hearted declaration of his true opinions and sympathies were not enough (and Marx was well justified in thinking that it was not), he used another argument to prove the impossibility of his Jewish identity. The Jewish nationality, he claimed, was "illusory," it was

[40] Gordon Craig, *The Germans* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1982), p. 127.

[41] Quoted in Marvin Lowenthal, *The Jews of Germany: A Story of Sixteen Centuries* (The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1936), pp. 231–2.

[42] All quotations are given from the text in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, op. cit. pp. 26–52.

[43] Indeed in this time in Vienna there lived only "tolerated" wealthy Jews—all in all 197 families in 1847, access to the other Jews was barred—see P. G. J. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* (John Wiley, New York, 1964), p. 10.

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"chimerical," it did not actually exist. It was just an illusion held by hucksters, traders and financiers who worshipped Mammon, and in a transformed society in which huckstering would become impossible, this illusion would disappear too.

THE obstacle to the German identity was removed. The Jewish people did not exist, and if it did, then Marx certainly made it clear that he disliked the Jews as much as anyone and obviously had nothing to do with them. In his very next essay he—with a sense of liberation—could say: "We Germans." Unfortunately, in reality it was not that easy. It was not enough to renounce one's Jewishness to be accepted as a German. As a matter of fact nothing at all was enough. The Jews (and former Jews) were not accepted. True, the period between 1820 and 1860 was the period of *Gemütlichkeit*, it was called the "halcyon" period in the history of Germany.[44] But, for German Jews, it only meant that there were no more "hep-hep" riots (or rather, that in comparison to 1819 outbursts of anti-Jewish violence were rare, for there were isolated cases of mob anti-Semitism, especially during and immediately after the 1848 revolution). As Treitschke explained, anti-Semitism was merely an expression of a healthy German patriotism: "The powerful excitement of the War of Liberation," he wrote, "brought to light all the secrets of the German character; amid the general ferment all the old and profound hostility to everything Judaic once more made itself manifest."[45] However, the new anti-Semitism was more than just a revival of the old and profound hostility. Romantic nationalism brought racism in its wake, and made the cleft between Germans and Jews unbridgeable. The new racial element made the acceptance theoretically impossible.[46] It did not, could not matter whether the Jews accepted everything German, subscribed entirely to the ideals of German culture, and rejected wholeheartedly their own. Already in 1803, in a pioneer publication in this respect, a patriotic lawyer Grattenauer denounced "elegant" Jews more than others (for whom he had no sympathy either), who might talk about Goethe, Schiller, and Schlegel, but still remained an "Asiatic, alien people," and all intercourse with them was "highly reprehensible."[47] It has been an explicitly accepted notion since then, predestined from the 1860s and 1870s to blossom later and to bear horrifying fruit.[48] It did not matter whether Jews baptized or not. Or rather it mattered only for Jews. *Jew* grew to be a pun, wrote one historian, "on many Jewish lips it designated a creed; on many German lips, a Volk—a people, a race. . . ."[49] Moses Hess, a one time friend of Karl Marx, wrote in 1862: "The Germans hate the religion of the Jews less than their race. Neither

[44] M. Lowenthal, op. cit. p. 235.
[45] Quoted in ibid. p. 230.
[46] P. G. J. Pulzer, op. cit. p. 6.
[47] Quoted in M. Lowenthal, op. cit. pp. 221–2.
[48] P. G. J. Pulzer, op. cit.
[49] M. Lowenthal, op. cit. p. 223.

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'radical' reform . . ., nor baptism, neither education nor emancipation completely unlocks for the German Jew the portals of social life. They, therefore, seek to deny their origin."[50] Some Jews persisted in the belief that it was religion and nothing else that divided them from the society to which they wanted to belong. Some tried to reform their religion to bring it closer to Christianity. A great number converted to it. Heinrich Heine saw in baptism the "admission ticket to European civilization"; the views of his critics proved beyond doubt that he was wrong. There were no admission tickets. "It is like a wonder!" wrote Ludwig Borne. "I have experienced it a thousand times, and yet it always remains new. These people reproach me for being a Jew, and those forgive me for it, and still others praise me for it; but they all think of it. They are as if enchanted in the magical Jewish circle, and no one can get out."[51] Since race was the issue, nothing but physical, biological conversion would make it possible for the Jews to become Germans, and since this was impossible, there was no solution. Fichte in 1793 put it this way: "There is spread throughout nearly every country of Europe a powerful inimical State which wars continually against all others and often succeeds in bitterly oppressing their peoples—this State is Jewry. . . . The only way I can see to give the Jews civil rights is to cut off their heads in a single night and equip them with new ones devoid of every Jewish idea. . . . To protect ourselves against them, again I see no means except to conquer their Promised Land and pack them all off to it."[52]

MARX could not possibly have been ignorant of the virulent anti-Semitism of his time. Even the skin of an elephant would not be thick enough to leave him unaware that the intellectual feat he performed in his essay "On the Jewish Question" could not be entirely effective, and that he never would become a real German in the eyes of those he considered to be real Germans, if, indeed, the removal of the obstacle to German identity was his goal in this essay. For it must be emphasized that in this respect the possible motives of Marx in writing it are not important. Whether this was an unconscious attempt to shed his Jewishness or a conscious effort to give vent to feelings of self-hatred is entirely beside the point. What is relevant here and what this essay demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt is the fact that Marx accepted the anti-Semitism inherent in the Romantic nationalist attitude.

This anti-Semitism was part and parcel of German anti-Westernism; in fact it was one of the first forms this pervading perspective took. It resulted from a double intellectual somersault through which the transvaluation of values stimulated by the painful comparison between Germany and the "advanced nations" was in part accomplished. Facing

[50] Moses Hess, *Rome and Jerusalem* (Philosophical Library, New York), pp. 25–6.
[51] Quoted in G. Craig, 1982, op. cit. p. 132.
[52] Quoted in M. Lowenthal, op. cit. p. 229. See also J. G. Fichte, "Beitraege," in *Saemtliche Werke*, VI, pp. 149–50 and further.

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and resenting these nations German intellectuals turned their own vices into virtues and the virtues of others into vices. Yet this did not reconcile them to the German reality. However, now they compared Germany not so much to the West as to the ideal society which personified the anti-West, and which for them was the "real" and true, not merely apparent Germany. When they turned inward on the basis of this profound redefinition of values, they were likely to find appalling exactly those qualities in German life which represented points of similarity with, or reminded them of Western values: the bourgeoisie, trade and industry, cities, science. Yet the attitude to all these had to remain ambivalent: all these factors were absolutely necessary if Germany was not to forsake the hope of one day triumphing over the modern nations.[53] Jews represented all of these hated un-German values and they were not necessary. They were the symbol of the West within Germany itself. The parallels between the anti-Semitic stereotype of the Jew and the stereotype of the West in German thought—including Marxist—are indeed striking and they have been noticed and pointed out.[54] This symbolic substitution is transparently clear in the "Essay on the Jewish Question." Marx's opinion of the Jewish religion—"contempt for theory, for art, for history, and for man as an end in himself"—which he considers to be the "real, conscious standpoint and the virtue of the man of money" is exactly the way Romantic nationalists everywhere in the world perceived what for them represented "the West." But it is also clear that subscription to this view had to be extremely uncomfortable for a person who was Jewish himself.

In these circumstances it was impossible for Marx to remain faithful to the letter of Romantic nationalism. But through an ingenious turn of thought he succeeded in remaining faithful to its spirit, and retained all its fundamental beliefs and aspirations without having to subscribe to the position which—at least in the eyes of others—would define him as an alien, inferior being, excluded from participation in the victorious march of the superior race destined for glory. He ensured his own participation and escaped racism. This was achieved by the substitution of "class" for "nation."

AS is well known, Marx arrived at the idea of the proletariat not through empirical study, but by way of philosophical speculation. In the "Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" Marx postulated a need for a mass to carry out the

[53] For an excellent example of such ambivalence and the ways in which elements of Western civilization most obviously opposed to the German spirit were reconciled to it and incorporated in the German culture see Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1984). For a theoretical discussion of the possibility of such "cultural paradoxes" see Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (Basic Books, New York, 1976), and *The Coming Crisis of Post-Industrial Society* (Basic Books, New York, 1973).

[54] Moishe Poistone, "Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German Reaction to 'Holocaust'," *New German Critique* 19, (Winter 1980), pp. 97–115.

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teachings of German philosophy. The mass had to correspond to the character of this philosophy: in other words it had to be the material expression of the situation and destiny of Germany, in the same manner in which philosophy was its spiritual expression. This mass therefore had to embody the very antithesis of the modern society, and had to contain within itself the seeds of its overthrow. It was destined to become "everything," and therefore had to be as close to "nothing" as possible. A concept of a new class closely corresponding to these requirements was available in contemporary French socialist literature which had been becoming very fashionable in Germany since the 1830s. Already German philosophers tended to identify proletariat with mankind in the same way in which since the beginning of the century they had identified Germany with mankind.[55] The goal of German history—the overthrow of the modern society—was in their opinion, the goal of humanity. It was only a small step to the identification of the proletariat with Germany.

The concept of the proletariat and the phenomenon it corresponded to was analyzed in the Hegelian framework by Lorenz von Stein in his *Der Socialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreichs* published in 1842. Von Stein viewed the proletariat as an entirely new class, emerging in the wake of the French Revolution. It was propertyless and tended to generalize its condition by creating a "community of goods." Thus it was the very antithesis of the modern Western society "founded on principles of property and personality." Moreover, proletariat was not simply the mass of the poor, it was a special class of defiant propertyless people who resented their society and wished to transform it into a different one through a revolution. Marx was deeply influenced by von Stein's book, and adopted the concept of the proletariat developed in it.[56]

It is in this function, as the mass—the carrier of the German philosophical idea—that the proletariat appeared for the first time in Marx's "Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right." Later the idea of Germany's mission and leadership on the way to the world revolution disappeared from his theoretical writings (though it reappeared now and then in letters and occasional newspaper articles), and the proletariat emerged in the role of the saviour or leader. The true philosophy—which earlier was a manifestation of the national spirit, the ideal projection of the real tendencies of national history—was incorporated in the idea of the proletariat, it was part and parcel of its economic situation.

At the same time, Capital—or capitalism—became "*artisan des malheurs du monde*" (to use the words in which Rouget de Lisle characterized England). It replaced the West, the "modern nations," England and France, as the anti-hero. Thus while the proletariat became metamorphosed Germany, Capital became the metamorphosed West.

[55] Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx* (The Humanities Press, New York, 1950), p. 191.
[56] R. Tucker, 1961, op. cit. pp. 114–16.

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Both retained all the qualities of the forces of good and evil respectively of the Romantic nationalist scheme.

The similarities—or rather the convergence—between class for Marx, and nation in the conceptions of nineteenth-century German philosophers, publicists and Romantic poets may be perceived on an even deeper level. Like nations for the Romantics, it is classes for Marx that are the actors of history; classes, not men are real individualities in the Hegelian sense. Men are subsumed under them, they are nothing but their members (in the biological rather than sociological sense of the word). The characters, abilities, behaviour and views of men are but reflections of the dispositions of classes, as they are of nations in the thought of German patriots of the period. Like nations (notably in Fichte and the Romantics), classes in Marx's theory are divided into partial and pan-human. The view of the proletariat as the universal class, in distinction to all other classes, reflects the idea of Germany as the pan-human nation in distinction to all other nations.

Thus all the elements of the archetypal response of backward societies to the West were retained. Though it was Capital now and not particular societies which was evil personified, its characteristics were exactly the characteristics ascribed to the advanced, modern nations, and one therefore was justified in denouncing these nations for being the historical embodiment or expression of Capital. The West was seen as the doomed embodiment of evil; the role of the saviour of mankind was to be played by the non-West. However, as a result of the metamorphosis of nation into class, the archetypal nationalist response gained two additional sources of appeal. First, while originally each nation opposed to the West had to have its own version of the archetypal response with the role of the saviour performed for Germans by Germany, for Russians by Russia, etc., and while therefore the battles fought by each nation and the enemies against which it fought were different in every case, the new Marxist version was acceptable to all the nationalities struggling with the realization of their inferiority; in this sense it was indeed international.

Second, the Marxist version of the archetypal response had the form of an economic theory. At least, ostensibly, it represented a scientific, objective, and therefore, non-ethical position. To subscribe to it was not any more a question of moral choice, or of choice in general.[57] Those who were willing to subscribe to it were absolved from moral responsibility. Their sympathies and antipathies were now justified by science. They were doing what they wanted to do, but now they knew that they had to do this. In a way, they just fulfilled orders. Here they stood and they could do nothing else. They were free—of doubts and pangs of conscience—for this was a state of recognized necessity.

[57] See for example Karl Kautsky, *Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History* (Charles H. Kerr, Chicago, 1907); R. Tucker, 1961, op. cit. p. 12 regarding Lenin; and Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism* (Vintage Books, New York, 1960).

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IT was not coincidental that Marxism had its greatest victory in Russia. Significantly, the earliest disseminators of Marxist ideas in Russia were populists—people for whom Russia's international standing, glory and well-being was the most important goal, who were nationalists in the sense in which Marx was not, because for them the national sentiment was indeed the deepest, the governing passion. They discovered Marx when the humiliation of the Crimean War turned them into nihilists, when the hopes and solutions proposed by both Slavophils and Westernizers seemed untenable, since turning back was already impossible and any moderation frustrating. They were disillusioned in the earlier strategies of the intelligentsia to deal with Russia's inferiority vis-à-vis the West. But their fundamental perception of the situation, the pattern of their attachments and dislikes, their aspirations, remained the same. Like their counterparts in Germany, they still believed in the special, extraordinary, great fate of Russia, and their aim was to remove all the obstacles on its way to greatness, to show it to the world, to catch up, overcome and leave the perfidious West behind.[58] In Marxism they found their own perception of the situation, "under scientific sauce"[59] as Mikhailovsky put it, and the guarantee that their dream would come true.

In the final analysis, to use one of Marx's favourite phrases, Marxism may not be an exception in the age of nationalism, but another expression of this age; and class struggle not an independent phenomenon as characteristic of the modern society as the rise of nationalism, but another face of nationalism. And in many a conflict under the Marxist garb and behind the banners of economic justice and equality there may be concealed a totally different, but no less important, issue of national *ressentiment*.

[58] J. H. Billington, *Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1958); Franko Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in 19th century Russia* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960); Stepan S. Volk, *Karl Marks i Russkie Obshchestvennye Deyateli* (Nauka, Leningrad, 1969).

[59] Quoted in J. Billington, op. cit. p. 174.

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The Proceedings of the Grabski Commission[1]

Wieslawa Surazska

THE Grabski Commission was a peculiar inner-Party event at the time of the political crisis in Poland. The crisis began with strikes that spread rapidly over the country during the summer of 1980. The signing of the Gdansk Agreement between the workers and the government on 31 August 1980 was the surprisingly successful result of these strikes, leading to the formation of independent trade unions with massive membership, eventually taking the name of Solidarity. This was a severe blow for the ruling Communist Party, since the movement included the vast majority of blue-collar workers, including holders of Party membership cards; in the biggest factories the membership of Solidarity among blue-collar workers reached 80 per cent and more. The Party's claim to rule the country on behalf of the Polish working class was thus being strongly undermined.

On 5 September 1980, at a special session of the Central Committee, First Secretary Edward Gierek was dismissed, together with seven other top Party and state officials. Afterwards, the past performances of the Party and state apparatuses were closely examined in both the state and Solidarity media. The latter were concerned mainly with the system's organizational shortcomings, while the former competed for public attention and provided a wide scope of data on the personal conduct of the former leadership. Investigations were carried out at central and local level by regular Party and state bodies. They were helped considerably by the Chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control, Mieczyslaw Moczar, who engineered the downfall of Gomulka in the late '60s and was Gierek's major political rival. During his chairmanship of the governmental control agency (to which he had been demoted at that time) Moczar, using all his experience and connections as former head of the Security Service, was in a position to collect plenty of information on the personal conduct of leading political figures. Consequently, when the time came, he was only too willing to produce it as evidence against his former competitors. These data, though officially kept secret, were easily leaked in suspicious circumstances to journalists who presented them in detail to the public. This caused a major upheaval in the ranks of Party and state officials, including the suicides of two ministers. According to the *Trybuna Ludu* of 12 May 1981, as a result of formal investigations, 768 members of the Party were expelled (including 282 in various leading

[1] *Protokoly Komisji Grabskiego*, *Dokumenty* series, No. 50 (Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1986). Reprinted from *PZPR o sobie* ("The PUWP speaks about itself"), the manuscript of the tape-recorded proceedings of the Grabski Commission, which were leaked to the public from the PUWP Central Committee archives and were later edited by the Cracow Committee Against Violence in 1985.

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posts), and 1,020 others were charged with abusing their positions and indulging themselves in luxurious life-styles.

However, the numbers given one month later by the Supreme Chamber of Control differed substantially, amounting to 10,490 people, whose incomes and property were made subject to scrutiny. Of these, 6,135 (the majority of whom were Party members) were charged with financial abuses. It was established, for example, that 30 per cent of the cottages belonging to these people were built illegally, by means of unpaid services provided by state firms, the purchase of land and houses far below their real prices, unpaid taxes etc., amounting to a total of 140,766,400 zloty[2] (the average wage of a blue-collar worker was at that time about 4,000 zloty). Since most Party and state officials owed their positions to Gierek and his associates, any further investigation into the activities of the former leaders would necessarily involve questioning these people too. Many of them faced the prospect of being publicly exposed in the press as thieves.

THE proceedings of the usual, permanent organs of control apparently did not satisfy Party activists at lower levels either. The high-level members were subjected to acute social criticism and were accused of being representative of a corrupt party. The new activists were determined to root out those to blame for the crisis as quickly as possible. This would supposedly put an end to the "witch-hunt" which was causing "honest and responsible comrades" to suffer.[3] The lower Party apparatus was at that time in a strong position as the result of an electoral campaign for the forthcoming Extraordinary Party Congress, and because of its unusual "democratic" procedures. The grievances of provincial Party activists therefore had to be taken seriously, and this led to the establishment of a special commission at the Tenth Central Committee Plenum in April 1981. This Commission was entrusted with the task of assessing the current progress of investigations so that conclusions could soon be reached concerning the political responsibility of the former Party and state leaders.

The chairman of the Commission was Tadeusz Grabski, another political loser from the Gierek era, made Secretary of the Central Committee in the wave of "crisis appointments" in the central Party apparatus. The rest of the Commission was officially presented as including "five blue-collar workers, two peasant workers, two Party intellectuals, one professional high-ranking soldier, two first secretaries of provincial Party committees and two meritorious Party activists of the older generation."[4] Closer examination of the Commission's composition shows, however, that the members with the real work to do were the Party apparatchiks at middle and lower level, most of whom were in fact using the turnover in the Party leadership brought about by

[2] The report of the Supreme Chamber of Control to the Grabski Commission on 8 April 1981.
[3] *Trybuna Ludu*, 11 May 1981.
[4] Ibid.

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the crisis to take shortcuts in their careers. Participation in the Commission gave them another excellent opportunity to make their names known to the public as the warriors of Party renewal.

The Commission sent letters to 35 major Party and state officials of the '70s asking for their opinions on the following questions: (1) the reasons for and mechanics of the current crisis, (2) their own degree of responsibility, and (3) the degree of responsibility of other persons who held top Party and state positions during the '70s. Not all those who were asked were willing to give their opinions, even less to stand before the Commission to answer its questions. As the proceedings of the Commission took place during the elections for the PUWP Ninth Extraordinary Congress, to appear before the Commission responsible for clearing accounts with "those responsible for the crisis" was bound to reduce one's chances of being elected. Hence some of those called up were reluctant to appear before the Commission, even though its proceedings were closed to the public (the press was not admitted). For example, one member of the leadership to be subjected to scrutiny, Kazimierz Barcikowski, refused to appear. This implied that the status of the Commission was not fully recognized by the top Party echelons, and that the Commission itself was regarded as a gesture designed to appease public opinion, but that it had no real authority. Comrade Grabski understood the situation very well, and suggested that the names of some activists interrogated who still had chances of being re-elected to the Congress (for example, comrades Waszczuk and Jagielski) should not be disclosed or, at least, that publication of their names should be postponed until after the election.

THE records available consist of 14 meetings held between 14 May and 29 June 1981, and include discussions between members of the Commission as well as interrogations carried out with 11 top Party and state officials, among others, the First Secretary Edward Gierek; the Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz; a secretary for the Party cadres and organization (and Prime Minister after the ouster of Jaroszewicz), Edward Babiuch; and the Minister of the Interior, Zygmunt Kowalczyk. The records are not complete, as certain sections were removed from the Central Committee archives. The parts remaining provide no essential details unavailable elsewhere. Furthermore, one should keep in mind that those interrogated tried to present the facts in the most favourable light for themselves. For example, when the former Minister of the Interior stated that there was no section in his department assigned to collecting the personal records of the Party apparatus, he was not necessarily speaking the truth. Nevertheless, the documents available provide an invaluable record of the Party speaking with its own voice. They also provide some supportive data for facts that formerly were purely matters for conjecture, for example, those concerning the direct involvement of the central Party apparatus in daily governmental affairs. It is usually claimed that the Party's role is to provide ideological

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guidance. One way among others of achieving this is the *nomenklatura* system, the existence of which has even been admitted by Soviet political scientists. Direct involvement in the daily routine of governing the country, on the other hand, has repeatedly been denied.[5]

THE frustration of the party activists, in the face of the tumultuous chain of events which occurred at the time of Solidarity, left them particularly interested in the self-justifications of their former leaders. At the beginning of the proceedings Grabski admitted that clearing the way with the former leaders was taking up a great deal of the Party's attention, so much so, that its entire machinery was being paralysed. This problem had to be resolved before the Ninth Extraordinary Congress, Grabski maintained, otherwise the Party would not be able to deal with present and future urgent problems.

However, the range and scope of those self-exculpations was a sensitive matter. The first obstacles in the path of eagerness for renewal came from the need to sustain the Party image, which had already been severely undermined by political developments at that time. On the other hand, the uncertain state of affairs within the Party aroused personal animosity and internal feuding which had been intensifying almost from the moment it was set up. Grabski claimed that members of the Gierek leadership kept telephoning him every day and sent him reports about "how good it was in the '60s and how badly it had turned out in the '70s." Gomulka even expressed willingness to stand before the Commission. But an exception was made in his case—as Grabski said, "we would rather avoid spitting on each other in public." Finally it was decided to limit the Commission's hearings to the '70s, i.e. the period between the Seventh Central Committee Plenum of December 1970 (when Gomulka was replaced by Gierek in the post of First Secretary) up to the Ninth Plenum held in September 1980 (the fall of Gierek).

Further limitations on the Commission's activities were imposed by the very nature of the system that it did not wish to undermine. Both sides, the Commission members and those subjected to interrogation, were far more closely related to each other than to any of the political groups prevalent at that time in society, including rank and file Party members. Some of the Party activists had already initiated so-called "horizontal agreements" between factories under the slogan of inner-Party democracy. None of them were active on the Commission aimed at Party renewal.

> The Commission has been addressed—said Grabski—with demands [sent from the Party meetings held in factories] to clear the circumstances of the communist use of power in Poland since 1944.

But comrade Wronski stated starkly:

[5] For a comprehensive review of this subject, see Archie Brown, "Political Power and the Soviet State: Western and Soviet Perspectives" in Neil Harding (ed.), *The State in Socialist Society* (St. Antony's/Macmillan series, Oxford, 1984), pp. 71–84.

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> We have to continue as the Party. There are no doubts about that. The power that we seized in Poland must continue to exist. I don't know how it could be otherwise. Therefore, we must establish what kind of mechanism funcitoned [in the '70s] and how it is to be put right for the future.

Another member of the Commission, comrade Drabik, gave his reasons why this had to be so:

> I do not believe that our ideology is wrong, as some are now saying. So many comrades died for our cause; they lived their lives honestly and sacrificed everything and then the misdeeds of leadership appeared, poor administration, and everything got spoiled.

All participants in the Commission's proceedings were equally terrified by the political developments which began with the emergence of Solidarity. They called them disastrous and tried their best to limit the damage already done to the Party by forces set free of its control. Under attack from all sides, and even from their own subordinates who used to be entirely subservient, they were all in the same sinking boat.

However, there was a political game going on too, a game in which the participants were taking every opportunity for their own advancement. Thus in the pronouncements of the Commission members, the presentation of their own ideological "principalness" became confused with signs of tribal solidarity. For example, comrade Wronski preached:

> Everyone knew that something was going wrong in Poland, [there was] too large a bourgeoisie in the country. It was the non-Party bourgeoisie that was living above acceptable standards; and this in a socialist country ruled by the Communist Party! And there was another bourgeoisie too, [consisting of] those with Party cards, and they too were living beyond their means.

But a bit later on he reminded the others:

> . . . today we are here [as the interrogators] but tomorrow we may find ourselves on the other side [as the interrogated].

A great lesson taught to all communists by Stalin was resurrected during the interrogation of Gierek. He asked the Commission to say to him quite openly: "Sacrifice yourself, Gierek, because that is what the Party needs," and only then would he "do so without hesitation." This request was answered by a Party intellectual, the late comrade Putrament. He said that such sacrifices were made in the past, but that the Party no longer needs them. Also, comrade Kowalczyk, the Minister of the Interior under Gierek, when asked about information received by his department during the '70s concerning Party officials abusing their powers, answered as follows:

> Once upon a time, there were certain sections in our department to deal with such matters [personal records of the Party apparatus]. But now, if I may give my opinion. I do not consider it in the Party's interests for there to be an institution in the country which is

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> superior to it. Actually, as far as it is in my power, I shall support the view that the Party should purge itself, and that there is no need for helpers, not even from within the magnificent ranks of the Security Service.

THE first explanation for the political developments which proved so disastrous for the Party was that of a counter-revolution. The emergence of a counter-revolution would not necessarily undermine Party legitimacy; on the contrary, according to its doctrine, the Party possesses the historical right to fight such an event with all its forces, on behalf of progress. The former Minister of the Interior, Zygmunt Kowalczyk, was carefully interrogated by the Commission on the matter. He was charged with weakening Party vigilance by not reporting on counter-revolutionary activity in the country, and what is more, he was also accused of undermining the efficiency of the Secret Service:

> For example, [said one of the Commission members,] the agencies of the Secret Service were withdrawn [in the second half of the '70s] from whole cities and big factories, even from the factories of the arms industry. It looked as if the Secret Service was in decline.

Kowalczyk explained that the administrative reforms of 1975, which entirely changed the division of the country, also caused confusion within the organizational structure of his department, with the result that his main objective became the maintenance of security in the most important divisions. Certain tasks had to be handed over to the ordinary Milicja (police) forces. Particularly harmful for his department, said Kowalczyk, was the abolition of the county tier in the administrative structure, since it had been the foundation of the whole security network. It was where information was collected and networks of informers established. It took some time before such a network could be re-established. But Kowalczyk denied failing to inform the Party leaders. He said:

> In the period 1976–79 we sent from our department 2,360 messages on conflicts and 320 on work disruptions [strikes] in the plants, which were not made public. . . . In my opinion both the Radom developments of 1976 and the latest ones [Solidarity] had nothing to do with the activity of anti-socialist forces. These forces surfaced and became active only after the protest of the working class had taken shape.

Kowalczyk clearly understood the reasons why information about such conflicts was not given to the public, but in his opinion the Party itself had not paid enough attention to the clashes. The Party was ill-prepared to cope with the problems arising from these conflicts. To quote the former Minister of the Interior:

> I am very sorry to say so, as it sounds like croaking, but it is not the information that is cruel, but rather the reality, from the events of 1975 onwards. I have been accused of repeating what Radio Free Europe kept saying. But what could I add? To fight the political

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> enemy one needs more than just a gun, a truncheon or iron bars, although they do have to be used when necessary. The Party must also be informed about political threats, not just economic ones, though there wasn't much said about those either. The Party should know its enemy better. Who is he? Bare theory on the class struggle is not enough. And that was why the ideological retort from the Party was insufficient.

That ideology had gone astray under the former Party leadership, the Commission itself was well aware. One of its members, comrade Putrament said:

> I remember one of the meetings of chief press editors in the Central Committee, when the major address was given by comrade Lukaszewicz [the secretary for propaganda]. He said that the greatest achievement in the field of ideology had been the creation of ceremonies [concerning particular aspects of Party activity]. I was shaken. . . . How could it be true? (Is the creation of ceremonies the goal of Party ideology?)

The problem of ideology was raised again during interrogations of the former Central Committee Secretary responsible for Party propaganda, Jerzy Lukaszewicz. He was strongly criticized by the Commission for creating the image of the PUWP as "the Party of the nation," and for making claims about the "ideological unity of Polish society." This policy was said to have anaesthetized Party vigilance and to have caused deterioration in "the quality of the Party ranks." Grabski asked why this wrong assumption had not been revised, not after the riots of Radom and Ursus in '76, nor later on, when the opposition groups became active. Lukaszewicz explained that the "ideological unity" of Polish society was assumed because of the moderate policies adopted in the aftermath of Poland's economic dependence on Western creditors. He stated:

> I don't know whether it was right to decide that there should be no political prisoners in Poland. Perhaps it would have been much better to lock up some 10 or 20 men, so that it wouldn't then be necessary to imprison many more. One can see how smoothly the Yugoslavs have dealt with such matters so that the world doesn't condemn them. But we were still afraid of world opinion. . . . I personally didn't think that the anti-socialist forces in Poland were that influential. We underrated the scope and range of their impact while overrating the level of socialist involvement in society. . . . Why did we cling to those wrong assumptions [of ideological unity in Poland] in this time of crisis? When matters went from bad to worse I tried to gag the TV and press even more than usual . . . . It was intended to be a means of defence, for forestalling an attack . . . I was convinced that the changes must come from above . . . . My point was that if the need to give someone a hiding should arise, then we [the mass media] should be ready to do it. But if there was some new suggestion to be made, it was the First Secretary who should make it . . . otherwise the suggestions might have gone further than the leadership could possibly go. . . . In my opinion TV was to be

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> entirely subordinate . . . the Party should have a monopoly on the mass media. If there is something going wrong, then the person in charge must be replaced, but the model should remain.

A similar mechanism was in operation to prevent information on Poland's debts being disclosed to the public:

> We couldn't publish reports in the press about our debts, [said Lukaszewicz,] until official announcements had been made. It was my opinion that either the First Secretary or the Prime Minister should first make a statement on our indebtedness . . . unfortunately, neither of them was prepared to do so.

Thus, the public could not learn from Polish sources about the increasing level of Polish debt. In fact, the Polish mass media constantly bragged about the success of ambitious plans for the economy while the economic crisis was in full swing. By the end of the '70s the contradiction was becoming quite obvious to everyone in the country. This made it increasingly hard for the Party to keep in touch with its own members. The CC Secretary responsible for Party cadres and organization, Edward Babiuch, was the man most accused of breaking links between the Party and the masses. Paradoxically enough, the PUWP of his time was the largest in its history, consisting of nearly three million members in the late '70s. This fact was also subjected to the Commission's scrutiny, and Babiuch was accused of "lowering the quality of the Party ranks through pursuit of purely quantitative measures." Babiuch told the Commission about the methods he had applied to strengthen the Party's "leading role" in the country. He had devised a system of consultations, particularly in big factories, but he admitted before the Commission that it had failed and had become a farce. There were also "direct links" established between the Central Committee and the 165 largest factories, but this did not work well either. Then he set up the Commission of Social Control in the provinces to stimulate the bureaucracy to work better. The idea itself was "brilliant," but there was not much enthusiasm among citizens, and it too failed. The introduction of "individual conversations" conducted by Party activists and industrial managers, which was supposed to increase their socialist involvement, was not very efficient either. As Babiuch explained:

> Amidst growing difficulties . . . the energy of the basic Party organizations drained away, the individual conversations [with Party activists and factory managers] became more and more difficult. For example, we came out [from the Central Committee] with a slogan to make the national economy more efficient, but it didn't have much effect. When we spoke to Party members at the factories, they used to reply: "Why are you talking about better efficiency, while here in the factory expensive machines are uselessly wasted, the machines we bought from abroad for hard currency? We've made a huge loss, that's what we've done." Well, we rapidly had to cut our investment plan when it got overloaded, and that's why the machines that were

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> bought earlier became useless. . . . But we (at the top of the Party) were charged with responsibility for that.

Comrade Babiuch felt it was unjust. And what is the use of such conversations, asked comrade Drabik, if they are not followed up with action? These were conversations purely for the sake of conversations! He also complained indignantly that:

> . . . there were occasions when the director of a factory decided who was to be the first secretary of the factory's Party Committee!

IT used to be the other way around; something must have gone awfully wrong with the Party. As was bound to happen, the first person called on to explain the terrible state of affairs was the former First Secretary, Edward Gierek. Comrade Zofia Grzyb addressed him with a heavy accusation:

> We trusted you, comrade Gierek. You were the top person in the country. Now we want to know how it came about [under your rule] that after 30 years we have had to introduce food rationing.

Gierek answered helplessly:

> Well, yes, I know that the people expected a lot of me. I did expect much more of myself. If my efforts failed, it was not because I didn't care. I did care very much, but circumstances were against me. . . . The responsibility of the First Secretary is enormous, but it isn't he alone who is responsible, there are other people as well. If I had had to be the only one responsible for what I am now being accused of, I would have gone mad!

But the members of the Commission were of the opinion that the First Secretary is responsible for everything. That is, after all, what the First Secretary is for.

> You should have pushed some of them to do their job [said Wronski] and kept them under control. Instead of visiting places and going to and fro, that was what you should have done, comrade Gierek.

Gierek's journeys were well-known all over the country. He was very proud of his popularity, and he liked to be assured of the people's admiration. According to his statement before the Commission, he made more than 600 trips throughout the country to visit factories, farms, cooperatives, construction sites, etc. Of course, everything was laboriously prepared for his visits, regardless of cost. (For example, a story went round about a peasant who was given a cow from the local state farm on the occasion of Gierek's visit to the peasant's private farm. When the visit was over, he refused to give it back.)

Gierek was convinced that the people would have accepted everything if the Party's necessary decisions had been properly explained to them. He told the Commission how much courage it had required to go to the miners in 1951 to persuade them to work for one hour a day longer ("they

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called me a son of a bitch and wanted to throw me into the pit"), to go to Poznan in 1956 ("when the corpses had already been gathered in from the streets"), or to Gdansk in 1970 (where the situation was similar to that of Poznan in 1956). Nevertheless, he went and succeeded.

He must have known about other methods of "persuasion" used by the Party on those occasions, such as shooting in the streets, imprisoning workers or throwing them out of their jobs. It is difficult to ascertain how genuine was Gierek's belief in his own persuasive powers in preferring them to the methods listed above. In any case, his faith in his personal charm seems to have been considerable . . . . He tried to explain to the Commission the causes of labour riots which took place under his authority (in Radom and Ursus in 1976 and then again in Gdansk in 1980). In his opinion, the riots would not have taken place had adequate information been given to the people:

> People weren't told how sensible the price rises were, or about the reasons that made them necessary. [In 1976] the Prime Minister gave a speech which was badly prepared . . . [and so the people failed to see the rationale behind the price increases].

GIEREK tried to put forward his "charisma" as a sort of claim for legitimacy, although his predecessor, Wladyslaw Gomulka, had been in a very similar position at the beginning of his term in office. The enthusiasm which had greeted his rise to the post of First Secretary had been even greater [owing to the post-Stalinist thaw] than any that Gierek had ever enjoyed. However, the strategy of the two leaders was different. Gomulka had not tried to build support by attempting to satisfy the people's aspirations. In constrast to Gomulka, Gierek cherished some hope that it might be possible to replace the terror with a sort of social compact founded on a mixture of benevolent patrimonialism and liberal consumerism.

Gierek brought with him a distinctive style of ruling. However, he seemed to underrate both the significance of the Party middle level apparatus (the role it plays in stabilizing the power structure), and the means of compulsion that was traditional to the system. When asked the reasons why he tolerated opposition groups of intellectuals in the country, he replied:

> We came to an agreement that a political enemy was to be harassed, but at the same time we tried to avoid turning Poland into a country of political trials.

Gierek's situation as he stood before the Commission was rather pathetic; only yesterday he had considered himself the darling of the people, and now his name was being associated with disgrace, and the press was full of "slander," as he called suggestions that he and his family were involved in scandalous financial abuses:

> You must decide [he said] whether you are talking to a thief or to an

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> honest communist who just happened to make some mistakes. . . . If you won't defend me [against the press campaign] I am ready to defend myself. I've got enough information and friends to help me.

Gierek saw the press campaign as a plot aimed at drawing attention away from the genuine causes of the crisis. In his opinion the situation had to be considered within the context of the whole 36 years of communist rule, and not only of the last decade:

> We sat in this very room [in the building of the PUWP Central Committee] in the [early] '50s, alongside comrades [from the Commission] representing the Politbureau, in the midst of a very difficult situation. We were discussing the causes of the crisis. Then came the famous events of 1956 [the secret speech of Khrushchev and the labour riot in Poznan] then of '68 [the unrest among intellectuals and students] and of '76 [the Radom and Ursus workers riots] . . . for 36 years, comrades, we have been dealing in this party with the same problems . . .

Piotr Jaroszewicz, the former Prime Minister also said:

> The mechanisms which were operative in the Party of the '70s, their patterns and interactions, were there from the very beginning in 1945. They have become deeply rooted in the consciousness and practice of all Party and state organs.

Although there were tortured attempts during the Commission sessions to explain these phenomena somehow, they were not very successful in distinguishing the "deeply rooted" causes of discontent dating back to the beginning of the system from those that were peculiar to the '70s. The former were not given much consideration by the Commission for the reasons stated above. However, some of the members spoke with apparent sorrow about the situation within the Party apparatus, "where no one can quit gracefully and with self respect, as is possible in civilized countries, France, for example," as opposed to Poland, where all changes of personnel are bound to be associated with disgrace and some sort of violent development.

THE Commission ostensibly concentrated on the phenomena that were said to be peculiar to the Party in the '70s. These were generally understood to have led to the loosening of Party control over the government. Comrade Szafranski stated this succinctly:

> The government must be under control [of the Party] in any case. How did the government get out of control and incur such enormous debts? Why didn't the members of the Politbureau know about it? Who in the government was responsible for such a state of affairs?

It was implied that the government, and especially the Prime Minister, Jaroszewicz, was guilty of evading Party control. Jaroszewicz was a very convenient scapegoat; though himself a Politbureau member, he was also

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the head of the state executive, and thus was presented as having made "errors and distortions" without consulting the Party apparatus, and even against its recommendations. Jaroszewicz was of a different opinion. The decision-making procedures—he said—were the same in the '70s as they had been in the previous, "normal" decades. He explained these "normal procedures" as follows:

> All crucial decisions concerning the economy, social policy, and in particular those concerning investments, agricultural policy, foreign credits and trade, were made by the Politbureau. Decisions concerning the implementation of socio-economic plans also went to the Politbureau for consideration. The governmental suggestions were highly critical, having previously been thoroughly discussed. When disagreements arose the stand of the Politbureau was decisive. The suggestions of the members of the Politbureau and the secretaries of the Central Committee were subsequently enacted through governmental decrees and bills passed by the Sejm.

This statement was the first admission by the highest state official of the Communist Party leader's direct control of governmental affairs. He presented it as normal and desirable practice. What went wrong with the "leading role" of the Party in the '70s may be explained in yet another way, as is apparent from certain remarks included in the Commission proceedings, which try to exculpate the Party. For example, Edward Babiuch, the secretary for Party cadres and organization, argued:

> Actually, there were too many comrades in the Politbureau who worked simultaneously for the government. It is difficult to say why it happened . . . . When we tried to correct this fault, there were always unpleasant resonances. In such a situation, the agenda of the Politbureau was in a sense dominated by members of the government. They used to bring up matters which had been previously settled at the Presidium of the Government or simply arranged between certain comrades from the Government . . . [so that acceptance by the Politbureau became a bare formality].

The Politbureau used to consider matters which had been carefully prepared beforehand, but according to "normal" procedure the preparations were made by the Central Committee apparatus, and not by the government, whose role was to receive final decisions and carry them out. However, in that decade things were different, and the changes did not occur without friction. Jerzy Lukaszewicz, the secretary for propaganda, said:

> In 1976 we discussed in the Central Committee the problem of how projects were prepared for [acceptance by] the Politbureau. And we strongly objected to the fact that the Politbureau considered only the government's projects and not those prepared by the Party commissions [within the Central Committee] . . . .

A remark made by comrade Drabik that "comrades from the Jaroszewicz government used to come to the Politbureau sessions in organized

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groups," sounded like an accusation of a *coup d'état*. From this, one could draw the conclusion that the government "conquered" the Politbureau, or at least, that it emancipated itself from the parallel structures of the Central Committee.

THE problem of Party–state relationships has become a moot point in all countries of "really existing" socialism, especially since they have faced the challenge of the "second industrial revolution," i.e. the modernization of their national economies. In Poland this happened at the turn of the '60s and '70s. The slogan "Let us build the second Poland" paved Gierek's way to power. On the other hand, the improvement of economic efficiency by means of modern technology and organization is a complicated task, and not one to which the Party's traditional methods were suited. The direct subordination of the ministries to the corresponding departments of the Central Committee was a major hindrance. Under tight control, the governmental agencies had hardly any chance of making decisions of any significance independent of personal-political considerations within the Party apparatus. This dependency paralysed all governmental activity in the '60s. Not only were the purely organizational demands of efficiency blocked by such subjugation, but forward steps were impossible in the economy without some separation of political from economic decision-making.

In trying to solve this incompatibility, Gierek devised a slogan: "The Party leads and the government governs." Although the slogan became very popular and widespread throughout the Polish media, its exact meaning was a mystery. Gierek himself stated, soon after launching the slogan, that the problems of Party–state relationships could not possibly be solved through formal regulations, but only by working them out in practice.[6] Practice showed, however, that the mere launching of a slogan cannot replace real political reforms. It is not surprising that when he was interrogated before the Commission, Gierek was somewhat disenchanted with his experience of running the country:

> I don't know whether at this stage we are able to sort out how the government should work . . . the main problem appears to be how to deal with particular interests. You see, if a minister is responsible for a particular field, he makes his field the centre of the universe, and I don't think much of such an approach, . . . in fact I think it's disastrous . . . When matters came before the Politbureau, each minister maintained that his affairs were the most important. It was extremely difficult to overcome [such attitudes of self-interest] . . . as long as such particular interests of different departments exist, there are bound to be distortions . . . . I don't see what else could happen. I don't think that those people [i.e. ministers] had bad intentions, not at all, but each one of them tried his best to grab as much as possible for his own cause.

In exactly the same way he had to respond to the claims of individual

[6] An address by Gierek to the Warsaw PUWP Committee in April 1971, *Zycie Partii*, No. 4, 1971.

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regions, with everyone thinking about the problems of his own province and no one considering the whole. Gierek continued his complaint:

> There was for example a cost calculation [for individual provinces], and it became everyday practice [for the provincial representatives] to establish their assessments below the real costs, and then, as you know, it would turn out that additional money was needed, then more and more. They simply lied, you know, just to get onto the list [of investments].

Gierek summed up his 10-year experience of governing the country as follows:

> Until, comrades, we can find a mechanism which can stand above all those individual interests, we are sure to have distortions.

Thus it was confirmed that no other regulation existed for the government to govern by, except that of the "leading role" of the Party. But it was asserted that this role was not properly carried out in Poland in the '70s. Certain interesting admissions on the matter were made by Grabski when he questioned the former secretary, Babiuch:

> In June 1976 [the Radom and Ursus developments in the aftermath of the price rises] we were not given the opportunity to call on the Central Committee Plenum to establish the causes of what had happened and make proper decisions [to remove the Prime Minister]. . . . And why? Do you remember, in August '76 when we set the matter out straightforwardly . . . and we told you: the Prime Minister must quit. . . . And then, at the Eighth Congress [of the PUWP in 1980] . . . was it [necessary] to call on the whole Party Congress solely in order to get rid of the Prime Minister? Why didn't you settle that matter at the Politbureau session? Were you afraid [of Jaroszewicz]?

The Chief Prosecutor, comrade Czubinski, also objected to the way in which the labour riots of 1976 in Radom and Ursus were handled. The matter was left almost solely to the government, while the Central Committee itself expressed no opinion on the matter. As a result, said the Chief Prosecutor:

> . . . so far these matters haven't been settled properly . . . we do not know what to do about these people [participants in the riots], whether they should be paid compensation or put back in their jobs, or what . . .

It seems that it was the lack of orders from the Central Committee that left the Chief Prosecutor helpless.

BABIUCH tried to explain the peculiar position of the Prime Minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz, in the Party–state leadership of the '70s:

> In December 1970 [when Gierek came to power] changes of leadership included in fact not only the First Secretary but also the Prime Minister . . . and afterwards it was extremely difficult to make any alterations . . . .

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In fact, considering the history of relations between the Party and the government in post-war Poland, one may conclude that the Prime Minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz, was the most powerful person among the state officials since Boleslaw Bierut quit the Presidency (in the aftermath of its abolition by the Constitution of 1952). The reason, of course, was not contained in Gierek's slogan about the Party which was "to lead," and the government which was supposed "to govern." The slogan merely reflected the power relationship at the time of Gierek's appointment to office. Although he was the most suitable person for the post of First Secretary as far as Polish circumstances were concerned, nevertheless, Gierek could not have been thought of by the Kremlin as a reliable person. That he had spent too short a time in the Soviet Union and too long a time in France, as well as his technocratic image (which helped him to victory in the country), would have been handicaps in winning the support of the Soviet leaders at that time.

This may help to explain the change in the top governmental balance mentioned by Babiuch. Piotr Jaroszewicz, a former Red Army officer, trained, trusted and proved for 40 years, provided guarantees of reliability, which at that time Gierek was not able to offer. Thus, Jaroszewicz became the Prime Minister, with at least as good access to the Kremlin as the First Secretary. This crucial factor explains the unusual power of Jaroszewicz's government. However, there were at least two reasons why such a state of affairs could not persist.

First of all, the art of power-delegation has not yet been mastered in Soviet-type systems, though it was usually distributed through the inter-personal power relations within elite politics (i.e. in a way which perhaps can best be compared with the Hobbesian vision of anarchy). Therefore, once Soviet opinion of Gierek's reliability had improved, the Party central apparatus began to make its claim for traditional control over the government. This resulted in the post of prime minister being taken over by the most powerful secretary of the Central Committee, Edward Babiuch, in 1979 (at the Eighth Party Congress). Secondly, once the government had attained real power, through the strong position of the Prime Minister, it appeared that, as Gierek put it, "there was no mechanism which could have stood above particular interests." In other words, the state institutions lacked their own authority and rules for dealing with state affairs independent of the Party apparatus. This can be seen more distinctly in the course of the debate which the Commission conducted with the lawyers.

ACCORDING to Communist Party routine, the proceedings of special commissions used to be summed up with the customary sentence: "Comrade X presented his self-critical view on the matter of his activity . . . [etc]." and then whatever punishment the Party thought fit was announced, the worst being expulsion from its ranks. This time, however, such a procedure did not seem to be satisfactory, not only for

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society, but also for the rank and file Party members. The chairman of the Commission, Tadeusz Grabski complained:

> I reported the progress of our proceedings at several Party meetings [held at factories] and I realized that people were not happy with statements such as: "The former Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz was self-critical over several mistakes he had made in his job." They asked, for example: "What does it mean—he was self-critical? Perhaps you want him to evade his responsibility?" So I asked them whether we should stop giving out weekly reports on the proceedings of our Commission, and should instead only provide the final one. But they didn't want that either; they wanted the weekly reports, but, you see, the word "self-critical" made them that angry. I don't know how to put it to their satisfaction.

One can understand how the myth of Party responsibility vanished. The ghastliness of presenting one's own "self-criticism" before the special Party commission, and the consequences of doing so, had lost the sinister power they had held under Stalin. "Self-criticism" no longer bore a threat to one's life, nor even to one's well-being. It is said that the "soft" treatment dealt out to comrades who happened to have made some "mistakes" was the result of Khrushchev's policy. The consequences of this new policy were twofold. First of all, having lost its mortal threat, the game for power grew more intense. Thus, tensions within the top as well as between the top and the middle level of the Party hierarchy increased. Secondly, the lack of ideological restraints (which are usually associated with terror) led to changes in the life-styles of the politicians of the elite. Access to material well-being became almost as important as access to decision-making. After all, power itself might easily be lost, then all that would be left would be the wealth which one might enjoy for the rest of one's life, and then hand on to one's children. This prompted an enormous drive among the *nomenklatura* to acquire their own personal property, often exploiting their official positions for that purpose.

The ascetic image closely associated with the revolutionary ethos (regardless of the actual conduct of particular persons) lost its importance at the more pragmatic stage of the system's development. A technocrat obviously does not have much in common with the revolutionary image. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the regime remained the same, i.e. it was based on revolutionary claims. Thus a growing contradiction arose between the life-styles of the powerful elite and the origins of its legitimacy. One cannot employ the liberal principle of "live and let live" while at the same time claiming the revolutionary legitimacy of one's power, without raising some embarrassing questions.

SINCE the punishments imposed by the Party on the former Party and state officials did not appear to satisfy the public sense of justice, the Commission felt obliged to turn to lawyers for advice as to what sort of legal punishment it would be appropriate to apply. A group of legal experts was carefully chosen to include high authorities in the field, who

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were also considered reliable by the Party. "After all," said Grabski, "what we've been discussing here are inner-Party matters." In the written proceedings the opinions of two experts are set out, those of Professor Buchała of Jagiellonski University in Cracow, and of Professor Burda of Lublin University.

Grabski told the legal experts that they were "the only hope for the Commission to close its proceedings with sensible conclusions." As there were some doubts whether detailed information on the highest Party and state officials could be disclosed to the experts (even the most trusted), Grabski suggested that the experts should give their "abstract opinions, rather than being concerned with particular persons. . . . Then the Commission itself would assess the legal responsibility of particular persons according to the evidence in its possession . . . ." Only then would the Commission be able to apply legal regulations in a flexible manner, with proper personal–political considerations in mind.

Professor Buchała was worried, however, as the rules designed to regulate the exercise of governmental power in Poland were unknown to him. He said:

> Obviously, I know something from the press [about governmental decision-making procedures] but I don't know them in detail, so it would be useful to obtain some general data on the matter under investigation.

For example, he continued, to apply section 246, on the responsibility of officials who do not fulfil their duties, some premises must exist defining the transgression of one's competence. "And here we must establish," he said, "whether or not such competence can be defined somehow." He also pointed out another problem, concerning the circumstances in which particular decisions were made:

> From a legal point of view it is fairly important to decide whether someone could be to blame for a decision made in particular circumstances. I am aware that we would rather not appear before the people now, in such a highly emotional atmosphere, just to tell them that someone was not in the right circumstances to act correctly, that within this system of authority he, in fact, could not possibly have done anything else . . . it would be ridiculous to say that to the people now, but that would be in keeping with legal opinions. The people are now crying: "Crucify him!" and I would be the last person to disregard their claims . . . [but on the other hand] . . . there is a defined power system . . . how within this system the Prime Minister is supposed to act, or any other minister for that matter, is difficult to say, if there are no other rules besides those of pure political game. . . .

Furthermore, said Professor Buchała, even if section 246 (on the responsibility of state officials) were stretched so as to be applicable to the persons under investigation, another difficulty would arise: it is clearly stated in this section that it should not be applied to matters concerning economic affairs, as there is another section to apply specifically in these

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cases, number 217. As the people concerned are charged mainly with causing losses to the national economy, the charges were really concerned with economic offences. But it was not clear whether such a person as the Prime Minister or even an ordinary minister would fit the prescription of section 217, said Professor Buchala:

> The prescription in question was not written to be applied to officials of the highest ranks. It concerns "officials who are employed at institutions of the national economy," and a ministry could not possibly be regarded as one, although its particular institutions could be . . .

The logical implication of this legal reasoning was that the economic offences committed by the highest state officials remained out of the reach of the law. Obviously, this leaves a fairly substantial gap in the legal system of a country with a nationalized economy, and with the Party in the "leading role."

HOWEVER, the situation was even more complicated as far as the Party officials were concerned. Professor Buchala highlighted the difficulties as follows:

> An official on the PUWP Central Committee is not an official in the legal sense . . . here we might consider the kind of responsibility which in the legal lexicon is termed an *abetment* . . . let us say, a secretary [of the PUWP Central Committee] who in fact had the power, is responsible for an abetment, whereas a minister would be a perpetrator . . . one could draw the conclusion that the Prime Minister is merely the executor of decisions [made by a secretary of the CC], which would have undesirable repercussions, and [with regard to the '70s] is not quite true.

Grabski then asked the legal experts an interesting question:

> . . . where does political responsibility end and legal responsibility begin, according to the law of the Polish People's Republic?

In trying to answer this question, Professor Buchala attempted to define the nature of a political decision as follows:

> For example, a political decision might be to place a particular person under arrest. The Prosecutor has the power to make such a decision . . . but there would appear to be certain doubts as to whether a secretary of the Central Committee could be authorized to decide whether such and such a person, or categories of people, must be arrested. Does, in fact, political authority include making such decisions? Another question: deciding whether a particular association should be legally registered or not—this decision certainly has a political character, and the decisions which follow are only implementations [of the original, political decisions].

Professor Buchala specializes in criminal law, but the expert on constitutional law, Professor Burda, also found it difficult to explain the

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question of political responsibility in the Polish People's Republic. He did, however, show touching concern for the sensitive nature of his task:

> We are here to affirm the humanistic aspect of socialist law, that justice is the same for all . . . on the one hand, an ordinary worker is sometimes sent to prison for helping himself to 300 zloty whereas on the other . . . I heard some impressive figures on the radio, amounting to tremendous benefits, it has to be said. And I think that whatever punishment we are able to establish according to existing law, we shall never satisfy the social sense of justice . . . . I really don't know, I am rather sceptical . . . now, it's like the contents of Pandora's box . . . all those evil forces . . . especially in the press . . . [The journalists are behaving without any sense of responsibility.] . . .

In Professor Burda's opinion, it was impossible to take any legal action, as it would have to be applied retrogressively. This none of the lawyers could possibly accept:

> We are a nation with a particular past, and of course, one evil should not be replaced by another one.

A certain comrade Stawinski tried to help the legal experts, caught as they were between the rigidity of the law and the difficulty of preserving the former leaders from responsibility, to overcome these obstacles:

> . . . perhaps [he said] from a legal point of view, it would be possible to consider that, for example . . . the Seym enacted a plan for the national economy, but the government disregarded this plan and made changes according to its own views, and the Seym, which is a superior authority, never gave its approval for those changes . . .

But Professor Burda could not see it that way:

> I'm answering briefly: if the Seym kept quiet and didn't protest, that implied its approval [of the changes introduced by the government].

The Chairman Grabski would not accept such a standpoint:

> All right, comrade Professor, but there is a certain amount of wilfulness involved, say, in stretching the limits of one's power . . . limits of competence had been defined by the bill enacted by the Seym, thus transgression of those limits implies obvious legal responsibility, perhaps not for the whole government, but [certainly] for the Prime Minister . . .

Comrade Stawinski, who stressed his concern for the law, supported Grabski's point: "This was a fraud, and it misled [the higher authorities]!" Another member of the Commission also tried to appeal to the legal experts:

> Comrades [from the government] have confessed here that they themselves made decisions which demanded enormous expenditures! Isn't it a sort of lawlessness, a way of failing to fulfil one's duties? It cannot pass by without punishment!"

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But Professor Burda stubbornly reiterated his point that even if an economic plan was enacted by the Seym, the government had the power to modify it, and if the Seym had not protested, neither legal nor political charges could be made.

THE Commission found it difficult to interpret the rules of the political game being played between the government and the parliament, neither of which has any power in undemocratic systems. The real power is of a purely hierarchical and one-dimensional character. If one assumes (or pretends to assume) that the Seym is the "superior authority" then its job is to give orders to the "inferior unit," and consequently, the government, as the latter, has to carry out the orders that come from above. As we know from other points in the proceedings, the members of the Commission blamed Jaroszewicz's government for evading the control of the Party apparatus, and not that of the Seym. However, since the Party apparatus has no formal place in the Polish legal–administrative system, the Commission tried to make the government responsible for "disobeying" the Seym. (It was stated elsewhere in the report that the bills enacted by the Seym, most of them carried unanimously, originated from the Politbureau.) On the other hand, everyone is well aware that the Seym of the Polish People's Republic does not represent the real authority, although it is a very useful institution for the ruling Party. Comrade Stawinski expressed his misgivings about abandoning false pretences:

> We should take care not to stress the passivity of the Seym [in our report], or we will be discrediting it.

In this sentence the true relationship between the Seym and the Party apparatus was, for once, made explicit.

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Document

A Small Hand-Book for the Bribe-Giver: Tokens of Gratitude

WE reproduce below an extraordinary article which appeared in the Warsaw weekly Polityka *(Politics), 30 August 1986. It conveys vividly the problems of daily life in Poland . . . and in other communist countries.*

MANY citizens of our country wrongly assume that as soon as they pay for something (there are even people who think it quite enough simply to pay taxes), they are at once entitled to everything, whether it is the polite and efficient handling of a particular matter by an official, the serving of a bed-pan in hospital, or even the acceptance of a child into nursery school or university.

However, life is hard, and in fact we start greasing other people's palms even before we are born (or strictly speaking, our parents do it, when they take the trouble to try and arrange tolerable conditions for our arrival into this world—cognac for the head of the hospital obstetrics ward, and 50–100 zlotys for bringing in stewed fruit for the expecting mother outside visiting hours). Then comes admission into the creche, nursery school, the nearest or the best primary school, secondary school, the school certificate (involving private lessons), higher education, how to find the best job, a flat, the nicest suite of furniture, a car, a joint of pork, a lavatory seat and chain, herrings, lavatory paper, petrol, a train ticket to a seaside resort, a well-located building plot, cement, hospital treatment when one is ill, and last of all, death and a funeral. Right up to the grave we grease others' palms, on that occasion the grave-diggers' —well, to be precise, our closest relatives do this—so that the funeral may take place peacefully (supply, carriage and burial of the coffin costs 5,000–10,000 zlotys on top of the official fee).

As you can see, we grease palms for various reasons, but chiefly because we cannot buy many indispensable and less-than-indispensable yet expensive goods legally (so we "take care of the problem," we "make some arrangements"). We grease palms because of the labour shortage, because within state organizations wages are low, as if the employer has assumed in advance that, for example, an official or a teacher will in any case be going to supplement his income somehow. Finally we give bribes because, for instance, Mr Zenek from the spare parts shop is also a human being wanting to make a living. And so he puts aside a tyre or a motor-distributor for those who will grease his palm.

In this way bribe-giving has become something so ordinary and so universal in our everyday life that, inclined as we are in difficult situations to use euphemisms, we have started to call corruption, bribery and palm-greasing "a presentation of some tokens of our gratitude."

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Nowadays hardly anyone uses crude old expressions such as "He who greases [palms] will have a smooth ride," or "Only a fish would be reluctant to take the bait," although they are no less topical.

To whom do we show our gratitude?

To those who perform a wide range of services and who can make some arrangement for us. The decision whether to make a presentation of a token of one's gratitude is inevitably the result of careful analysis. First of all we have to know *to whom to give it*, secondly we analyze how difficult it is to obtain our object. If, for example, we are planning to go to the appropriate official in order to get permission, let's say, to build a house in a neighbourhood where no one ever gets planning permission—quite a problem—we must be ready to pay a lot of money. In this case we won't buy ourselves out with a pendant, a ball-point pen or a bar of chocolate. After all, we will have encouraged an employee of the national administrative organs to break the law. There is an obligatory principle involved in such cases: the more difficult and risky the decision, the greater one's gratitude must be, and the higher the sum involved.

Thirdly, we make a careful investigation of the recipient of our gratitude in advance. We try to find out his habits, weaknesses and interests, to learn his mentality. Once we have this knowledge, we will avoid mistakes and blunders, and we won't lose any chances of gaining our end. We won't, for instance, make the sort of mistake which a university student once regretted. By collecting information about his examiners he found out that "the Assistant Professor is very fond of a drink." He turned up at the exam, put three bottles of vodka down on the desk, held out his registration book and said: "Please mark down a 3." The Assistant Professor thought for a moment, then took the registration book and wrote in it: "I give a mark of 2," signed it, and threw the student, bottles and all, out into the corridor.

In an analysis of this incident it is important to stress that the first part of the inquiry about the would-be recipient of one's gratitude would seem to have been correct in this particular case. But although inventiveness, supported by a youthful sense of humour, deserves admiration, it was clearly his very youthfulness and lack of experience that caused the student to forget that there are still among us people who are considerate, sensitive, and morally pure, upon whom our brusque manner can make a bad impression. It is up to us to discover their susceptibility, and then to hand over the tokens of our gratitude in such a way that these people are convinced they haven't taken anything, and so that it would appear that we think that despite everything they are honest citizens.

There are certain cases where one can boldly cast aside such scruples, as when the price of one's gratitude is determined in advance by the bribe-taker himself. For example, we can suppose that a lease to rent shop premises in the vicinity of one of the main shopping streets in Warsaw will cost 5 million zlotys, and that the price is not subject to

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bargaining. Installation of a telephone will cost up to US$500, and a hotel room in the capital 1,000–2,000 zlotys or US$5.

What does one give?

Above all, money. That's easiest and safest for both parties. At one time, boxes of chocolates were very useful for getting small things done. Nowadays a paradoxical situation has arisen—one has to show one's gratitude to be able to buy a box of chocolates which is to serve as a token of gratitude. So now we have, so to speak, a bribe to the power of two.

Besides money, practically anything in short supply is being given. To a young mother we may present flowers, coffee and chocolate. "Here are a few sweets," we stress, "for the children." Recently it has also been fashionable to give citrus fruits for children (bananas cost 2,200 zlotys a kilo, and oranges 1,600 zlotys a kilo).

To male officials, depending on their position and function—if they do not themselves indicate the sum they are after in zlotys or a foreign currency—we pay with a bottle of brandy bought in a Pewex shop (the price of that is from US$1·90 upwards). To a "higher-up" official one should present cognac or whisky (which cost from US$5–10), a good cigarette lighter, a pen and ball-point set, or some cosmetics.

Ever since nothing but bottles of vinegar have been available in the shops we have returned to giving natural products. A few years ago it became tactless to take money to country doctors or vets, or to officials on local parish councils or at agricultural cooperatives. There are still to the present day a few bribe-takers in cities who prefer to be given a turkey, a chicken, 60 eggs or half a carcass—it all depends on the matter in hand.

In times of crisis so-called mutual exchange gratitude takes place, which is also known as an exchange bribe. On the principle of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," if I work in a bookshop I'll get you an encyclopaedia or a dictionary, and you can get me a mudguard for my car so that I don't have to put my name down on the waiting list.

A subtle way of showing gratitude has been devised by school teachers and academics. Before the end of the school year, the final school certificate or an entrance exam for higher education, we turn to the teacher: "Do you know anyone who could help my son/daughter to pull his/her socks up?" The teacher then sends us to a friend from another school (or faculty), and the friend will in turn send his own giver of gratitude to our teacher. Let us be prepared for individual tuition—as it is so nicely called in school language—to cost us 400–500 zlotys per lesson. And it is not so important that our child has learned something and has deepened his or her understanding, but rather that the recipient of gratitude has, in our eyes, a clear conscience, simply because he hasn't actually taken anything from us.

How does one give it?

The best way is person to person in private. We must ensure that the

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bribe-taker trusts us, and that we aren't going to cause him any trouble.

We hand over money in an envelope, saying, for example, "Oh, you forgot about this envelope, sir. It was among your papers." We take larger objects in bags, which should preferably be made of a stiff material. This is because the bag should have the same shape on leaving the office as it did on entering. It is best to give bottles wrapped in paper, holding them upside-down, so that they look like bunches of flowers.

A masterpiece of its kind was the presentation of some tokens of gratitude in the capital of one of the north-eastern provinces. Some students attending evening classes (they were teachers, incidentally), during a break in their exam treated the examiner to a cake. He liked it, so one of them asked: "Would you like a piece for the road?" On the train home, the examiner noticed as he unwrapped the packet that the cake was suspiciously heavy. When he picked the cake apart, it turned out that some ingenious person had baked six silver teaspoons into it.

Suppose, for example, we own a car workshop. When we fix a car, we let the official who owns it know, and he then gets something for us for free—or in return for some symbolic payment (after all, it is important not to offend anyone) and when we return his keys, we affirm: "We'll settle accounts somehow."

In a situation where an employee doesn't yet know us very well—to return to complicated matters—another way of showing our gratitude can be to invite him to a smart dinner party, to lunch, or, for instance, for a weekend at our summer residence out of town. An atmosphere of recreation, relaxation, free-flowing alcohol and lengthy conversation further promote the granting of our request and the delivery of a gift in return. But, let us repeat—these are special cases where one needs to investigate the potential recipient before handing over the tokens of gratitude.

Well, that's all very well, some will say, but what do you do if you don't want to give anything, or if you can't; what if you own very little or nothing, or are one on whom little or nothing depends, or what if you are one of those who still exist among us—an honest person? Oh, my dear ladies and gentlemen, this is a very complicated business and there are many different aspects to it. But if even with this modest lecture we have failed to convince you that it is not only necessary to give bribes, but also to know *how* to give them, then there's nothing left for us to say.

Warning: *Since bribery is a criminal offence, those who accept and give bribes are law-breakers. This "hand-book" is to be regarded as a joke for the silly season. Any similarity to real characters or situations is purely coincidental.*

Wojciech Markiewicz

Translated by Antonia Lloyd-Jones

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Hungarian Revolution (London, 1957), which he helped Melvin Lasky to edit, and *The Life and Work of Willi Munzenberg* (*Survey*, Spring 1965, No. 55).

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The prize (of 5,000 French francs) may be awarded to Poles, Czechs and Slovaks who, through their independent cultural activity, contribute to strengthening cultural ties between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Jerzy Lederer, the *émigré* Czech journalist and essayist who died on 12 October 1983, was throughout his creative life untiringly devoted to common understanding between these two Slavonic countries.

The editorial boards of the Polish quarterly *Zeszyty Literackie* and the Czech *Svedectvi*, both published in Paris, are responsible for awarding the prize.

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

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